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Abstract 
Why do public discourses within middle powers often contrast with their foreign and 
security policy practice? In this thesis, I argue these differences occur because the 
content of certain debates can harm the national interest. As a result, security and 
foreign policy elites seek to reorder discourses in order to ameliorate security threats. 
I make this argument using a framework based on neoclassical realism. Neoclassical 
realism posits that structural forces guide international politics over the long-term, 
but that domestic forces can restrain or accelerate security responses in the short-
term. I use this approach to frame a typology that demonstrates how elites promote 
or demote specific discourses, depending on the issue at hand. 
I analyse cases that are not typically grouped together as middle powers: Australia, 
Turkey and Mexico. I argue these ‘pivotal’ middle powers are useful cases because 
they sit at the centre of important security competitions and are reliant on both low 
threat perceptions and highly pragmatic foreign and security policy. This account 
fills a gap in the current middle power literature, which suggests that the foreign and 
security policies of middle powers have their genesis in ideational factors.  
Within each case I demonstrate how elites respond in three different ways, 
depending on the security narrative at hand. These are: (1) deflection, where 
contentious issues are removed from domestic debates because they threaten the 
ability of elites to make pragmatic foreign and security policy and security decisions; 
(2) dilution, where rogue and populist voice gain traction, resulting in their messages 
being taken on by the centre in order ameliorate problematic narratives; and (3) 
inflation, where benign issues are promoted as these provide ‘safe’ are of political 
competition without the risking of interfering in core security concerns.  
This contribution finds these pivotal middle powers, over the long-term, behave as 
expected under a pragmatic, realist reading. But, in the shorter term I find that 
domestic debates concerned with foreign and security policy are often volatile, 
meaning elites seek to control them so they do not interference with higher order 
foreign and security policy.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The Puzzle 
Why do public discourses focussed on foreign and security policy in middle powers 
often deviate from their actual policy practice? For instance, why do domestic 
discourses towards security within Australia emphasise the threat of immigration, 
even though the rise of China privately occupies a more central concern of foreign 
and security policy elites? In this thesis I employ cases studies to argue these 
differences occur because the amplification of particular security discourses can 
harm the national interest. Furthermore, the ways elites respond to debates with 
security implications can be grouped into three types of broad responses. They can 
either: (1) deflect them, through acts such as bipartisanship; (2) dilute them, by 
taking on problematic discourses and reframing them in benign ways; or (3) inflate 
relatively minor security issues. These responses provide a pragmatic way of 
allowing public participation within security and foreign policy debates that have 
less acute strategic implications. 
A generalised approach such as this, which explores the intersection between 
domestic and international politics and uses multiple levels of analysis, is not new. In 
fact many other authors have explored the so-called ‘via-media’: the bridge where 
pragmatic security policy and domestic sentiment meet.1 But many of these accounts 
                                                 
1 This includes: Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The 
Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 03 (1988): 427–460; Thomas J. Christensen, 
Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in 
International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41, no. 03 (June 1987): 335; Alexander Wendt, 
“Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 
46, no. 2 (April 1, 1992): 391–425; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge Univ Press, 1999); Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process, 
and Domestic–Level Variables,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997): 1–26; Gerry C. Alons, 
“Predicting a State’s Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and International Constraints,” 
Foreign Policy Analysis 3, no. 3 (2007): 211–232; Jongryn Mo, “The Logic of Two-Level Games with 
Endogenous Domestic Coalitions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 3 (1994): 402–422; Jongryn Mo, 
“Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games,” American 
Political Science Review 89, no. 04 (1995): 914–924; James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and 
Theories of International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 1, no. 1 (1998): 289–313; Ahmer 
Tarar, “International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 
3 (2001): 320–340; Ole Wæver, “Does the English School’s via Media Equal the Contemporary Constructivist 
Middle Ground,” in Or: On the Difference Between Philosophical Scepticism and Sociological Theory’, Paper 
Presented at 24th Annual BISA Conference, Manchester, 1999, 20–22; Keisuke Iida, “When and How Do 
Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 
(1993): 403–426; Steve Chan, “Taiwan in 2005: Strategic Interaction in Two-Level Games,” Asian Survey 46, 
no. 1 (2006): 63–68; Deborah Savage and Albert Weale, “Political Representation and the Normative Logic of 
Two-Level Games,” European Political Science Review 1, no. 01 (2009): 63–81; Bernard I. Finel, “Black Box 
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focus on either the broadest level of analysis and emphasise the role of great powers; 
or alternatively examine narrow examples of institutional bargaining (such as Robert 
Putnam’s account of the fourth G7 summit in 1978).2 As a result, this thesis takes a 
wider perspective, and differentiates itself from existing accounts. It does so by its 
focus on ‘pivotal’ middle powers, the framing of the analysis through the lens of 
neoclassical realism, and the use of a typological approach across the cases. 
To answer this puzzle I analyse three cases that are not typically grouped together as 
middle powers: Australia, Turkey and Mexico. I argue these ‘pivotal’ middle powers 
are useful because they sit at the centre of important security competitions, and are 
reliant on both low-threat perceptions and highly pragmatic foreign and security 
policy. Australia is the archetypical middle power according to much of the existing 
literature.3 It frequently frames its foreign and security policy in the language of 
internationalism, with an emphasis on institutionalism. This makes it an important 
first case. But at the same time I find the rush to frame Australia’s foreign and 
security policy in activist terms does not always align with the private concerns of 
foreign and security policy makers. While there is a public perception of Australia’s 
foreign and security policy as values driven, the assessment within this thesis finds 
that Australia’s foreign and security policy is highly conservative, defensive and 
bipartisan. More importantly, I argue that many visible parts of Australia’s foreign 
and security policy in popular domestic debates, such as coverage on immigration, 
are relatively minor when viewed in pragmatic security terms. 
In the next case, I argue that Turkey is also a middle power because it shares a set of 
conditions and capabilities similar to Australia. In both economic and military 
terms—Turkey and Australia are near parity. Like Australia, Turkey sits in the 
middle of several continuing and emerging security competitions. It also uses 
ideational rhetoric to advance its interests in the liberal-democratic space, but also 
increasingly to Middle Eastern and Central Asia audiences, leading to a variety of 
                                                                                                                                          
or Pandora’s Box: State Level Variables and Progressivity in Realist Research Programs,” Security Studies 11, 
no. 2 (2001): 187–227. 
2 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.” 
3 These most prominent examples include Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations: In the 
World of the 1990s, 2nd ed. (Melbourne, Vic: Melbourne University Publishing, 1995); Mark Beeson, “Can 
Australia Save the World? The Limits and Possibilities of Middle Power Diplomacy,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 65, no. 5 (2011): 563–577; Andrew Carr, “Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systemic 
Impact Approach,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 1 (2014): 70–84; Andrew Fenton Cooper, 
Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing 
World Order (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1993); Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil, Middle Powers and the 
Rise of China (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014). 
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paradoxes when comparing their domestic discourses to external security threats. In 
this instance, I find Turkey a useful, but infrequently invoked comparison that can 
help us to understand the way middle powers behave, and how states in pivotal 
positions reorder certain ideational messages to enhance their security position. 
The final case is Mexico, which has increasingly featured in the middle power 
literature because of its emerging economic and material capabilities.4 Mexico 
provides a useful comparison with the other cases because it is a G20 member, and 
its material capabilities are comparable to Australia and Turkey. Yet its geographical 
position provides an important contrast. Not only does its proximity to the US 
intensify the required management of its security discourses, but it also sits in the 
middle of cultural and ideological contests informed by historical Latin American 
and European heritages. As a result, I highlight Mexico’s cautious attempts at (and 
frequent retreats from) ideational diplomacy. I also reveal how contentious 
discourses about sensitive issues, such as communism and Cuba, have been handled 
in ways that mitigate provocation of the US. One important finding is that unlike 
many of its Southern neighbours, Mexico’s tempered and centrally managed 
approach to leftist politics has acted to protect it from overt US interventionism. 
Framing the Research 
This thesis structures its argument on a framework using neoclassical realist theory. 
Neoclassical realism’s main goal is to provide a link between systemic and domestic 
levels of international politics. By moving beyond structural realism’s atomistic 
stance on state behaviour, neoclassical realism attempts to reveal how foreign and 
security policy actors and their statecraft align their decision-making with the 
realities of their material capacity. This research program has been a focus of work 
by scholars including William Wohlforth and Randall Schweller, and has primarily 
been used to understand counter-intuitive great power behaviour, such as the 
collapse of the Soviet Union5, the scope of Hitler’s agency during the lead up to the 
                                                 
4 See Hernán F. Gómez Bruera, “To Be or Not to Be: Has Mexico Got What It Takes to Be an Emerging 
Power?,” South African Journal of International Affairs 22, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 227–248; Andrew Fenton 
Cooper, “MIKTA and the Global Projection of Middle Powers: Toward a Summit of Their Own?,” Global 
Summitry 1, no. 1 (June 2015): 95–114. 
5 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: 
Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2001): 5–53. 
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Second World War, and the extent to which the unbalanced tripolar system 
facilitated his rise.6  
Other authors, such as Norrin Ripsman, have used neoclassical realist assessments to 
generate typologies of behaviours, allowing for an understanding of how domestic 
actors manage different types of discursive contests with security implications.7 In 
this thesis I take the typological approach used by Ripsman and apply it to pivotal 
middle powers. This facilitates a framework that demonstrates how elites manage 
security concerns by either promoting or demoting certain rhetoric and actors, 
depending on the issue at hand. The result is a typology that places responses to 
domestic discourses, that have the potential to harm the national interest, into broad 
and manageable analytical categories.  
Using this existing research and framework as my starting point, I find that foreign 
and security policy elites seek to manipulate discourses in ways that allow 
‘appropriate’ changes in security posture, thereby gaining ‘permission’ from 
domestic audiences.8 In this context ‘appropriate’ means the state will behave as 
expected under a realist reading of international politics. Likewise, ‘permission’ 
refers to the ability of elites within a state to convince domestic audiences that a 
certain foreign policy or security action is justified. Together, this approach may 
give the analyst a useful toolbox to explore the link between domestic ideational 
factors, and to assess how these constrain, or alternatively permit, foreign and 
security policy elites to meet the challenges of the external security environment. 
In this wider scholarly context, a neoclassical realist approach can address four key 
challenges within current research on middle powers that relies on international 
relations theory. First, it can assist in the tendency of ideational literature to conflate 
niche variables as causal in foreign policy and security decision-making. Second, it 
can help reinterpret and reinvigorate material assessments that have relied heavily on 
relatively crude metrics such as GDP and military capabilities. Third, it can help to 
identify a link between the international security environment and domestic politics 
                                                 
6 Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1998). 
7 Norrin Ripsman, “The Politics of Deception: Forging Peace Treaties in the Face of Domestic Opposition,” 
International Journal 60, no. 1 (December 1, 2004): 189–216. 
8 See Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Chicago: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 16–17. 
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(the ‘via-media’). Fourth, it can reuse and reapply existing research from both the 
realist and constructivist paradigms.  
While the ‘via media’ is central to this analysis, neoclassical realism differs from 
most constructivist accounts by asserting that material factors enjoy primacy. This 
position claims there is a downward causal relationship with high-level elements of 
the system, which shape events and actions within the lower part of the system. This 
is widely accepted as a cornerstone of structural realism and the associated 
paradigms in international relations.9 Epistemologically, this invokes a positivist 
model, which (unlike constructivism, for example) assumes that objective claims can 
be made about the behaviour of states.10  
Having established this theoretical platform as the most appropriate to address the 
research question, my specific contribution to neoclassical realist theory is the use of 
a typology that addresses responses within middle powers. I call these types 
deflection, dilution and inflation. In brief, deflection removes contentious political 
issues from the agenda, where the respective issue can intervene too strongly in 
foreign and security policy decision-making. In this situation, populism may require 
leaders to take measures that harm the national interest, because not doing so can 
harm political legitimacy. A central feature of deflection is domestic bipartisanship, 
where foreign and security policy elites recognise the security implications of 
introducing certain topics into the domestic discourse. This is visible in states such 
as Australia, where issues concerned with the US alliance or China are rarely used as 
political currency by the major parties. In fact, this is a common phenomenon within 
international politics across a range of state actors, typified by Arthur Vandenberg’s 
assentation that partisan politics ‘stops at the water’s edge’.11 
The second type is dilution. This is when harmful and problematic populist ideas are 
removed from the fringes of the political debate. These are issues that cannot be 
easily deflected as they resonate with a small, but important, domestic sphere. For 
example, the rise of right-wing populists such as Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders in 
                                                 
9 See Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” 341. 
10 For example, see Jörg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can 
Advance International Relations Research and Methodology,” International Organization 63, no. 04 (October 
2009): 701. 
11 Arthur H. Vandenberg Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, ed. Joe Alex Morris (Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 108,552. 
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the Netherlands12 and Marine Le Pen in France have required centrist parties in these 
countries to adopt positions on immigration outside of the centre.13 In these cases, 
elites have responded by recapturing parts of the discursive content of radical actors, 
at which point their most problematic foreign and security policies can be realigned 
with the national interest. 
Finally, I identify inflation. This is where foreign and security policy elites inflate 
certain domestic ideas with the goal of obfuscating practical matters with pertinence 
to national security. Generally, this involves a form of scapegoating or exaggerating 
a threat, such as the dangers of immigration, or overstressing the existential threat of 
terrorism. This is a form of political deception that has the effect of drawing the 
domestic population towards issues that resonate emotionally, but that have a 
minimal effect on issues critical to the national interest.  
Applying this typology of domestic responses to ‘pivotal’ middle powers is 
important because the link between public discourses and foreign and security policy 
is potentially more pronounced in a middle power setting. For example, a large state 
such as China will often be vocal about populist issues, such as WTO accession to 
domestic audiences, yet remain pragmatic in negotiations, as there are fewer 
repercussions for poor domestic discourses given their material strength.14 Likewise, 
in issues such as the South China Sea dispute, Beijing can sometimes be appearing 
simply to appease a domestic audience. Yet, it can do so because it has a level of 
political capital to undertake brinksmanship, something which is not available to 
middle powers.15 
This contrasts with smaller mid-sized states, in which the reverse is often true. The 
experience of Iraq is instructive. For instance, many scholars attribute the removal of 
Saddam Hussein and subsequent issues in Iraq are attributable to a poor domestic 
                                                 
12 See Koen Vossen, “Populism in the Netherlands after Fortuyn: Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders Compared,” 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11, no. 1 (April 1, 2010): 22–38. 
13 See Michael Minkenberg, “From Pariah to Policy-Maker? The Radical Right in Europe, West and East: 
Between Margin and Mainstream,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 21, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 5–
24. 
14 See Changfu Chang, “One System, Two Frames: The Coverage of the WTO Negotiations and the SARS 
Outbreak by the People’s Daily and the China Daily,” in Evolution of Power: China’s Struggle, Survival, and 
Success, ed. Xiaobing Li and Xiansheng Tian (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013). 
15 See Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive 
Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 54–67. 
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understanding in the US about the intricacies of the 9/11 attacks.16 In this instance, 
the narrative within the US that Saddam Hussein was a ‘villain’ enabled Washington 
to launch foreign and security policy actions with little resistance, and more than 70 
percent of Americans (initially) supported the military action.17 This occurred 
despite the fact there were no links between the Baathist regime and the 9/11 attacks. 
The lesson from Iraq was that rogue discourses and poor ideational messages create 
existential threats to weaker states and open opportunities for great powers to act 
offensively. This example also demonstrates why poor messaging is important 
within the middle power arena, and to states such as Australia, Turkey and Mexico, 
which sit in the middle of important security regions, and who ultimately have little 
scope to act independently in foreign policy and security terms. This means that 
middle powers, such as Australia, are largely compliant with broader systemic forces 
as dictated by realist accounts of international politics, such as alliance formation 
and balancing against threats. As a result, domestic narratives become an important 
security tool to mitigate external threats.  
The evidence presented in the following chapters finds many examples of middle 
powers acting in ways that ameliorate this type of poor messaging. In the Australian 
chapter I find the most obvious example is its treatment of China. China was once 
the focus of a great deal of Australia’s domestic concerns at the time when it 
arguably did not present a security threat, during the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast, 
China rarely ranks near the top of domestic concerns linked to domestic foreign and 
security policy. While issues such as Chinese investment in mining and property 
frequently arise, they rarely resonate in the way other issues, such as immigration do. 
I explain this by arguing that when issues that do have the ability to impact 
Australian security—such as Sinophobia—are exploited by political entrepreneurs, 
their discourses are taken on by the centre and retooled. This occurs by transferring 
the narrative content of issues that are problematic, to ones that are ultimately 
benign. In the Australian case, this has occurred by repurposing a tradition of 
xenophobia away from Asia and towards immigrants from far away regions such as 
the Middle East, who present fewer existential threats to the Australian state.  
                                                 
16 For an excellent overview of the way that public discourse was linked the events of 9/11 and Iraq in the 
absence of evidence, see Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq 
Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric,” Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 03 (2005): 525–537. 
17 Ibid. 
18 
 
Turkey has followed a similar pattern, although its geopolitical environment is 
increasingly complex and their security posture is highly volatile. Turkey’s domestic 
discourse has consistently emphasised a strong security backbone due to the 
traditional role of the military in its political affairs, but similar, generalised 
responses are visible. In the Turkish chapter a sweep of its modern history reveals a 
tendency for elites to promote threats that are detached from the core concerns of the 
state. Consequently, within this chapter, I show how changes to the external security 
environment often coincide with new sets of domestic concerns linked to security. 
Over the past fifteen years, this has been highly visible within the so-called ‘neo-
Ottoman’ security policy that emerged as a response to the unclear post-Cold War 
environment, and where Ankara has been less central to Washington’s regional 
objectives. Correspondingly, domestic rhetorical shifts have occurred. Here, elites 
have enacted a series of radical security and foreign policy changes that were 
marketed to the domestic audience by mixing and reordering a variety of real and 
invented threats. The result as of 2017 is that Ankara now prefers to promote vague, 
opaque and malleable threats such as Israel, the US, Gülenism and ‘western’ tools 
including communications technologies. In the Turkish case, the creation of a long 
menu of ‘ills’ means it can quickly refocus domestic discontent, allowing it to act 
strategically and pragmatically as required. 
The third case, Mexico, shares similar geographical and material conditions with 
Australia and Turkey, but its internal security situation is problematic, to the extent 
that Mexico has been sometimes referred to as a ‘failed state’ by US military 
planners.18 Nonetheless, Mexican elites have demonstrated the ability to navigate 
many problematic discourses, such as radical leftist politics and communist 
sentiment, which could invite intervention from the US should they be perceived as 
too great a threat. Consequently, in this case I find that Mexico has created false, yet 
convenient, dichotomies using loosely defined anti-American and anti-capitalist 
sentiment. This means the Mexican case fits well within the typology, and reveals a 
strong link between its non-interventionist and isolationist foreign and security 
policy and its proximity to the US. 
                                                 
18 Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force (United States Joint Forces Command, November 25, 
2008), 34, accessed February 16, 2016, http://fas.org/man/eprint/joe2008.pdf. 
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In a comparative context, I argue these cases provide explanatory power and a level 
of prescriptive richness currently missing when addressing middle powers and their 
place in the international system. This widens the analytical toolkit for future 
researchers and provides a defensible interpretation of how middle powers act, in 
which ideational factors are primarily a way to mitigate the emergence of security 
issues, rather than acting as determinants of behaviour themselves. 
Hence, this framework, the typology, and the cases, based on the neoclassical realist 
approach, are designed to answer the primary research question:  
How can we explain and reconcile the differences between foreign and 
security policy responses to security challenges and public discourse 
concerning those challenges in pivotal middle powers? 
Put simply, I answer the question using the following logic: in international politics 
middle powers act according to systemic pressures, but the ability to actualise 
foreign and security policy requires domestic discourses to be broadly aligned with 
the external objectives. Doing so often requires elites to reorder the content of 
certain debates about foreign and security policy to match these objectives. 
The thesis makes its case over six chapters. Following this introduction, I undertake 
a literature review that probes the existing research for suitable and conceptual 
insights. In doing so I build the neoclassical realist framework designed to answer 
the research question. This sets up the central research question, addresses the 
methodology and identifies the sources used to make claims. Three case studies 
follow: Turkey, Australia and Mexico. Chapter Six concludes the thesis and links the 
findings to the wider research program in international relations theory.   
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CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTAND SECURITY DISCOURSES 
IN PIVOTAL MIDDLE POWERS 
A substantial amount of literature exists on middle powers and their foreign and 
security policies.1 Nonetheless, problematic gaps remain, especially when exploring 
the difference between public discourses and foreign and security policy responses in 
such nations. Throughout this chapter I survey the literature, identify these gaps, and 
provide alternative ways of understanding why public positions are often at variance 
with official ones. I then establish a framework, based on neoclassical realism, that 
justifies the methods and theoretical approach this thesis takes to its analysis of 
middle powers.  
The chapter then selects and justifies the cases of Australia, Turkey and Mexico. 
Australia has been chosen because it is a focus of the middle power literature. Yet on 
closer examination it acts largely as expected under a material reading based on 
power. Indeed, there is significant evidence that political actors prioritise certain 
debates about foreign and security policy to enhance Australia’s general security 
position. Likewise, Turkey is the focus of a body ideational literature that explains 
its behaviour via cultural positions, yet there is evidence to suggest that Turkish 
security responses are largely pragmatic, in contrast to domestic rhetoric. Finally, 
                                                 
1 Some of the most commonly cited examples include Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers; 
Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1984); Annette Baker 
Fox, The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1977); Jonathan H. Ping, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Asia Pacific 
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2005); Andrew Fenton Cooper, Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers 
after the Cold War (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1997); James Cotton and John Ravenhill, Middle 
Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010 (South Melbourne, Vic: Oxford University Press, 
2011); Robert W. Cox, “Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order,” International Journal 44, no. 
4 (October 1, 1989): 823–862; Charalampos Efstathopoulos, “Reinterpreting India’s Rise through the Middle 
Power Prism,” Asian Journal of Political Science 19, no. 1 (2011): 74–95; Bruce Gilley, “Middle Powers 
during Great Power Transitions,” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 66, no. 2 
(June 1, 2011): 245–264; Annette Baker Fox, “The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969,” 
International Journal 24, no. 4 (October 1, 1969): 751–764; Robert O. Keohane, “Review: Lilliputians’ 
Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International Organization 23, no. 2 (April 1, 1969): 291–
310; Eduard Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between 
Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers,” Politikon 30, no. 1 (2003): 165–181; Carl Ungerer, “The ‘Middle 
Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 53, no. 4 (2007): 538–
551; Bernard Wood and North-South Institute (Ottawa Ont.), The Middle Powers and the General Interest 
(North-South Institute, 1988); Ken Rutherford, Stefan Brem, and Richard Anthony Matthew, Reframing the 
Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security Policy (Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2003); Melissa Conley Tyler and Eleanor Pahlow, “Australia on the UN Security Council 
2013–14: A Voice for Small and Medium Countries?,” The Round Table (2014): 1–14; Mark Beeson and 
Richard Higgott, “The Changing Architecture of Politics in the Asia-Pacific: Another (Lost) Middle Power 
Moment?” (2013); Matthew Sussex, “The Impotence of Being Earnest? Avoiding the Pitfalls of ‘Creative 
Middle Power Diplomacy,’” Australian Journal of International Affairs 65 (November 2011): 545–562; Carr, 
“Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systemic Impact Approach”; James Manicom and Andrew O’Neil, “China’s 
Rise and Middle Power Democracies: Canada and Australia Compared,” International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific 12, no. 2 (May 1, 2012): 199–228; Gilley and O’Neil, Middle Powers and the Rise of China. 
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Mexico has been chosen, not only for its pivotal role between the US and South and 
Central America, but also for the fact that it maintains a domestic discourse that is 
antagonistic towards the US. Yet paradoxes emerge because in the security sphere 
Mexico has rarely challenged the US in any meaningful way for nearly ninety years. 
The chapter ends by setting up a typology to describe the different ways foreign and 
security policy elites manage the issues that entering domestic debates.  
Understanding Middle Powers 
Usage of the term ‘middle power’ is often vague, and tends to be loosely presented 
in varying contexts to describe states of many differing sizes.2 For example, are 
France, Britain, Germany and Japan great powers or middle powers? If they are great 
powers, then what are the PRC and US? At the other end of the scale, are smaller 
states with varying degrees of wealth and power, such as Malaysia and Switzerland, 
middle powers? And, since a body of international relations literature assumes that 
states act in an offensive manner to maximise security, are most states not near the 
top of the hierarchy simply less-than great powers?3  
Unfortunately, the literature provides few clues to these questions. For example, 
Tobias Harris and Graeme Dobell have asked whether Japan is a middle power4 
while Jonathon Ping has argued that Taiwan and Singapore are middle powers.5 
Eduard Jordaan attempted to define between ‘traditional’ and ‘emerging’ middle 
powers, claiming Australia, Norway and Canada as the former, while Argentina, 
Malaysia and South Africa are the latter.6 In fact, countries as varied as New 
                                                 
2 For examples, see John Langmore and Jan Egeland, “Learning from Norway: Independent Middle-Power 
Foreign Policy,” Griffith Review, no. 32 (Winter 2011): 97; John Ravenhill, “Cycles of Middle Power Activism: 
Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 
52, no. 3 (1998): 309–327; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers; Alan K. Henrikson, 
“Niche Diplomacy: Norway and Canada,” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International 
Relations, ed. Jan Melissen, n.d., accessed February 9, 2014, 
http://campus.diplomacy.edu/env/scripts/Pool/GetBin.asp?IDPool=952#end_43. 
3 The theory of offensive realism is outlined in John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New 
York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 
4 Tobias Harris, “Japan Accepts Its ‘Middle-Power’ Fate,” Far Eastern Economic Review 171, no. 6 (Jul): 45; 
Graeme Dobell, “Is Japan Just a Middle Power Now?,” Lowy Institute for International Policy, August 23, 
2010, accessed January 12, 2012, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/08/23/Japan-just-a-middle-power-
now.aspx. 
5 Ping, Middle Power Statecraft, 104. 
6 Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and 
Traditional Middle Powers.” 
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Zealand7, Qatar8 and Thailand9 have all met the definition of ‘middle power’ 
depending on the typology employed. 
Material Approaches 
Other preferences and interpretations of the place and role of middle powers emerge 
when viewed through different paradigmatic positions within international relations 
scholarship. For instance, realist approaches, in general, question whether other-
than-great powers are useful actors for analysis. Kenneth Waltz was blunt on this, 
making the claim that it would be ‘ridiculous to construct a theory of international 
politics based around Malaysia or Costa Rica’.10 For Stephen Fruhling, the use of 
‘middle power’ to describe a country such as Australia is ‘unhelpful’ because it 
understates Australia’s place in the regional order, and overstates Australia’s 
material capabilities.11 To Adam Chapnick the concept of middle power is ‘rarely 
defined, and limited explanations are never specific’.12 Similarly, Denis Stairs argues 
that middle powers are not necessarily a good way to divide different types of 
powers with the concept of ‘middle’ almost impossible to conceptualise outside of 
material considerations. This is because they ‘behave in all sort of different ways, 
and the roles that have often been associated with them are in fact performed by all 
sorts of countries’.13 
In short, realist approaches are sceptical about middle power because they stress the 
role of material capabilities. Power, as famously described by Robert Dahl, is where 
‘A has power over B to the extent he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do’.14 Dahl’s formula has no ‘middle’. Power is dyadic with a director and 
a recipient. Of course, this type of interpretation is not new. Thucydides famously 
outlined the same principle two thousand years ago, describing the fate of weaker 
powers by claiming ‘the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they 
                                                 
7 Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power,” African Security Review 9, no. 3 (2000): 47–
58. 
8 Andrew Fenton Cooper and Bessma Momani, “Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy,” The 
International Spectator 46, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 113–128. 
9 Ping, Middle Power Statecraft, 104. 
10 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010), 72. 
11 Stephan Frühling, “Balancing Australia’s Strategic Commitments,” Security challenges 3, no. 3 (2007): 149. 
12 Adam Chapnick, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth,” International Journal 55, no. 2 (2000): 188. 
13 Denis Stairs, “Of Medium Powers and Middling Role,” in Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond, 
ed. Ken Booth (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 282. 
14 Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 201–215. 
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must’.15 This means that most rational assessments of middle power become 
exercises in relativity against the material positions of other great powers.  
Despite occupying this awkward space, the middle power concept has attracted 
quiet, but constant attention from realist scholars. For instance, as early as the 
sixteenth century Giovanni Botero theorised that: 
‘Middle-sized states are the most lasting, since they are exposed neither to 
violence by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness, and their wealth 
and power being moderate, passions are less violent, ambition finds less 
support and license less provocation than in large states’.16 
This type of assessment is assisted by Martin Wight’s analysis of the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815. During this time diplomats sought to grade powers in a way that 
recognised the ‘graduations of influence and differences of interest’.17 To do so, 
delegates from smaller states at the Congress were grouped into six curiae, meaning 
a single delegate would represent several smaller states. This, in turn, created a 
relatively stable regional system that resulted in members avoiding direct conflict 
until the Crimean War in 1853. As a result, middle power diplomacy became a 
seemingly useful way of manipulating the balance of power. This style of analysis 
led Wight to claim that a middle power is: 
‘a power with such military strength, resources and strategic position that in 
peacetime the great powers bid for its support, and in wartime, while it has 
no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inflict costs on 
a great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by 
attacking it’.18 
Wight’s commentary was written in the context of the emerging post-war order, 
where authors pondered what the role of middle powers should be in the emerging 
institutional architecture. In this political climate, countries such as Australia were, 
for a period, viewed as important actors in talks at Dumbarton Oaks around the 
formation of the UN. At the same time, there were concerns about whether certain 
emerging middle powers, such as Brazil, could sit at the centre of their own 
                                                 
15 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Moses I. Finley and Rex Warner (London, UK: Penguin 
Books Ltd, 1974). 
16 Martin Wight, Power Politics (London, UK: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002), 299. 
17 Ibid., 64. 
18 Ibid., 65. 
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problematic security regions, thereby destabilising the post-World War II order. This 
wariness stemmed from Brazil’s behaviour in the UN’s precursor, the League of 
Nations, where it withdrew in 1926 in protest at Germany’s admission–thereby 
weakening the League’s ‘global’ credibility and facilitating its decline.19  
These suspicions about middle power led authors, such as G.P. de T. Glazebrook, to 
focus on two central issues about their role in the UN. The first was how one could 
define middle powers if the UN system did not give them special status. The second 
was how to prevent bloc voting, or middle powers simply becoming proxy votes for 
other great powers, considering most were strongly aligned with them.20 
Consequently, Glazebrook argued there should be a role for middle powers, but was 
concerned that middle powers in the UN were primarily motivated by ‘their 
opposition to great power control’ and would therefore complicate and hurt the 
credibility of any new organisation through tactics like bloc voting.21 
Similar scholarship on questions about the role of smaller powers continued into the 
1960s, when an influential work by David Vital explored the role of states including 
Czechoslovakia, Israel and Finland. For him, these were examples of strategically 
isolated smaller powers playing influential roles beyond their material weight. His 
conclusion was that middle powers were largely reactive. Moreover, while they had 
little sway in larger power dynamics, they sought to exploit a ‘grey area’ of 
international politics.22 They did so by avoiding full commitment to great powers, 
given total subordination removed their ability to coerce concessions or quickly 
realign their interests.23  
Annette Baker Fox covered similar theoretical ground, using five cases we might 
today associate with middle powers: Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Spain. 
She made the following claims about their role: 
‘[Their] success depended on convincing the power pressing the small state 
that its continued neutrality was advantageous to the great power too. The 
small state’s leaders had to make clear, that the belligerents’ major 
                                                 
19 “The League of Nations: Brazil Out,” Time, May 21, 1928, accessed February 7, 2016, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,731754,00.html. 
20 G.P. de T. Glazebrook, “The Middle Powers in the United Nations System,” International Organization 1, no. 
02 (June 1947): 307. 
21 Ibid., 308. 
22 David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon Press, 1967). 
23 Ibid., 9–10. 
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requirements could be satisfied without the use of force or that the use of 
force would be too expensive in terms of the benefits sought and the larger 
dividends available if applied elsewhere’.24 
Baker Fox’s notion of middle powers advertising their usefulness within great power 
games was later applied in a more specific sense when addressing the cases of 
Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Brazil in her book The Politics of Attraction.25 Her 
conclusion was that defence collaboration was a defining element of Australia and 
Canada’s middle power-dom.26 In contrast, lesser-developed ‘middle powers’, such 
as Mexico and Brazil, had leveraged their own domestic stability when engaging 
with states such as the US. For example, this had meant the US has been hesitant to 
involve itself deeply in Mexico’s domestic politics. Therefore, the US quietly 
supported the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and its ‘revolutionary’ stance, 
despite it being counter to the core values the US outwardly projected from roughly 
1938 onwards.27 
Baker Fox’s conclusion was that ‘the cases are thus consistent with a body of work 
which posits a discontinuity between welfare issues and those involving high 
politics’.28 For example, while the Canada and US had ‘essentially identical 
interests’ on defence issues, divergence did occur. However, this most often 
happened in matters that were domestically sensitive, such as resource sharing and 
environmental issues, driven by Canada’s close proximity to America.29 
Of the work on middle powers grounded in material analyses, Carsten Holbraad’s 
Middle Powers in International Politics is perhaps the most influential. A key reason 
for this is his use of a conceptual framework rather than an overly historicist 
approach.30 Indeed, he is critical of the historicist view, stating that middle powers 
did simply not exist in the way we perceive them during them now.31 This was 
because the older structure of international politics, based on units including empires 
                                                 
24 Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1959), 180, accessed February 5, 2016, http://archive.org/details/powerofsmallstat001511mbp. 
25 Fox, The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States, 5. 
26 Ibid., 269. 
27 Ibid., 273. 
28 Ibid., 269. 
29 Ibid., 280–283. 
30 Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics. 
31 Ibid., 41. 
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and city-states, encompassed many more variables than the current norms of 
statehood.32  
More importantly, Holbraad argued that there is no consistent behaviour to describe 
middle powers globally. Instead, it is contingent on the structure of the security 
environment. For example, he described a unifocal system analogous to empire or 
hegemony, within which middle powers engage in rivalry among themselves, rather 
than balancing behaviour, to improve their position in the middle power hierarchy. 
In contrast, middle powers in dualist systems, where two great powers exist, have a 
greater role as important allies or ‘objects of that [great power] rivalry’.33 Another 
important output of his work was that middle powers do not balance against strong 
states. Rather, they display a preference for the use diplomatic and peacekeeping 
tools. Moreover, while these attempts can be framed through an institutional lens, 
middle powers, in the end, generally adhere to international laws, because 
lawlessness is not in their interests.  
Despite these important contributions, the shift towards structural realism in the 
1970 and 1980s, itself pushed by the context of literature preoccupied by the bipolar 
competition between the US and the Soviet Union, resulted middle power study 
being pushed to the fringe of materially based assessments. Of these, structural 
realism34 was the most influential, driven by Kenneth Waltz’s seminal Theory of 
International Politics, which developed the concept of Defensive Realism. This 
asserted in its simplest form that states preferred the maintenance of the status quo in 
international politics.35 Waltz’s structural realism meant that the most influential 
work in this area, including that by Robert Jervis, Barry Posen, Jack Snyder, Stephen 
Walt and John Mearsheimer, largely disregarded the role of smaller powers in favour 
of a focus on great power dynamics.36 
Nonetheless, a few structural realist approaches hinted at a larger role for smaller 
powers. This included Walt’s Origins of Alliances, which reworked balance of 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 42–43. 
33 Ibid., 156. 
34 The terms neorealism and structural realism are often used interchangeably in the literature. I use structural 
realism for the sake of clarity. 
35 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 2. 
36 Essential work from these realist scholars include Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Barry 
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1986); Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, 
no. 02 (1978): 167–214; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); 
Snyder, Myths of Empire. 
28 
 
power logic, arguing that states balance against perceived threats rather than simply 
material considerations, thereby allowing middle powers to transcend traditional 
metrics of power.37 Consequently, scholarship on other-than-great powers benefited, 
as Walt’s thesis helped to explain how and why weaker states, such as those in the 
Middle East, would cluster around great powers. For Walt, alliance formation by 
great and smaller states was important when understanding the international 
dynamics of power. Under this reading, smaller states prefer to balance against 
larger powers because ‘joining the more vulnerable side increases the new member’s 
influence, because the weaker side has greater need for assistance’.38 
Despite these advances, realist positions were challenged by the events of 1989 and 
the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union. Critics such as Richard Ned Lebow were 
quick to point out that structural realists failed to anticipate domestic factors during 
the end of the Cold War and therefore that their theory lacked any useful explanatory 
power.39 Nevertheless, elsewhere, John Mearsheimer was quick to defend the 
structural position in his Back to the Future articles (Part I and II), where he argued 
for a pessimistic European future. This is important from a middle power perspective 
because his logic suggested that smaller states would be compelled to pursue nuclear 
programs to defend themselves against vulnerabilities stemming from the absence of 
strong great power alliances.40 Controversially, he recommended that limited nuclear 
proliferation should be allowed, specifically within the new Germany, to avoid the 
‘bullying’ of new post-Soviet states.41 
Institutional and Ideational Approaches 
The hawkish prescriptions put forward by structural realists like Mearsheimer were 
not likely to attract much neither political, nor domestic support, especially within 
the new liberal democratic discourse informed by democratic peace theory and the 
End of History thesis.42 Consequently, a trend emerged where scholars within middle 
powers gave preference to institutional approaches. In the post-Cold War world of 
                                                 
37 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 3–43. 
38 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (April 
1, 1985): 6. 
39 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” International 
Organization 48, no. 2 (April 1, 1994): 249–277. 
40 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15, 
no. 1 (July 1, 1990): 5–56. 
41 Ibid., 54–55. 
42 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 1992); Michael W. 
Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (July 1, 1983): 
205–235. 
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peace dividends, scholarship based on comparative advantage, niche diplomacy and 
international engagement gained a great deal of popularity. These became (and 
indeed persist) as common ways to understand the role of middle powers within the 
international political system. 
Similarly, the institutional approaches of the 1980s and 1990s analysed how middle 
powers mixed material conditions with alternative, non-military paths to express 
influence with a focus on developed states such as Canada and Australia. 
Consequently, this ability to incorporate mid-ranged powers resulted in Keohane’s 
work becoming increasingly influential in middle power scholarship. For instance, a 
highly cited 1990 article by Richard Higgott and Andrew Cooper is framed using 
Keohane’s question of what happens ‘after hegemony’, and claimed that ‘changing 
configuration of power in the global political economy in general has diminished the 
ability of the major actors’.43 In this instance ‘ability’ referred to the capability for 
great powers to dominate the international environment under a deeply linked 
neoliberal environment. 
Higgott and Cooper looked at the strength of the agricultural export grouping of the 
Cairns Group, and argued that while a hegemon is necessary for the creation of 
organisations and agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), ‘issue orientated’ coalitions (such as the Cairns Group, which sought to 
liberalise the international agricultural trade), were playing an increasingly important 
role in underpinning the global political economy while also aiding in international 
stability.44 From this perspective, middle power actors such as Australia had the 
ability to exploit and leverage such positions and act beyond their simple material 
capabilities. Indeed, they could begin to leverage these ideational factors to improve 
their security positions in the international system. 
Higgott, Cooper and Kim Richard Nossal consolidated these arguments in 
Relocating Middle Powers, claiming that middle powers possess four distinct 
characteristics.45 First, middle powers were driven by their position in the 
international hierarchy, which is measurable by common indicators such as 
                                                 
43 Richard A. Higgott and Andrew Fenton Cooper, “Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, 
the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,” International Organization (1990): 589–
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44 Higgott and Cooper, “Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the 
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45 Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers. 
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population, economic might and military capability. Second, geography lends 
substantial weight in a regional context as Australia does. Third, ideology plays a 
role, with second tier states such as India attempting to wield influence via groupings 
such as the non-aligned movement. Finally, they identified a normative approach by 
middle powers, with states such as Australia and Canada believing in a diplomatic 
and ideational approach to the system, where they could act without force, by instead 
by promoting ideas to their advantage.  
Importantly, they attempted to formulate a conceptual framework, claiming evidence 
of three distinct types of types of middle power behaviour. One of these was as a 
catalyst. This is where a middle power ‘triggers an initiative’ and attempts to take an 
international lead on an issue.46 When applied to recent history, Kevin Rudd’s 
Emission Trading Scheme is an example of Australia acting as a ‘catalysing’ state in 
the lead-up to the Copenhagen Climate conference. The next type of behaviour was 
by behaving as a facilitator. This involves acting as conduits and coalitions to enable 
systemic change in the absence of harder forms of power. The third was the role of 
middle powers as a manager, by engaging in institution building and norm creation.  
The generalised institutional approach articulated by Higgott, Cooper and Nossal 
was strengthened by Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant’s Australia’s Foreign Relations, 
which presented a pragmatic view written by policy practitioners. It placed the 
national interest in diplomacy linked to institutional engagement, again highlighting 
Australia’s membership of the Cairns Group alongside its active promotion of 
regimes such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and regional leadership on 
peacekeeping in areas such as Cambodia. This converged with economic leadership 
in areas such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC).47 The 
overall message was that ‘good international citizenship’ was strongly linked to 
pursuit of the national interest. 
The rush by Australian scholars to use the middle power concept was followed by 
academics focussing on Canada.48 For example, Alan Hendrikson highlighted the 
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role of peacekeeping in Canada’s foreign and security policy. To him, activities such 
as peacekeeping gave Canada the opportunity to express a different type of power 
detached from military and traditional diplomacy, where it could ideologically and 
ideationally challenge great powers with few recriminations.49 Other assessments, 
such as one from Laurence Baxter and Jo-Ann Bishop, highlighted the Ottawa treaty 
to ban landmines and how these ‘politically courageous effort[s]’ demonstrated a 
new type of public diplomacy intended to make the role of ‘facilitator’ central to 
international political negotiations.50  
John Ravenhill later compared Canada’s and Australia’s foreign policies, finding 
that there was an ‘emphasis on diplomatic capabilities and the capacity to provide 
intellectual leadership’ within middle powers.51 Similarly, Andrew Fenton Cooper 
used agricultural trade as a way to find congruence across Australian and Canadian 
foreign diplomacy, finding that both have similar goals, but different techniques in 
achieving them.52 Australia’s diplomacy was bolder, which he claimed stemmed 
from its ‘historical sense of grievance’, while Canada’s was nuanced and constrained 
by its relationship with the US.53 
Nelson Michaud and Louis Belanger also took a comparative approach, exploring 
how Canada has embarked on the ‘Australianisation’ of its foreign policy, with the 
implication that use of middle power activism is a fruitful exercise.54 If fact, rather 
than the increasingly crowded multilateral space, they claimed Canada had moved 
towards ‘plurilateralism’ and  emphasised ‘heroic’ foreign policy, where rhetoric and 
public diplomacy provided better returns for interests that ‘routine’ middle power 
actions.55 
While informative in many ways, there are some problems with the outputs 
generated by these types of middle power assessments. For example, David A. 
Cooper has highlighted the issue of case selection. To him, Canadian and Australian 
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approaches to middle powers ‘lend[s] a troubling parochial bias to scope of the 
literature’.56 Ultimately, this arguably creates a narrow set of tropes about how 
middle powers use multilateral institutions and likeminded states to pursue 
interests.57 Adam Chapnick has been even more critical, stating that  
‘Canada will continue to promote itself as a middle power, but the concept of 
middlepowerhood, upon which it depends for moral and political affirmation, 
is mere rhetoric - words carefully manipulated to promote Canada as more 
powerful than it is’.58 
Critical Approaches 
Chapnick’s criticisms are clearly aimed at the third wave of middle power research 
stemming from the constructivist paradigm most closely associated with Alexander 
Wendt.59 Though it shares links with the English School, Wendt started from a 
position more familiar to US scholars—structuralism—and explicitly attempted to 
link systemic behaviour to the construction of national ideas. This attempt at a ‘via 
media’ argued that anarchy in the international system did not entail the simple 
positivist unitary model presented by Waltz and others. Instead, the ‘ontologies of 
social life’ acted in such a way that anarchy was ‘what the state made of it’.60 In 
short, Wendt reused a sociological argument, originally articulated by Berger and 
Luckman, who wrote that everyday life was contextualised and continually 
revolutionised by a pattern involving the create of ideas, the verbalizing of ideas, and 
the enacting of these ideas.61  
What Wendt did was to move these concepts away from smaller social groups and 
apply these to the state unit, finding that states were anthropomorphic in nature, and 
that the prescription and descriptions from the sociological level were applicable at 
the international level too. More specifically, he argued that ideas played a central 
role in the end of the Soviet Union. The payoff for middle power scholarship was 
that earlier literature seemed to make sense in the context of ‘weaker’ states when 
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viewed as norm makers or entrepreneurs. Using this lens, middle powers could 
transcend their material limits and therefore could potentially have the agency to 
change political dynamics at the international level.62  
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink provided a practical way to articulate this 
type of causality in ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, National 
Interests in International Society’.63 For them, norms followed a particular lifecycle. 
First, a norm emerged as a response to a need or a perceived wrong, eventually 
reaching a ‘tipping point’.64 Second, norms ‘cascaded’ and became a necessity for 
states to achieve international legitimacy, regardless of domestic pressures. The 
result was that norms became a ‘socialising agent’. Finally, norms were 
‘internalised’, and thus forming an integrated part of the social environment, and 
performed without question. 
This approach has influenced many middle power scholars. For example, drawing on 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm socialisation concept, Key Young-Son found ‘two 
middle power norms of dependency and activism constitute and reproduce Japan and 
South Korea as bona fide middle powers’.65 Similarly, Benjamin Zyla has identified 
the norm of ‘external responsibility’ as one that has emerging thanks to norm 
socialization within Canada. Its claim was that Canada is not free riding on these 
norms for merely relative gains, but rather that there are normative ‘predispositions’ 
and expectations within Canada’s domestic politics. Hence, he was critical that the 
‘rationalist scholarship on NATO burden-sharing ignore[d] the conscientious and 
independent thinking that can underlie state action’.66 This is important because the 
Canadian commitment to burden-sharing in international policies issues such as 
Afghanistan was ‘beyond its relative ability when compared to other middle and 
even major powers’.67 
                                                 
62 James Manicom and Jeffrey Reeves, “International Relations Theory and Power Transitions,” in Middle 
Powers and the Rise of China, ed. Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil (Georgetown University Press, 2014), 26. 
63 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International 
organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917. 
64 Ibid., 902. 
65 Key-Young Son, “Middle Powers and the Rise of China: ‘Identity Norms’ of Dependency and Activism and 
the Outlook for Japan–South Korea Relations vis-à-vis the Great Powers,” Japanese Journal of Political 
Science 15, no. 01 (March 2014): 94. 
66 Benjamin Zyla, “Explaining Canada’s Practices of Burden-Sharing in the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) through its Norm of ‘External Responsibility,’” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of 
Global Policy Analysis 68, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 304. 
67 Ibid., 294. 
34 
 
Australian scholars have also embraced the normative approach, especially about the 
idea that Australia was ‘relocating itself’ towards Asia. So, for example, Andrew 
Carr has argued that normative variables have shaped the foreign policy behaviour of 
Australian governments since 1966.68 Christian Reus-Smit has used a similar 
approach to argue Australian foreign policy is often misplaced, because it has not 
recalibrated to a new set of international norms embedded in global politics.69 
Another stream of research in this area is also important to middle power 
scholarship. This is where actors are perceived as more powerful in security terms 
than their material capabilities suggest. For example, how and why can weaker 
material and non-state actors Al-Qaeda and ISIS exploit great powers? Here, Marc 
Lynch has argued that Al-Qaeda has used ‘strategic social construction’ to create a 
set of norms that help maximise its influence beyond its material abilities.70 For him, 
these norms are reinforced by the repetition of certain moral, cultural and ideational 
arguments that sit diametrically in opposition to traditional western values.71 The 
implication is that smaller actors in international politics could punch above their 
systemic weight by exploiting norms in a period dictated by a US liberal order. 
Similar ideationally-grounded research also emerged on weaker, but still influential 
states like North Korea. For instance, Sung-bae Kim has argued that the foreign 
policies of both North and South Korea are deeply invested in norm creation, with 
the South using historical narratives about occupation by external forces to shape 
debates on unification. Consequently, while the two are technically at war, a 
narrative has been constructed to place this blame at external actors, therefore 
softening the path to eventual reunification. North Korea uses a similar, but more 
aggressive form of norm creation, with narratives about its nuclear weapons program 
pitched as the way to rectify the history of external aggression.72 
From this position, it is easy to see the attraction of constructivist approaches. In the 
absence of clear mid-level theories to describe middle powers, constructivism’s wide 
                                                 
68 Andrew Carr, Winning the Peace: Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia-Pacific (Melbourne, Vic: 
Melbourne Univ. Publishing, 2015). 
69 Christian Reus-Smit, Lost at Sea: Australian in the Turbulence of World Politics, working paper / The 
Australian National University, Department of International Relations 2001,4 2002,4 (Canberra: Australian 
National Univ., Dept. of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 2002). 
70 Marc Lynch, “Al-Qaeda’s Constructivist Turn,” In Praeger Security International: Terrorism, Homeland 
Security, Strategy. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. (2006). 
71 Ibid. 
72 Kim Sung-bae, “The North Korean Nuclear Threat and South Korea’s Identity Politics in 2006,” Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis 24, no. 3 (2012): 335–353. 
35 
 
ontology allows many varied issues to enter the analysis. This is also its weakness 
though, since it creates an increasingly wide scope encompassing many 
uncontainable variables. One consequence is that constructivist approaches have 
become a tool of overtly activist-driven literature. Here, the narrative scope allows 
the conflation of populist issues such as environmental failure73 and the role of anti-
whaling regimes74 alongside great power politics. 
Furthermore, the constructivist literature lends itself to self-congratulatory rhetoric 
from middle power scholars on issues like R2P (Responsibility to Protect). Here, the 
explicit use of norm creation, with the goal of normalising humanitarian intervention 
in problematic states, was the justification behind UN resolution 1973: the legal 
basis for military action by the international community to protect the civilian 
population in Libya. Its invocation led to some particularly bold claims from Ronald 
Behringer. For him the use of R2P vindicated Finnemore and Sikkink’s work, and 
successfully tested the third stage of norm dynamics, where they become a 
socialising agent. For Behringer, these ‘incredible achievements [of R2P] would 
never have been achieved without the leadership of middle power states’.75 
Yet the problem is that on close examination many of these claims have alternative 
explanations and the internalisation of norms has not occurred as prophesied. For 
example, as Jean Baptiste notes, R2P’s role in the Libyan intervention was largely 
the result of an ad hoc consensus among powerful states, which viewed it as 
expedient given the political climate of the time.76 This is easily demonstrated by 
support for the Libyan intervention, but the neglect of numerous conflicts including 
those in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ukraine, and most 
notably Syria—where state interests have been prioritised over any socialising via 
global norms. More problematically, there is evidence that intervention norms have 
been used cynically, most notably by Russia in Georgia and by the US in Iraq.77  
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Another problem with the interpretation of middle powers in this paradigm is that the 
fluidity of normative discourses means they can easily be repurposed by critical 
approaches. This means that methodological frameworks are borrowed, and then 
minor issues conflated to be at the centre of important international political debates. 
For instance, Nikola Hynek invoked a Foucauldian concept of governmentality to 
explore Canada’s contribution to humanitarian based arms control. The function of a 
middle power in a setting such as Canada involves ‘socialising other participating 
actors into accepting norms, methods and procedures linked to this governmentality 
of advanced liberalism’.78 The claim was that there are significant changes between 
governments and non-governmental actors in the way agenda setting and issues 
framing are handled. Furthermore, for him, there is evidence that non-state actors 
and ‘self-constructed’ middle powers, such as Norway and Canada, work in a 
mutually constituted way to set agendas.79 
Consequently, the push towards critical approaches to address middle powers can 
sometimes be unhelpful as it dramatically broadens the scope for middle power 
scholars and inflates the agency of smaller states. Perhaps more importantly, many 
of the middle power achievements focussed on by critical scholars can be explained 
by realist positions with sharper analytical clarity. For example, the Ottawa Treaty to 
ban landmines is sometimes heralded as a high point of Canadian middle power 
engagement,80 built upon the construction of norms and values based diplomacy, yet 
the simple fact remains that key actors, including Russia, the US, and the PRC are 
not signatories.  
Similarly, other areas championed by ideational middle powers, such as the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and Responsibility to Protect (R2P), have tepid 
support from great powers. In the instance of R2P, Canada and Australia helped draft 
the Rome Statutes via the so-called ‘Like-Minded Group’.81 However, while these 
examples of good international citizenship are popular within activist middle powers, 
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their popularity is contested, especially in Africa, where they are sometimes 
interpreted as a form of neo-colonialism. Hence, for Mahmood Mamdani the ‘ICC is 
rapidly turning into a Western court to try African crimes against humanity’.82 
Elsewhere, Ray Bush, Giuliano Martiniello and Claire Mercer have claimed R2P is 
‘Imperialist intervention [that] uses the language of humanitarianism’.83 
From another position, the argument can be made that many of the most successful 
and important conventions on weapons are driven not by middle powers, but by the 
great powers. These include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which 
both Russia and the US were initial signatories.84 Similarly, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention was concluded after lobbying by then Australian Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans, who claimed that the convention was an ‘outstanding example of the 
kind of role Australia could play’.85 Yet an alternative reading is that it was the 
interests of great powers, including Britain, PRC, France, Russia and the United 
States that consolidated the convention.86 Put simply, the proliferation of cheap 
chemical weapons by weak actors threatened to decrease the relative power of larger 
states. 
Another problem with this view of middle powers is that states such as Iran are 
commonly framed as ‘rogue’, even though they meet many of the ideational and 
behavioural aspects ascribed to middle powers. Therefore, for Anoush Ehteshami, 
Iran is a middle power that has an ‘unorthodox way of approaching international 
agendas’.87 While its actions often appear crude and offensive to Western (and many 
non-Western) audiences, activities such as the Tehran holocaust conference in 2006 
can be interpreted as an attempt to capture and control a historically erroneous, yet 
popular regional narrative. Regardless, Tehran’s motive was to promote ‘alternative’ 
histories that tapped into anti-Western sentiment can be understood as a form of 
relatively successful middle power activism. A 2008 survey found 40 percent of 
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Israeli Arabs are holocaust deniers88 and another 2014 survey found that 52 percent 
of those surveyed within the Middle East and North African region claimed that the 
Holocaust was exaggerated, while 10 percent believed it to be a fabrication.89 Hence, 
state level denial of the holocaust by Iran (and Syria) becomes framed as ‘revealing’ 
the ‘real’ historical narrative around Palestine, and this type of activity resonates 
with a wider anti-Semitic sentiment within the region, with the hope of increasing 
political influence. 
Iran has also exploited anti-Western actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah for gains in 
niche areas in ways that share similarities with the normative approaches of other 
middle powers. For instance, though Hamas and Hezbollah are listed as terrorist 
groups by most Western states, Iran has framed its support for these groups primarily 
through humanitarian language. Elsewhere, Hamas is known in the West for its use 
of political violence, but this often obscures its social programs via Dawah 
institutions, which offer services including hospitals and schools.90 Support for 
Hamas, with a focus on non-violent institutions, functions as a strong form of 
political advertising for Iran amongst wider Middle Eastern audiences.91 Such 
actions have led to a positive opinion of Iranian political action throughout Palestine 
and certain parts of the Middle East. Indeed, according to Pew polling in 2013, 51 
percent of people in Palestine, 40 percent of Tunisians, and 30 percent of Lebanese 
were in favour of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons.92 
What this suggests is that self-referential frameworks of Australian and Canadian 
scholars that emphasise a normative liberal view of middle power are missing many 
valuable cases that exhibit similar phenomena, but do not fit a preconceived notion 
of ‘good’. Indeed, David Cooper makes the claim that: 
‘a body of speculation, mostly dating from the late and post-Cold War period 
and now widely regarded as somewhat dubious, that middle powers may also 
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share distinctive normative characteristics, notably as virtuous “good 
international citizens” who put the good of the international community 
above their own interests’.93 
Overall, this contributes to a climate where middle power research seems less 
relevant in an international environment increasingly dictated by the rise of the PRC, 
a revisionist Russia, a radical and reactionary US administration, and emerging 
actors such as ISIS who proactively abuse norms though the use of horrific violence 
in order to increase their pertinence to great powers. In the end, this supports 
Cooper’s assertion that ‘middle power theory arguably is at an impasse’ and that 
middle power ‘theory-building progress is being stunted by a dearth of empirical 
testing’.94 
Realism Revisited: Pivotal and Passive Middle Powers 
Given this ambiguity, this next section argues that the analysis of pivotal middle 
powers is the more useful approach in the current political environment, as it is here 
where certain actors ‘in the middle’ of international relations have the greatest deal 
of information to extract. Thus, since the end of the Cold War it is often states like 
North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Israel, Pakistan and Iraq rather than great and 
former powers such as Russia, Japan or Germany who shape the international 
system. Yet few of these states—except for Israel and perhaps a future Iran—are 
commonly viewed as ‘middle’ through simple power metrics such as GDP. Indeed, 
geographical positions seem the key for middle powers to exert disproportionate 
international influence.  
For example, comparisons between Canada and Saudi Arabia have little congruence 
despite them both being G20 members. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has a greater GDP 
than Norway, and almost double that of South Africa, yet few authors have analysed 
Saudi Arabia in a middle power context.95 Part of this is because of its political 
system, where Saudi Arabia’s autocratic government notionally negates the role of 
ideational factors intervening in its foreign policy decision-making.  
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Instead, the overall tendency within middle powers analysis is for states to be 
pitched as ‘active’, with their ideational outputs serving as ways to maximise their 
positions in the absence of hard power. However, as noted above, the central 
problem here is that states such as Norway, Australia, Canada and Sweden 
ultimately have little influence in global affairs, despite their attempts. Furthermore, 
many perceived middle power ‘successes’, such as Canada’s involvement in South 
Africa’s ending of apartheid, Norway’s role in hosting neutral Middle Eastern 
conferences and Australia’s activism towards APEC, nuclear disarmament and R2P 
norms are not necessarily unique to these countries, or a result of some form of 
middle power exceptionalism.  
Indeed, explanations that are more prosaic are available for many middle power 
successes. In the instance of the South African Apartheid, US sanctions applied in 
1986 reduced Pretoria’s exports by a third96. This move arguably had more influence 
than Canada and then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s championing of the anti-
Apartheid cause to Commonwealth countries, a position given agency in some of the 
middle power literature.97 Similarly, a contrarian interpretation of Australia’s role in 
nuclear non-proliferation is that it has amounted to very little. This alternative 
reading suggests that actions by the US, notably the Nunn-Lugar agreement, where 
payments were made to many of the states of the Soviet Union in return for their 
decommissioning of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons stockpiles, have had 
a greater impact than middle power activism typified by meetings such as the 1996 
Canberra Commission on Nuclear Weapons. 
Alternative Frameworks 
A central question, therefore, is how to explain the role of these ‘pivotal’ middle 
powers and understand how they navigate the international environment. As 
demonstrated above, the dominant approaches within international relations research 
capture only certain elements of state behaviour well. And as stated at the outset, 
realism describes material and pragmatic security considerations in detail, but fails to 
incorporate the role of rhetoric and narrative. In contrast, critical approaches have 
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been favoured in states that act contrary to what material factors suggest, such as 
states in the Middle East and Africa, who have substantial latent capabilities, but 
have failed to convert them into hard and soft power. 
Despite the emphasis of the middle power literature on ideas, realist approaches have 
attempted to assess the same types of states, with a different lexicon. Notably, 
Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy have argued for an enhanced role for 
so-called ‘pivotal’ states in international analysis, with the logic that understanding 
the role of important—but not great—powers would allow the US to better address 
the hierarchy of security threats and foreign policy responses.98 In their 1996 
analysis they identified Algeria as a state of concern, with weight beyond its material 
capabilities given it was a critical pivot to Mediterranean Sea lanes, oil and gas 
markets, and that it represented an important pivot between the forces of radical and 
moderate Islam.99 Its importance was further underlined by the fact that disruption in 
Algeria would affect three key US allies: Italy, Spain and France. Their conclusion 
was that Algeria plays a much larger role in US affairs and possesses a greater 
interest to the US than a brief analysis would suggest.  
This could apply to Pakistan and India too. In fact, Chase et al’s analysis from 1996 
has some predictive power, given they warned that radicalism fomented during the 
Kashmir conflict could spread and become a cause célèbre for radical Islamists.100 
From their position, although Pakistan lies at the bottom of many traditional metrics 
of power, when combined with a nuclear capacity and its proximity to the PRC and 
India, it becomes a more important ‘middle’ player in international politics 
(compared to, say, Denmark or Norway). Moreover, as of 2017, Pakistan is of great 
concern to the foreign and security policy of the great powers, including the PRC, 
US, Russia and the EU, given its role at the centre of several important international 
political competitions that include nuclear proliferation, counter-terrorism, 
extremism, and energy security. In this light, Chase et al’s claim that assessing the 
reactions of ‘pivotal states strategy might help bridge the conceptual and political 
divide in the national debate between “old” and “new” security issues’ appears 
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highly justified.101 Turkish scholar Mehmet Ozkan agrees with this overall 
sentiment, asserting that ‘pivotal middle powers […have the…] ability to link 
between the regional and international issues’ and are ‘aware of the fact that a 
regional issue could easily have repercussions at the international level and vice 
versa’.102 
This approach, therefore, introduces important elements that are frequently absent 
from ideational readings—namely that geography remains a critical variable in 
assessing the role that states play in international affairs. Indeed, the notion of the 
geography of pivotal states invokes Mackinder’s early twentieth century writing in 
the ‘Geographical Pivot of History’, which claimed that the control and influence of 
states weak in material capabilities was at the centre of great power politics. Under 
this stark reading, the state that ‘rules the World-island commands the World’.103 In 
this instance, the post-Soviet states were at the centre of the heartland, but the 
emergence and decline of the Soviet Union largely discredited Mackinder’s work.  
From this perspective, a revival of Mackinder is warranted. As Robert Kaplan 
argued, geography is still the driving force behind international politics and we 
should ‘revise Mackinder for our time’, noting the emergence of the Pakistani port of 
Gwadar, a small fishing town that now commands the interest of India, the PRC, the 
US, the Middle East and Europe by virtual of its pivotal position.104 He termed such 
areas ‘shatter zones’ that ‘threaten to implode, explode, or maintain a fragile 
equilibrium’.105 
Therefore, viewing middle powers as a space and spectrum of various intermediate 
overlapping actors is more useful. This includes states that shape the international 
environment, and that are in the ‘middle’ in power terms. They include cases such as 
Iran, Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia. This importance is arguably visible in the 
informal and formal groupings emerging, including the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, 
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and China)106 and MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia)107, 
MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey)108, CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa)109 and the ‘Next Eleven’ (Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, South 
Korea and Vietnam).110 Very few of the states within these groupings are what might 
be classified as ‘traditional’ middle powers. Furthermore, few existing approaches 
seem well equipped to address how these states approach and manage their security 
positions.  
This supports Cooper’s claims about the vagueness of ‘middlepowerdom’.111 
Australia and Canada occupy the bulk of the middle power literature, yet a number 
of emerging entities are shaping international politics and do not share the 
aspirational middle power view of Canberra and Ottawa. Many of the states are 
classed as problematic from a liberal democratic position, but from a strict security 
position, many of them are performing relatively well and have considerable latent 
capabilities.  
A key challenge, then, is to develop a framework that covers a range of states across 
many ideational and political systems. Such a framework also needs to incorporate 
the role of rhetoric in security making, given that a key reason that states (such as 
Iran, Nigeria, Egypt and Pakistan) are dismissed as poor comparative cases is 
because they lack the liberal democratic narrative that underpins a great deal of the 
middle power literature. Yet they are pivotal states in important geographical 
positions, with substantial resources, populations and military capabilities. 
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The next section assesses two newer frameworks with the potential to interrogate the 
research question and the role of pivotal middle powers: regional security complex 
theory (RSCT) and neoclassical realism. Each shows promise and flexibility when 
attempting to explore the link between the international security environment and the 
actualisation of security and foreign policy domestically. 
Securitization and Regional Security Complex Theory 
Of the more recent analytical frameworks, RSCT and securitization show promise in 
helping understanding states that are not great powers, but that feature prominently 
in international affairs. The use of regional security complexes (RSCs) via sub-
regional analysis is a way to assess the role of smaller states with challenging 
positions. For instance, Suleyman Elik has used the RSC concept to link and frame 
the security dynamics affecting both Iran and Turkey.112 Andre Barrinha has also 
used RSCT to explain how Turkey absorbs myriad security pressures that flow 
between the Middle East and the West.113 Maria Lazar has similarly analysed the 
post-Soviet RSC to explore whether Ukraine was the catalyst of regional tensions, or 
rather a consequence of wider regional security dynamics.114 And Rajesh 
Rajagopalan took a similar approach when assessing Pakistan, using RSCT to 
explore why Islamabad’s impact on international affairs appeared so much greater 
that its material conditions suggested.115 
An essential part of RSCT’s attraction is that it positions itself as a paradigmatic 
bridge between neorealist and constructivist viewpoints by incorporating critical 
security logic into a more rigorous framework. Led by Barry Buzan, RSCT and the 
‘Copenhagen school’ was a reaction to the perceived decline of the English School 
approach because of its insistence on heavy historicism over practical outputs.116 
While RSCT has not gained much traction at the great power level, it has found an 
important role in exploring niche states or emerging regions. So, for example, while 
Central Asia, the Middle East and South East Asia have failed to have their security 
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dynamics better understood by structural theory, RSCT and the securitization 
discourse have notionally allowed for insight into non-European and US 
perspectives.117  
The formative ideas of RSCT were outlined in Buzan’s People, States and Fear.118 
Buzan questioned the tendency for international relations scholars to look at the 
international system in terms of two simple levels: the state and the global. Instead, 
RSCT argues that a more sophisticated way to observe international politics is at a 
regional level. For instance, a few patterns are visible regionally, but not at the 
global level. North Asia is instructive here. The power dynamics between players 
such as Japan, the two Koreas, Taiwan and the PRC are not well captured by global 
level structural analyses. When viewed at this level, different types of regional 
systems emerge, including ‘centred’ and ‘standard’ types.119 In the example of Asia, 
Buzan argued there exists a standard, balanced, bipolar style of system between the 
PRC and Japan (with the US being the external security guarantor for Japan).120  
A key tool of RSCT is ‘sectors’: an epistemological device allowing for analysis of 
the ‘referent object’ (or the security level the analyst has chosen) through one or 
more of five domains (typically military, political, economic, societal and 
environmental).121 This approach is designed to delimit and create separate analytical 
categories. For instance, scholars concerned primarily with issues like culture and 
memory can use the ‘societal’ sector. Indeed, its proponents claim that the 
‘organising concept in the societal sector is identity’.122 Traditional approaches to 
security, meanwhile, can use the military, political and economic sectors. Together, 
they are designed to create a typology that avoids the unconsidered use of variables 
across a diverse range of security subjects. 
A related and arguably more important tool within RSCT is the notion of 
securitization. This is similar to the Berger and Luckman formulation that lies at the 
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root of constructivist research agendas. Here, an idea is actualised, verbalised and 
consequently become a realised as an objective truth.123 A simple example, and one 
often applied to both immediate social interaction and international politics, concerns 
road rules. Driving on a certain side of the road, stop signs, and give way signs, 
contributes to shared expectations among road users. Hence, if an issue, symbol or 
activity is believed to be true, it will lead to its acceptance as a rule. Consequently, 
when acted on as truth, it ultimately becomes empirical fact. Securitization takes this 
approach but limits its construction of ideas to threats, which in turn demand 
‘security’.  
A central feature of the securitization discourse is its interpretation of certain 
instances of elite rhetoric as ‘speech acts’. Here, previously benign issues experience 
rapid and intense politicization, drawing them into the security discourse. Of note 
was Matt McDonald’s use of securitization to explain the prominence of asylum 
seeking in Australia’s domestic debates.124 McDonald claimed leaders act as norm 
entrepreneurs who exploit the issue of asylum seeking for political gain. Leaders do 
so by engaging in discursive shifts where specific terms such as ‘unauthorised’ 
become normalised within debates. This created a climate where any attempt to 
discuss asylum-seeking policy is automatically linked to threat and fear, rather than 
the welfare of those seeking refuge.125 
Another prominent example of rapid securitisation has been the discourse on 
terrorism, where leaders (especially within liberal democracies) have been 
constrained by traditional legal frameworks, and have needed to invoke emergency 
measures to counter perceived extraordinary threats. For example, in response to the 
9/11 attacks in the US, the UK parliament passed major legislative changes based on 
constructed threats stemming from violence that happened abroad. The Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 received Royal Assent barely three 
months later, despite subsequently being found in contravention of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.126 Similarly, the US Congress passed the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
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Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) only six weeks after the attacks, 
despite widespread concerns about provisions, including data retention, surveillance 
and the issue of warrants.127   
Other notable speech acts that securitised the issues concerning terrorism included 
George W. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech during the 2002 State of the Union, in 
which he linked the threat of WMDs to terrorism, despite little empirical evidence.128 
This had the function of securitising a wide range of actors, thereby ‘permitting’ 
military action to further US interests, even though the 9/11 attacks had few direct 
links to the states mentioned in Bush’s speech. In each of these cases, securitisation 
can, on the surface, help understand how and why domestic audiences take notice of 
certain issues concerning security, while ignoring others. 
But despite these seeming advantages, several problems with the approach persist. 
Most notably, RSCT tends to overcomplicate simple assessments. First, it relies on 
the concept of regional security complexes. The complexes are explained by Buzan 
and Wæver in Regions and Powers, where ‘The central idea […] is that, since most 
threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security 
interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security 
complexes’.129 But difficult cases such as Turkey remain outliers, being classed by 
RSCT as an ‘insulator’ rather than part of any larger security complex. This means 
that while Turkey’s behaviour—pulling and pushing between Europe and the Middle 
East—can be easily understood in the tradition realist language of hedging and 
balancing, RSCT substitutes this for a more complex assessment. For RSCT an 
insulator ‘defines a location occupied by one or more units where larger regional 
security dynamics stand back to back’.130 
Second, and more problematic, is the tendency of sectoral analysis to exaggerate 
certain issues. The Copenhagen School’s emphasis on ‘speech acts’, which catalyse 
the securitisation process, are particularly problematic. For instance, Claudia Aradua 
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has used ‘pity’, ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ as securitizable objects in the context of 
human trafficking and EU policy.131 Similarly, Bülent Aras and Rabia Polat have 
applied the securitization discourse in order to explain why Turkey had softened its 
security stance towards Iran and Syria over the past decade.132 They argued that 
policy makers desecuritise numerous issues, including those that intervene with 
foreign policy, such as the Kurdish question, and the role of political Islam. To them 
this has created a ‘policymaking process […] now emancipated from ideational 
barriers’.133 In this sense, the rigidity of the framework can unintentionally amplify 
ambiguous variables and assign them equal weight to higher-level strategic concerns. 
Therefore, while the framework is organizationally sound, RSCT is problematic for 
this thesis. Firstly, at a methodological level, it has poor control over variables, 
resulting in what Bill McSweeney termed an ‘objectivist theory with relativist 
consequences’.134 Secondly, the emphasis on ‘speech acts’ where elite rhetoric alone 
is equated with action is open to selection bias. This is especially so in states like 
Turkey, where cultural and historical narratives are frequently invoked as 
explanations for its foreign policy choices.135 
Neoclassical Realism 
It is here that neoclassical realism fares better conceptually. This is because it 
presents clearer causal inference between capacities and constraints. Under this 
reading, material pressures are the main feature of international politics, and they 
shape and constrain the foreign and security policy choices available to elites. 
Reordering the context of public foreign policy discourse is therefore a critical tool 
in responding appropriately to material pressures. The benefit of this, compared to 
other approaches such as securitization, is that the Waltzian notion of the ‘black box’ 
acts as an isolating container for myriad variables. This means that structural level 
analysis can draw on the well-formed research of scholars such as Waltz, Walt and 
                                                 
131 Claudia Aradau, “The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words: Risk and Pity in the Securitisation of Human 
Trafficking,” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 33, no. 2 (2004): 251. 
132 Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s 
Relations with Syria and Iran,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 5 (2008): 497. 
133 Ibid., 511. 
134 Bill McSweeney, “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,” Review of International Studies 
22, no. 01 (1996): 81–93. 
135 For examples, see Bahar Rumelili, “Negotiating Europe: EU-Turkey Relations from an Identity Perspective,” 
Insight Turkey 10, no. 1 (2008): 97–110; Senem Aydin-Düzgit, Constructions of European Identity: Debates 
and Discourses on Turkey and the EU (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Pinar Bilgin, “The 
Politics of Studying Securitization? The Copenhagen School in Turkey,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 4–5 (August 
1, 2011): 399–412. 
49 
 
Mearsheimer, while seeking answers inside the ‘box’, using logic informed by both 
qualitative and quantitative assessments operating at multiple levels of analysis, and 
from a variety of research streams.136 
Despite these benefits, neoclassical realism, in its current state, remains a broad and 
unrefined research program. Its main value thus far has been in assessing the role of 
elites in great power politics, such as during the collapse of the Soviet Union, where 
both clear international and domestic dynamics were at work.137 It is less successful, 
though, when generating taxonomies to describe elite responses in smaller states 
when security dynamics are in flux. In other words, while it describes how and why 
elites act, it fails to provide broad descriptions of the way elites manage internal 
narratives if their systemic positions are relatively weak to start with.  
At the same time, neoclassical realism shares many of the same goals of RSCT: it 
attempts to reconcile international structural logic while also accessing explanations 
for behaviour within states when assessing security. Hence, Gideon Rose claimed 
that ‘neoclassical realists occupy a middle ground between pure structural theorists 
and constructivists’.138 Indeed, the broad claim of neoclassical realism is that 
structural and material capabilities dictate the long-term security posture of the state, 
but these need to be filtered through several domestic variables before they are 
actualised. Thus, a number of domestic level variables, including domestic political 
culture, leadership and identities can shape short-term decision-making, but not 
dictate long-term foreign policy responses. From this perspective, neoclassical 
realism competes with RSCT as an attempt to understand states as differentiated 
units within a systemic context.  
Gideon Rose first described the emerging research program as neoclassical realism 
in a 1998 World Politics article.139 The key claim was that the interface between the 
state behaviour and foreign policy—or as Rose termed it, ‘the transmission belt’—
was not something that occurs without friction. He stated that ‘foreign policy choices 
are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of 
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relative power that matter’.140 The failure to correlate these concerns was because 
‘over the short to medium term countries foreign policies may not necessarily track 
objective material power trends closely or continuously’.141  
This leads to the core claim of neoclassical realism. States will generally act in 
accordance with structural realists’ expectations of power over the longer term, but 
their responses are contingent on elites and patterns of domestic politics within the 
state. This is because ‘leaders and elites do not always have complete freedom to 
extract and direct national resources as they might wish’.142 Thus, neoclassical 
realism is an attempt to reconcile the neorealist tradition of scholars such as Waltz, 
Walt, Mearsheimer and Jack Snyder, with those who have emphasised innenpolitik 
and domestic foreign policy analysis, such as Richard Rosecrance, Joe Hagan and 
Andrew Moravscik.143  
Overall, Rose defined neoclassical realism as the following: 
‘It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and 
systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its 
adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is 
driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and 
specifically by its relative power capabilities. This is why they are realist. 
They argue further, however that the impact of such power capabilities on 
foreign policy in indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be 
translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are 
neoclassical’.144 
Rose identified four texts as representative of this new area: Randall Schweller’s 
Deadly Imbalances,145 Thomas J. Christensen’s Useful Adversaries,146 Fareed 
Zakaria’s From Wealth to Power147 and The Elusive Balance by William 
Wohlforth.148 As summarised in Deadly Imbalances, Schweller challenged the claim 
that the rise of Adolf Hitler was a ‘necessary and sufficient condition for the 
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[...Second World…] War’.149 At the same time he also rejected ‘geographic 
determinism’ that posited the inevitability of conflict because of ‘structural 
imbalances’.150 Instead, he presented a middle ground, where structure is a 
‘permissive cause of action’.151 His core claim was that structural conditions ‘let’ 
rather than ‘make’ things happen.152 Zakaria and Christensen both extended this 
notion of permission, viewing states as often reticent to make change. For them, 
‘shocks’ allow unresolved structural conditions to be corrected.  
For Zakaria, elites have used strategies to control ‘state power’ at a domestic level in 
order to achieve their international level goals successfully. He calls this ‘state-
centred realism’.153 In doing so, he argues domestic variables ‘can be introduced into 
a systemic theory ‘without undermining the theory’s basic premise’.154 In short, he 
claimed that ‘capabilities shape intentions’ rather than strictly determine them.155 
Indeed, this addresses some of the problems of defensive realism, which has largely 
ignored outliers in state behaviour, and passed them off as ‘lessons’ that play out 
over the long-term.156 
Even from a critical position that accepts the socialisation of states, neoclassical 
realism is useful because it clearly constrains those variables within a material 
framework. While Thomas Christensen is sometimes ‘claimed’ by constructivist 
scholars, works such as Useful Adversaries firmly sit within a neoclassical realist 
position because they can explore how leaders use and shape low level issues to 
enable longer-term strategic and security goals.  
Christensen’s work demonstrates this in US policy towards the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) during 1947 to 1950 and the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis.157 In the first 
instance, the Truman administration was facing internal resistance to American 
military commitments, which were likely to increase, given the reduction of British 
power in the aftermath of Second World War, with the US needing to commit to 
containment of the Soviet Union on both the European and Asian fronts. Christensen 
claimed that Truman turned to ideology (or fear of it) to justify US security 
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considerations to a domestic audience.158 In his second key argument, Christensen 
claimed that the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 was a way for Chinese authorities to 
justify the internal rebalancing of resources to enable the Great Leap Forward159. In 
sum, this meant that the domestic inflation of a ‘crisis’ created the rationale for 
Chinese elites to modernise.  
The overall approach of using two levels of analysis—the international versus 
domestic—is not in itself new. James Rosenau famously explored the phenomenon 
of ‘linkage politics’ in 1969, arguing that systemic pressures guide the international 
system, while internal politics respond to the pressures in their own unique ways.160 
In a similar manner, Andrew Moravcsik’s notion of liberal intergovernmentalism 
laid out the benefits of two-level bargaining in the context of the EU. By setting 
‘credible’ common policies, he argued that elites were ‘strengthening domestic 
agenda-setting power’.161 
Perhaps the most well-known example of scholarship exploring the domestic-
international nexus is Robert Putnam’s notion of ‘two-level games’.162 This essay 
explored how during the 1970s oil crisis policy makers and diplomats at the Bonn 
Summit Conference balanced a number of diverse and pressing domestic and 
international concerns simultaneously. His thesis was that states were far from 
unitary actors, with elites such as Carter constrained in their international actions by 
a number of domestic political limitations. According to Putnam, ‘unlike state-
centric theories, the two-level approach recognises the inevitability of domestic 
conflict about what the “national interest” requires’.163 Thus, domestic level politics 
affected bargaining at the international level, while domestic opposition to 
international level agreements could alter outcomes. Finally, the quality of the 
negotiator (or ‘elite’) could influence outcomes.  
This understanding is helpful for immediate domestic contests, and explains US 
resistance to certain treaties, such as those focussed on climate change and weapons 
control, but it fails to explain longer term of state responses to security challenges. 
                                                 
158 Ibid., 32–76. 
159 Ibid., 194–241. 
160 See James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems 
(New York, NY: Free Press, 1969). 
161 Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
Approach,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 4 (December 1, 1993): 507. 
162 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.” 
163 Ibid., 460. 
53 
 
At the same time, neoclassical realism’s grounding in structural logic is 
complementary given that it allows for a broader sweep of historical events, thereby 
permitting analysis of wider patterns of interplay between the domestic and 
international. 
This is evident in neoclassical realism’s roots, which were employed to assess the 
end of the Cold War. It allowed researchers to analyse the decline of the Soviet 
Union over a longer time frame and contextualise the rapid changes that occurred at 
the end of the 1980s. From this position, empirical data concerning the economic and 
political conditions of the Soviet Union demonstrated that changes to the domestic 
discourse were a way to respond to the realities of the poor fiscal environment, rather 
than a sudden embrace of liberal narratives.  
William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks articulated these links between the domestic 
and international levels in the Soviet case.164 In the USSR, decision makers were 
often opposed to reform, but the material realities of the situation ‘undercut the 
ability of Gorbachev’s critics to come up with a compelling general foreign policy 
alternative’.165 Their conclusion was that: 
‘scholars who focus on ideas need to consider more carefully whether the 
origins and impact of the intellectual shifts they highlight are endogenous to 
a changing material environment’.166 
This logic is equally important, if not more so, to middle powers given that idea 
entrepreneurs (both local and abroad) can have a great impact on states with weak or 
declining material positions. For instance, some interpretations of the 2013 Ukraine 
crisis view it as driven by rhetoric from abroad, and specifically fears from Russia 
about NATO expansion. Under this reading, Russian actions were a way to counter 
NATO expansionism, rather than behaviour solely engendered in Ukraine itself.167  
Another example is the Falklands War between the UK and Argentina, where the 
Argentinian leadership used aggressive rhetoric on foreign policy to consolidate 
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domestic power. The result was pursuit of a fruitless war against a nuclear adversary 
that resulted in a European Community (EC) embargo on arms exports, while also 
initiating a debt crisis and economic stagnation, weakening Argentina’s overall 
security position.168  
From this position, there is great potential in exploring a framework that can explain 
how middle powers respond and balance their domestic and international concerns. 
And yet despite these apparent benefits, critics such as Legro and Moravcsik have 
claimed the neoclassical realist approach has suffered from ‘theoretical 
indeterminacy’ and that it has relied on ad hoc interpretations of domestic 
variables.169 However, Brian Rathbun has countered these criticisms by noting that 
neoclassical realism needs to be understood in ‘directional terms’ when assessing the 
international-domestic nexus, with external material factors paramount.170 This 
contrasts with the bidirectional models that both liberals and constructivists use, in 
which the two levels of politics are perceived to be mutually constitutive. 
This differentiation helps gives the neoclassical realist framework analytical clarity. 
And in a middle power setting, neoclassical realism allows for explanations 
regarding responses that are typically described by neoliberal scholars. For example, 
in A Rose by Any Other Name Rathbun has further challenged the criticism of 
neoclassical realism from John Vasquez, Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik,171 
who claimed that neoclassical realism is effectively liberal because it ‘utilises 
variations in state-society relations as key explanatory factors’.172 Instead, Rathbun 
suggested that neoclassical realism presented a clear alternative to ideational 
frameworks. This is because ideational frameworks were inherently activist and 
therefore flawed when used in a prescriptive manner. 
Rathbun’s most important claim, though, was that ‘if leaders veer too much into 
constructivism they are punished by the system’.173 This underpins much of the 
neoclassical logic, where systemic pressures will ultimately prevail when played out 
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over the long-term as policy mistakes are corrected, and elites are forced to align 
their domestic positions with the material realities. In the simplest sense, state 
overexpansion and over-commitment because of poor rhetoric will result in systemic 
punishment. This echoes Waltz’s claim that states ‘are likely to be rewarded for 
behavior that is responsive to structural pressures and punished for behavior that is 
not’.174 
Building a Neoclassical Realist Framework to Understand Pivotal Middle 
Powers  
How, then, can we build a framework that best explains the role of middle powers 
and their important role in the international environment without resorting to the 
problems of falling back on great power-centric assessments, or alternatively, 
assessments that overstate domestic variables? One way is to test a range of middle 
powers that do not neatly fit within the liberal democratic category. This means 
incorporating a range of states that have different variables, including geography, 
economics, military power, which can be then used to contextualise ideational 
factors. 
I argue the neoclassical approach can answer these questions, and is the most 
instructive for assessing middle powers. This is especially so for those that practise 
middle power diplomacy, or ‘niche’ diplomacy heavily influenced by ideas and 
‘good international citizenship’. An orthodox position is that few downsides exist 
from the global policy that middle powers such as Australia pursue: this includes 
broad activist issues such as whaling, climate change, and nuclear disarmament. In 
contrast, when elites act too assertively, and on topics too close to the core of their 
security concerns, problems can arise. The PRC is instructive here, where leaders 
often order and dictate the ideas that are fed down to the domestic audience. In this 
case, it does so via a narrative that paints Western democracies as hostile forces, and 
associated concepts such as democracy and freedom as instruments designed to 
facilitate chaos.175 However, sometimes this use of ideas can become problematic. 
This was demonstrated when Beijing’s leaders used hawkish rhetoric towards Taipei 
in the run-up to the 1996 Taiwanese election. What was initially a simple attempt at 
coercive diplomacy was amplified by a ‘hyper-sovereignty’ norm, leading to the 
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PRC threatening the use of force, then then forced into a humiliating retreat after the 
US flexed its military might.176 
In fact, the PRC’s behaviour fits neatly in a theoretical framework articulated by 
Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu under the idea of ‘rightful resistance’. Here, emerging 
actors ‘accept’ a hegemon only through specific domains, such as military and 
economic ones, and instead challenge these hegemons via a narrow range of 
international areas to achieve safe relative gains.177 The conclusion is that emerging 
actors will place a greater emphasis on ideas, both positive and negative. In the 
PRC’s case, this allowed a heightened level of conflict to emerge around empirically 
small issues such as the Senkaku Islands and issues such as the publication of 
Japanese textbooks that whitewashed the extent of Second World War atrocities by 
Japanese soldiers in Manchuria. In turn, these led to greater levels of threat 
perception, which in turn put pressure on Chinese leaders to create responses in 
order to legitimise their political authority.  
Other authors, such as Jennifer Sterling-Folker have explained similar phenomena in 
the context of relations between Beijing and Taipei. For her, neoclassical realism 
unravels paradoxes within neoliberal perspectives about cross-strait tensions 
between Taipei and Beijing (where antagonisms have continued despite increasing 
economic entwinement since the 1990s).178 She has claimed that democratisation in 
Taiwan has opened the domestic political environment to ideational factors. Political 
entrepreneurs, in turn, sought to use the construction of a Taiwanese identity and its 
place in the hierarchy of Taiwanese politics as a bargaining point concerning cross-
strait relations. 
This type of analytical output means the neoclassical realist framework provides an 
excellent starting point from which to answer several questions. It can capture broad 
power shifts, as Wohlforth and Brooks demonstrated in the case of the Soviet 
Union’s dissolution. It can capture how the PRC uses alternative channels, such as 
contests focused on weaker states, to challenge US hegemony as outlined by 
Schweller and Pu. Furthermore, the contributions highlighted above by Rathbun and 
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Sterling-Folker demonstrated how material constraints can control the position and 
hierarchy of certain ideas within domestic debates. 
Nonetheless, neoclassical realism still lacks a rich typology to describe these internal 
factors and compare them across cases. John Mearsheimer did attempt a loosely 
defined extension of the neoclassical realist framework in Why Leaders Lie, by 
identifying seven kinds of lies leaders use to generate public support to address 
underlying security dynamics. These are interstate lies, fear mongering, strategic 
cover-ups, nationalist mythmaking, social imperialism and ignoble cover-ups.179 For 
instance, he categorised the Gulf of Tonkin incident as fear mongering, whereby a 
falsified attack on US forces was used by President Lyndon Johnston to justify 
military action in Vietnam. These laid the foundation for the full commitment of US 
forces to the region. Other examples of fear mongering included Donald Rumsfeld’s 
‘evidence’ that Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein were close allies, in an 
attempt to justify US actions in the second Gulf War.180 In contrast, nationalist 
mythmaking is ‘essential for building and maintaining a viable nation-state’ and 
‘lies’ work well here because ‘common people have a hunger for […national…] 
myths’.181 Nevertheless, and unfortunately, many of Mearsheimer’s assessments are 
crude and short. More pertinently, many of the types Mearsheimer identifies are US-
centric, and contingent on a state that can act in a proactive security manner, as 
opposed to the reactive way many middle powers behave. 
A more nuanced approach can be found in the work of Norrin Ripsman. In The 
Politics of Deception: Forging Peace Treaties in the Face of Domestic Opposition, 
he extended neoclassical realism using a typology in order to demonstrate how elites 
can smooth obstacles to making foreign policy through deceitful tactics. Ripsman 
presented a triad of elite strategies: hiding, misleading and blaming. These act to 
manipulate and diffuse domestic opposition to contentious issues such as peace 
treaties.182 For instance, in one example, populist domestic sentiment in the United 
Kingdom (UK) after the First World War demanded vengeance via heavy 
reparations from Germany. At the same time, Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
was privately concerned excessive demands ‘might drive Germany to 
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Bolshevism’.183 As a result, a number of strategies were used to separate public 
discourse and wider security driven concerns. Notably, Lloyd George lobbied for the 
inclusion of terms in the Versailles Treaty, such as ‘war guilt’, that formally 
attributed war costs to Germany in a way that satisfied domestic voices. At the same 
time, a complete reparation figure was not finalised until 1921, when the reparations 
debate has subsided in domestic debates. In the end, Ripsman claimed ‘Lloyd 
George’s strategy was to make purely cosmetic public concessions’.184  
The three types presented by Ripsman are more managed and controlled than 
Mearsheimer’s framework. Furthermore, his description of Britain at a conflict 
averse period better describes the defensive model of security that middle powers 
often pursue. Overall, this suggests the use of a typology, when combined with 
neoclassical realist logic, offers to shed light on the research question. Given the 
advantages of neoclassical realism identified above, it has great potential in 
understanding the differences between foreign policy responses to security issues 
and public discourses in a middle power setting. Nonetheless, the theory requires 
retooling to suit a middle power analysis. As a result, the following section builds an 
operational version of neoclassical realism for use in a middle power setting, using a 
typology of elite strategies. 
Deflection 
The framework and subsequent typology presented in this next section attempts 
break down and capture the broad processes at play when elites rearrange domestic 
discourses in order to respond to external challenges. The first response to external 
pressures occurs when elites engage in the deflection of issues critical to national 
security away from the domestic discourse. The more intense the threat, the riskier it 
becomes to introduce the topic into the public discourse, lest it become the focus of 
populism. In this situation, bipartisanship and non-politicisation on national security 
issues are common.  
This response is visible across a range of states. For example, German foreign policy 
towards Russia has enjoyed quiet bipartisan support since 1991. This is typified by 
the fact that as of 2017, German Frank-Walter Steinmeier from the centre-left Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) is acting as foreign minister, while Chancellor Angela 
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Merkel is a member of the Centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU). One 
explanation is that Germany’s semi-consociationalism relies on bipartisanship. But 
as Alexander Rahr points out, the comprehensive degree of cooperation between 
Germany and Russia on security issues—despite their problematic history—is 
surprising.185 Elsewhere, as Tuomas Forsberg notes, this tradition is strongly linked 
to pragmatic factors, such as energy considerations, while there is a hesitancy to 
politicise potential Russian threats, even in the aftermath of the Ukrainian Crisis. In 
that example, Merkel has condemned Russian actions as against international law, 
yet maintained that the security relationship between the two states had not 
changed.186 
Elsewhere, autocratic powers such as Iran and North Korea can deflect message 
much easier than democracies by virtue of their ability to engage in censorship. 
Hence, messages in Iran relating to the economy and sanctions are kept away from 
domestic audiences, resulting in paradoxical domestic positions, where most 
Iranian’s perceive their economy as average to good, despite living standards 
declining.187 A 2011 survey on this topic also found that ‘opposition to U.S. interests 
and the pursuit of a nuclear civilian and (possibly) nuclear weapon capability were 
supported by a significant portion of the Iranian population’,188 meaning: 
‘[the] extent of popular support for Iranian government policies revealed by 
respondents may be due to the Islamic Republic’s consistent efforts to sway 
public opinion through its control of most forms of media’.189 
Similar responses are found in North Korea, which will rarely challenge the PRC in 
its internal messages because this presents an immediate security threat. Thus while 
the formal press agency of North Korea, the Korean Central News Agency 
constantly refers to the US as hostile, there are no critical comments of Beijing.190 
This is in contrast to the PRC, which will rebuke North Korea on issues such as 
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nuclear weapons when it is in its interest to do so.191 The corollary of deflection is 
that on defence and security policy, a number of states variously described as middle 
powers, across different types of political systems are hesitant to invoke issues 
sensitive to security in domestic debates.  
Dilution 
A second potential response to problematic discourse with security implications is 
dilution. Here, established entities move rogue actors and political entrepreneurs 
towards the centre of policy debates to moderate their contributions to the domestic 
foreign policy discourse. This type of response is arguably visible in Israel, where 
Avigdor Lieberman, a right-wing populist, entered the Knesset in 2006 after his 
party received 9 percent of the vote.192 In this instance, his message was moderated 
by a move to the centre after an electoral alliance between the centrist Kadima and 
right wing Yisrael Beiteinu. In the case of Israel, intense sets of external pressures 
require the broad security consensus of a number of actors. As such, elites engage 
‘rogue’ messengers, such as Lieberman, to segregate their public discourse from 
their ‘private’ understanding of security. Indeed, a Washington Post article claimed 
Washington has ignored Lieberman’s rhetoric and acknowledges its domestic role, 
while at a pragmatic level US secretaries of state deal almost exclusively with Israeli 
Prime Minister rather than the foreign minister.193  
In fact, the rationale for dilution is well described in the existing literature. For 
example, George Kennan warned that public opinion was not always useful, 
claiming that: 
‘what purports to be public opinion in most countries that consider 
themselves to have popular governments is often not really the consensus of 
the feelings of the mass of the people at all but rather the expression of the 
interests of special highly vocal minorities—politicians, commentators, and 
publicity—seekers of all sorts’.194 
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In a similar manner, Hans Morgenthau stressed ‘the Government is the leader of 
public opinion, not its slave’.195 And in this respect an excellent summary of 
Morgenthau’s wider sentiment has been presented by Lowell Gustafson, who stated 
that ‘Morgenthau wants diplomats to have protective buffers from the howling mobs 
who love heroes, not horse trading’.196 
Inflation 
A third elite response occurs when elites publicly focus on benign threats with the 
goal of obfuscating higher order threats. We can call this inflation. One common 
technique here is scapegoating. Inflammatory rhetoric is used against certain actors 
unlikely, or alternatively too weak, to react to hyperbolic language. As a result, elite 
responses tend to focus on weak and abstract threats such as immigrants, ethnic 
groups and other stereotypical vagaries. Elites then link them to state security, even 
though they are relatively minor in the hierarchy of state threats.  
A way of describing inflation is a subtler version of Jack Levy’s scapegoat 
hypothesis and ‘diversionary theory of wars’, where elites divert domestic audiences 
to certain contentious issues to mobilise support for warfare.197 This, in turn, draws 
on Lewis A. Coser’s work drawing on the ‘in-group/out-group’ hypotheses, where 
larger groups self-identify with sociological groups.198 Levy paraphrases Coser’s 
central idea as follows:  
‘The cohesion of the in-group will be increased only if there already exists 
some minimal level of internal cohesion and only if it is generally perceived 
that the external threat menaces the group as a whole and not just some part 
of it’.199 
Inflation also has the benefit of incorporating analysis about the critical revival of 
authors such as Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss who explored the centrality of political 
antagonisms to political life.200 For example, Jef Huysmans and Alessandra 
Buonfino interpreted debates by political elites in Britain as linking immigration to 
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terrorism in order to enable the practical security measures needed to address the 
new post 9/11 security environment. From their position, the ‘politics of exception’ 
was a way to allow security considerations to escape the inconsistencies of liberty in 
democratic political systems.201 In this respect, the Schmittian concept of the 
friend/enemy distinction becomes useful, and thus inflation is a way of framing the 
how leaders exploit this sentiment in the wider context of structural constraints.202 
Hence, inflation acts to rally domestic groups around a single, yet benign security 
issue. Inflation of ‘soft’ issues is preferred because pivotal middle powers lack the 
resources and materials to engage in the sabre-rattling often witnessed between great 
powers. Overall, this means inflation is comparable to the manipulation of the ‘in-
group/out-group’ phenomena to remove the focus from other more important 
security issues. 
Case Choices and Defence 
With the limitations of the ‘middle power’ concept described above and the typology 
laid out, the cases must now be chosen. Moreover, as the previous section suggests, 
the examples should incorporate a range of variables including geography, economic 
and military, which can help contextualise ideational actors and their actions. In 
doing so, a number of candidates emerge.  
Take, for example, South Korea. It is a ‘middle power’ by most metrics. It is an 
awkward geographical pivot between Chinese and US influence that strongly affects 
its alliances, and is the focus of many scholarly articles focusing on middle power.203 
It also uses what David Kang termed ‘emotional diplomacy’ to achieve goals 
grounded in realist logic.204 It also has considerable military power. However, at the 
same time, the North Korea question introduces too many complexities to make it a 
useful case at present. North Korea is a unique case in international politics because 
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of its autarkic nature and its frozen conflict with South Korea introduces an 
excessive number of uncontrollable variables.  
Other candidates might include Brazil, which has the material capabilities to be a 
middle, or even potentially a great power in the future.205 Its recent behaviour, such 
as an attempt to broker the Iran nuclear deal (along with Turkey) indicates a desire 
for a more assertive role in international affairs.206 But overall, Brazil’s position is 
complicated by numerous factors. For instance, geographical factors are less intense 
or advantageous when compared to other regions such as Africa and the Middle 
East, and neither the PRC, nor the US is deeply invested in courting Brazil. 
Nonetheless, Brazil’s position as the strongest nation in South America means this is 
better analysed within the regional scope, and therefore beyond the remit of this 
thesis. 
Elsewhere Kenya is an emerging pivot with increasing PRC and US interests in the 
region focused on Nairobi. Yet its security dynamics are fluid and its alliances are in 
flux thanks to the emergence of the PRC as a key security player.207 Consequently, 
the literature and empirics are less readily available and theoretical analysis less 
developed. South Africa, too, is a focus of middle power literature, but as with 
Brazil, it is often focussed on regional hegemony and immediate security, rather than 
the way it engages with great powers.208 
A potentially more appropriate set of case candidates exist when exploring a specific 
type of pivotal middle power. This is where a state sits between two larger blocs as 
described in Chase et al’s analysis earlier in this chapter. This provides a critical 
geopolitical variable, and states that sit in the middle of security competitions 
provide a neat way to test both the material and ideational components against their 
respective security outlooks. 
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Australia 
Australia, provides an excellent set of conditions to test variables including 
geography, economics and ideas. It has been the subject of a great deal of literature 
exploring both its pivotal and the middle power position, although very little of this 
has tried to bridge the international-domestic divide. More importantly, it has dealt 
with many paradoxical domestic stances, where international activism ranks highly 
in internal debates, yet its security position is ultimately driven by an emerging 
security architecture of East Asia. At a structural level Australia sits neatly between 
the PRC and US spheres of influence, and manages these countervailing dynamics 
well. At the same time, there is the risk that certain domestic debates can threaten 
important relations with states such as the PRC and Indonesia. More interestingly, 
Australia shares a number of security conditions with countries that are not liberal 
democracies, such as Turkey. For example, both have had long and stable relations 
with the US and enjoyed security and stability despite their problematic systemic 
positions. This makes Australia an excellent candidate for the first case. 
Consequently, analysis of Australia should reveal a correlation between the shift in 
Australia’s strategic priorities (such as that from Britain, to the US, and most 
recently to China) and the internal discourses that accompany it. A brief survey of its 
strategic history supports this. Australia’s xenophobic approach to the wider Asian 
region throughout the early twentieth century was replaced by a moderated approach 
whereby China has become a focus of Australia’s security elites. In turn, vague 
sentiment about asylum seekers from weaker states, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, is 
now the focus of internal security debates, despite a lack of empirical evidence that 
these people do indeed present any type of core existential threat. 
Turkey 
Another prominent candidate is Turkey, which sits geographically between Asia, the 
Middle East and Europe. Consequently, it can be used to test the links between 
geography, security and ideas. Turkey’s recent attempts to revise its international 
position have been thoroughly analysed in the academic literature. More importantly, 
Turkey has confronted several issues that have crossed the international–domestic 
nexus, and that are poorly explained by the current literature on Turkish foreign 
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policy.209 This includes the role of political Islam and democratisation, which attract 
and threaten security debates at both the domestic and international levels. So, while 
the literature on Turkey is rich, it is often heavily focussed on historical factors, and 
in doing so fails to explain many paradoxical challenges. One example is Turkish 
public opinion, which reveals many inconsistencies. In this instance, NATO and the 
US provide the backbone for security, but the US is increasingly the target of 
negative domestic ideas. According to the 2014 Pew Global attitudes survey, 73 
percent of Turks polled had an unfavourable opinion of the US, while only one in ten 
saw the US in a favourable light.210 NATO also suffers from this poor perception, 
with seven in ten Turks possessing negative opinions of the organization.211  
In a similar way, a 2015 survey by Kadir Has University found 42.6 percent of Turks 
viewed Israel as the biggest threat to Turkey, whereas only 22.1 percent viewed 
Syria in the same light.212 This is puzzling as Turkey’s domestic concerns are largely 
disconnected from its foreign policy practice. At a pragmatic level Turkish foreign 
policy seeks to counter the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, Russian 
revisionism to the North, and the emergence of security competition focused on 
resources in Central Asia. Yet these immediate security concerns are often 
accompanied by prudent action, despite a façade of reckless rhetoric. Overall this 
generates a picture where the content of domestic narratives is inconsistent with the 
material pressures dictating Turkey’s strategic environment. These factors combine 
to make Turkey an excellent case choice. This links with the fact it already has been 
the focus of both a great deal of middle and ‘pivotal’ scholarship.213 
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To capture these complexities and numerous variables around Turkish security, 
critical approaches have increased in popularity. This is notable within scholarship 
from ‘non-traditional’ middle powers, such as Turkey, because critical security 
approaches help explain their awkward position in international politics. For 
instance, a survey by Pinar Bilgin found fifty-three peer-reviewed articles by Turkish 
scholars used the critically grounded securitization framework over the past 
decade.214 Furthermore, of those articles that were ‘theory-informed’, the majority 
came from the critical school, suggesting a preference for cultural and historical 
discourses rather than those dealing with ‘hard’ security dynamics.215 
This contrasts with the security-driven work by US scholars on Turkey, including the 
‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis, in which Samuel Huntington stated that Turkey’s 
reorientation east was driven by ‘the desire to counter Iran and Saudi Arabia from 
expanding their influence and promoting Islamic fundamentalism in the region’.216 
In a similar way Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard described Turkey 
only briefly in a crude sweep of Eurasian power dynamics.217 Of course, more 
nuanced work is available, such as F. Stephen Larrabee’s Troubled Partnership - 
U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change, alongside in-depth 
policy driven approaches by Steven A. Cook from the US Council on Foreign 
Relations.218 Nevertheless, overall, this suggests that the literature on states such as 
Turkey is firmly from either hard or critical security positions, with few attempts at 
conciliatory positions. 
Consequently, the contrasting positions of the literature make Turkey an interesting 
case to compare and contrast with Australia. Turkey, like Australia, has navigated a 
complex security environment relatively well, and has acted in line with what 
materially driven analysis would expect: it both has allied and free-ridden on the US 
security presence, with the goal of balancing against a variety of threats, including 
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Soviet Union, Russia, and most recently the Middle East. At the same time, domestic 
narratives generally complement these security positions. So, at the beginning of the 
Turkish Republic, Kemalism was a useful tool for the reordering of discourses 
within Turkey, and its statist, nationalist cornerstone made sense in the context of the 
Cold War environment. Correspondingly, the post-Cold War period, and the 
associated changes in the regional security architecture seem to correlate with a shift 
in domestic sentiment, to one more closely aligned with political Islam. This against 
makes sense, as neglect of these Islamic voices makes it the target of myriad 
ideational entrepreneurs that have emerged in the post 9/11 environment. These 
factors, together, make Turkey a potentially instructive case. 
Mexico 
Mexico is also a candidate for pivotal middle power analysis, albeit one that initially 
seems counterintuitive. Most notably, its geographical proximity to the US 
differentiates it substantially from Turkey and Australia. One point of differentiation 
is that the geographical pivot is less defined in material terms than the first two cases 
and opportunities for balancing against the US or aligned with states to the South or 
abroad are limited. Brazil, Argentina and Colombia are the only regional states with 
any substantial material capabilities and neither has shown an interest in forming a 
balancing coalition beyond broad economic groupings such as the Latin American 
Integration Association.219 Another point of differentiation is that Mexico has an 
extremely weak military and spent less than one-fifth of what Australia did on 
defence in 2015, despite having almost six times the population.220 Furthermore, it is 
an interesting case because it has not contested US power in any real form or shape 
since the Mexican revolution in the early twentieth century. This combines with the 
fact that Mexico sits between two large cultural blocs. This means that if ideational 
factors enjoy a pivotal role in regional security dynamics, these should reveal 
themselves, given Mexico’s predominantly Hispanic population and linguistic 
commonalities are much more strongly linked to Latin America than to the North. 
This makes Mexico a highly informative case from a security perspective, especially 
in relation to its peculiar internal dynamics. These include the fact that Mexican 
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instability presents the US with arguably its greatest local existential security threat. 
This is a result of the emergence of drug cartels, which have created a climate of 
lawlessness on the US border. For example, during the period 2007-2014, there were 
164,000 victims of homicide versus 103,000 in Afghanistan and Iraq combined.221 
Further puzzles emerge as Mexico possesses a political system that (on the surface) 
supports many of the leftist ideals espoused by other regimes in the region, such as 
Cuba, yet ranks low in US public concerns. This therefore suggests that Mexican 
elites are adept at controlling internal rhetoric in a way that has prevented it from 
becoming an existential threat to the US. 
Again, in the Mexican case, these processes are poorly explored in the literature, 
where it is the subject of sharp divisions between theoretical approaches when 
describing its role in international politics. For instance, according to a survey of the 
literature by Mariano E. Bertucci, the majority of academic scholarship on US-Latin 
American relations was written from an International Political Economy (IPE) 
perspective (38 percent), with a further 17 percent assessing ‘intermestic’ issues 
(those involving both domestic and international analysis), while only 14 percent 
were security driven.222 The insular nature of Mexican scholarship was underscored 
by the fact that only 0.5 percent of articles surveyed by Bertucci dealt with issues 
surrounding Mexico and the structure of the international system, and all works were 
written by Latin Americans rather than US scholars.223 Indeed, this problem is found 
across Latin America. As Arlene B. Tickner has noted, Latin American approaches 
to IR have paralleled the thought and processes found in the US, and ‘in non-core 
settings such as Latin America, offers relatively little of the kinds of alternative 
knowledge that critical scholarship so eagerly seeks’.224  
This narrow approach to the theoretical scholarship is concerning because Mexico’s 
role in international security is severely undervalued. For example, Mexico is a 
middle power by most metrics, being a member of the G20 and MIKTA, as well as 
sitting at a pivotal point between North and South America. Zbigniew Brzezinski 
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even claimed in the late 1990s that Mexico would be the next Iran given its 
unresolved political tensions with the US, combined with its unstable revolutionary 
history.225 Brzezinski’s claims may not have eventuated, but Mexico remains a 
problem for the US in security terms, especially when viewed in the context of drug 
violence. Take, for example, the focus on US and Iraq in both popular and academic 
discourse, even though the Mexican drug war, being partly played out on the US 
border, was arguably as violent as unrest in Iraq. In 2013, Ciadad Juarez was a more 
violent city than Baghdad, where 70,000 ‘additional homicides’ have occurred 
because of conflicts related to the drug war since 2007.226 Yet Mexico ranks low in 
domestic US perceptions compared to other perceived threats. In the 2009 Pew 
Research report of public perception, taken at the height of the Mexican Drug War, 
Islamic extremism, Iran’s nuclear program and the Taliban represented ‘major 
threats to the well-being of the United States’.227 In contrast, Mexico did not rate a 
mention in the top ten foreign policy issues.228 
In this respect, the use of Mexico as a case should reveal how security elites have 
managed the high politics of the US relationship pragmatically, while redirecting 
anti-US sentiment domestically in ways to avoid an existential impact on US-
Mexican relations. It should also explain how a domestic environment that is ripe for 
exploitation by political entrepreneurs, as has happened in other regional states, 
including Cuba and Venezuela, has been avoided in Mexico. 
Cases Compared 
This combination of Australia, Mexico and Turkey should provide useful outputs 
about how middle powers balance domestic discourses with external security 
priorities based on geographical and material factors. They are instructive because 
all possess domestic discourses that can be problematic for security, and that 
superficially can clash with their most important security partners. Other notable 
constants include the fact each bandwagons with the US. Australia and Turkey do so 
in a formal sense through the ANZUS treaty and NATO respectively, while Mexico 
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has a more informal relationship with the US in military terms, reinforced by close 
proximity.  
At this point, sceptics may ask why this thesis should not simply analyse the 
relationships of these states with the US. This is answered by returning to the 
concept of pivotal middle power. While all three bandwagon with the US, all three 
simultaneously hedge against the US. Australia engages with the PRC and uses that 
relationship to remain pertinent to the US. Turkey has a similar history, hedging with 
the Soviet Union, and more recently the PRC and the Middle East. Mexico relies on 
the US security umbrella by virtue of the Monroe Doctrine, even though no formal 
alliance exists, but still tests the relationship via engagement with a number of Latin 
American institutions encompassing problematic actors such as Cuba and 
Venezuela.  
Other important similarities exist too. All are G20 members. They all sit between 
two contrasting cultural regions. They are all relatively stable market economies. All 
were named as so-called ‘torn’ countries under the Clash of Civilisation thesis.229 
More importantly, all three have relatively good relations with their neighbours, 
despite being in potentially dangerous ‘neighbourhoods’. More recently, all three 
have become members of MIKTA, which states that members ‘play pivotal strategic 
roles in [their] regions’ and ‘share important fundamental values, including a 
commitment to democracy and human rights, and shared support of free trade and 
open economies’.230 This is an interesting development because, according to 
Australian policy documents on MIKTA, the ‘depiction of Mexico and Turkey in the 
literature as middle powers is predicated on a bridging or liminal role’ where as the 
role of MIKTA (according to Cooper) goes ‘hand in hand with a connotation over 
where they are situated geographically in the world’.231 Hence, an analysis grounded 
in material factors should result in a number of consistencies across cases despite 
differing political systems, if the central thesis holds. 
As a result, this mix of similarities and concordant geopolitical and security concerns 
makes them useful, with their domestic policy providing rich detail on how they 
behave when faced with similar structural constraints. Australia has a modern and 
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refined Westminster system of government. Turkey has a somewhat successful semi-
authoritarian system where a form of militant secularism was enforced by Kemalist 
ideologues and has recently converted to a hybrid authoritarian system under Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan. Mexico too has a unique presidential system that has both 
democratic and authoritarian elements. Consequently, while foreign policy elites 
seem to act in a unitary manner across cases when responding to threats, we can 
compare and contrast how these necessary changes are managed when introduced 
into domestic debates. Thus, in respect to the middle power definition presented 
above, all three cases are well suited to test the thesis and generate outputs about the 
way pivotal middle powers manage problematic domestic discourse that clash with 
the realities of their security positions.  
At this point, the general expectations of the research are that these three states 
remain relatively stable because they have in fact managed to successfully control 
the hierarchy of domestic issues focussed on security. For example, Australia has a 
long history of bipartisanship towards the US alliance, despite evidence to suggest 
that political entrepreneurs could exploit this narrative for domestic gains. Such 
moves would harm Australia’s national security given the importance of the alliance 
and therefore debates about such issues are largely quiet. Likewise, in Turkey, where 
the security situation is much more intense, certain debates, such as those about the 
regional role of Iran, and until recently political Islam, remain highly controlled. For 
Mexico, anti-Americanism is a core theme within Mexican society, yet Mexican 
elites rarely engage in populist rhetoric on the centrality of the role the US plays in 
Mexico’s broader security.  
Hence this thesis expects to find evidence of elites rearranging debates in line with 
the national interest and the security dynamics. We should also expect that when the 
broad security dynamics change, elites will respond by demoting or alternately 
promoting certain discourses that are less harmful.  
Research Design 
The research design for this thesis relies on a comparison across cases. In each case I 
use a consistent structure with a brief introduction, a description and assessment of 
the key threats and actors in that state, and an examination of the domestic 
72 
 
environment that probes for potential antagonisms with security implications 
between the domestic and international environments.  
The use of qualitative case studies, as this thesis employs, has been central to the 
study of international relations. While the comparative method can be traced back to 
John Stuart Mill, authors such as Stein Rokkan, Giovanni Satori and Harold 
Lasswell pushed forward the study of comparative politics in an attempt to clarify 
the usefulness of ‘small-N’ studies.232 Arend Lijphart later expanded on this research 
to champion the use of qualitative case studies, claiming that while problematic in 
the context of testable models used by the hard sciences, they were an excellent 
strategy and instrument to approach politics when using a modified scientific 
method.233 Harry Eckstein extended this by showing how case studies had heuristic 
value that could be then used to generate hypotheses.234 Indeed, Jack Levy 
encapsulated these ideas into his concept of a ‘theory-guided case study’235 which 
states that cases studies are ‘explicitly structured by a well-developed conceptual 
framework that focuses attention on some theoretically specified aspects of reality 
and neglects others’.236 These all inform the research design in this thesis. In this 
respect, this thesis can also be described as a ‘hypothesis generating study’, which 
according to Levy, can be ‘particularly useful in explaining cases that do not fit an 
existing theory, in order to explain why the case violates theoretical predictions and 
to refine or replace an existing hypothesis or perhaps specify its scope conditions’.237 
In fact, this methodological approach has been used by many influential international 
relations works including Perception and Misperception, Theory of International 
Politics and Regions and Powers.238 Finally, cases and comparisons as used in this 
thesis also play an important role in the middle power literature. For instance, Middle 
Powers and the Rise of China is an edited volume using eight case studies239, while 
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Niche Diplomacy also explores eight middle power cases.240 Elsewhere, Annette 
Baker Fox’s middle power work made extensive use of case studies in including 
Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Spain.241 
Within the cases, I use process tracing to make casual links. Theory-based process 
tracing as outlined by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, allows the 
identification of causal chains between independent variables242 and according to 
David Collier, process tracing is ‘an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal 
inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence—often understood as part of a 
temporal sequence of events or phenomena’.243 Andrew Bennett’s work on process 
tracing is also useful, in particular his method of establishing causation by using a 
series of theoretical tests including ‘straw in the wind’ and the ‘hoop’.244 The hoop 
test provides a ‘necessary but not sufficient criterion for accepting the explanation’ 
and the hypothesis must ‘‘‘jump through the hoop’’ just to remain under 
consideration’.245 ‘Straw in the wind’ is a subtler test. According to Bennett, ‘passing 
affirms relevance of hypothesis’, while failing ‘suggests hypothesis may not be 
relevant, but does not eliminate it’.246 In short, analyses that can incorporate both 
tests should be viewed as rigid theory. 
In a practical setting Bennett applied these tests to analyses of Soviet contraction in 
the late 1980 and assessed three theoretical approaches. The first was Wohlforth and 
Brooks’ interpretation, which argued material considerations drove Soviet decline 
(essentially a realist position). The second was a purely domestic account by Jack 
Snyder. In this instance changes in the Soviet economy were the key driver of 
substantial political change.247 The third explored constructivist positions, whereby 
the Soviet Union was socialised by a series of international events, including the 
experiences of Afghanistan and the role of public opposition in Eastern Europe, 
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meaning Soviet elites had ‘learned’ that the use of force was a poor choice and 
would only accelerate decline.  
According to Bennett, Brooks and Wohlforth’s neoclassical realist interpretation 
passed the ‘straw in the wind’ easily as it provided an understanding of the timing of 
Soviet decline. Most importantly, it passed the ‘hoop’ test by presenting evidence 
that ‘Soviet leaders linked the two in their public and private statements’.248 In 
contrast, theories grounded in domestic factors alone were the worst predictor. These 
often failed the hoop test as they as while their descriptions were rich, they were 
prone to problems in case selection, preventing a useful context for the events. 
Theories grounded in ideational positions alone provided rich descriptions and 
passed the hoop test, but ultimately failed to link economic factors with the discourse 
that emerged from Moscow. Overall, Bennett argued that this demonstrates that 
multiple valid explanations are available, and that process tracing therefore is a 
critical tool to strengthen arguments using causal inference, despite unavoidable 
fallibilities when used in social sciences. 
While process tracing is used to probe for evidence, I employ a wider research 
design around cases constructed using ‘controlled comparison’. This is based on 
Steven Van Evera’s ‘congruence method type 2’ where multiple within-case 
comparisons are applied, allowing the comparison of independent and dependent 
variables across many issues within a case.249 In the research presented here, the 
same values (inflation, deflection and dilution) are probed for across each case once 
the initial circumstantial factors are established. 
Finally, for this thesis, the independent variable is foreign and security policy, the 
dependent variable is domestic discourse, and the intervening variable is systemic 
pressures stemming from great power politics. Thus, when the independent variable 
changes, because of the intervening variable, the dependent variable responds. Many 
of the variables are easily described in objective terms. For instance, readily 
available metrics including Gross Domestic Product (GDP), military spending and 
alliances provide excellent evidence to describe changes in material capabilities.250 
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Theory Generation and Typologies 
Given this thesis seeks to generate empirical findings, it is important to produce 
rigorous and testable theory. I use Van Evera’s conditions of ‘good theory’ in order 
to generate useful outputs with the goal of expanding the neoclassical framework.251 
According to Van Evera, a good theory has seven qualities. These are: 
1. Explanatory power  
2. Parsimony 
3. Satisfaction 
4. Clear framing  
5. The theory is falsifiable 
6. Explains important phenomena 
7. Prescriptive richness 
To address point one, this thesis will have explanatory power by explaining the 
internal behaviour of elites across middle powers. This is a key task given that 
middle powers are not well theorised within existing frameworks. Point two can 
sometimes be contentious within international relations. This is because research 
demands a certain amount of reductionism in order to arrive at a parsimonious 
framework. Nonetheless, this thesis attempts to build a more parsimonious 
framework around middle powers than currently exists by narrowing down variables 
and making them explicit as demonstrated above. Point three is somewhat more 
abstract, but any success at parsimony should create satisfaction. That is, this 
dissertation should provide a satisfying understanding of why there is divergence 
between public discourse and foreign policy practice in middle powers. 
Point four—clear framing—is easier to achieve. The broad outline is expanded on in 
this chapter, but the use of clear and consistent case studies, in both the external and 
internal environment allows the reader a neutral position to view these links between 
cases. This thesis also meets the fifth point: being falsifiable. An empirical test can 
disprove the theory if the data is available and the same framework can disprove the 
hypothesis of middle power behaviour being put forward.  
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If proven, this framework identifies and explains important phenomena, thereby 
addressing point six. Given that middle powers can be subject to fetishisation in the 
normative literature, this helps provide an understanding of the reasons how and why 
ideas are promoted or deflected in elite discourse, and in doing so provides an 
alternative way of viewing how these states engage in international politics.  
Finally, point seven—prescriptive richness—is met. To Van Evera, this richness is 
achieved by ‘identifying antecedent condition required for its operation’.252 This 
gives policy planners ways to avoid and avert the mistakes and problems visible in 
the thesis. But, regardless of outcome, outputs of such a framework can still be 
useful for policy planners in dividing the hyperbolic world of media, public opinion 
and critical literature with that driven by a security driven perspective, providing this 
richness.  
To assist in the generation of theory, this thesis uses a typology. This provides 
several organisational benefits and is a common analytical tool within the social 
sciences. Typological approaches are a feature of many influential security based 
articles, including neoclassical realist approaches used by Jeffrey Taliaferro253 and 
Schweller.254 For example, Schweller placed states into nine zoological categories 
including ‘wolves’, ‘owls’ and ‘snakes’ to describe their behaviour.255 Elsewhere, 
Stephen Krasner used typologies in his highly cited book, Sovereignty: Organized 
Hypocrisy in order to generate four categories of sovereignty: international legal, 
domestic, interdependent, and Westphalian.256 According to David Collier, Jody 
LaPorte and Jason Seawright, conceptual typologies when used with categorical 
variables are a ‘valuable analytic tools in political and social science’ and that 
despite some criticisms, they ‘contribute to quantitative research in diverse ways’.257 
Following in this tradition, this thesis uses a conceptual typology where each type 
explains a part of state behaviour. 
Definitions and Roles: Elites 
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A definition central to this dissertation is elites. This definition is critical as the 
neoclassical realist framework I use views elites as the conduit for state behaviour. 
They must enact policy. In other words, real people ultimately must actualise 
material pressures upon the state through responses. At the most basic level, I define 
elites as the executive level of the state, including (but not limited to) the Prime 
Minster or President, the heads of foreign policy alongside the most senior 
bureaucrats in the public service of related departments, most notably in foreign 
affairs and defence. This is in line with Steven Lobell’s definition of the ‘foreign 
policy executive’ (FPE), which has the goal of devising grand strategy and 
maximising national security.258 Of course, these organisational structures vary 
across the cases, and one motivation behind the case selection is to test for 
congruence across several political systems to see if they respond in similar ways to 
external material pressures. 
A secondary type of elite is also present when using Lobell’s position. These are the 
societal elite.259 The societal elite include business leaders within major industries 
such as the finance sector, natural resources and the media. While not capable of 
making foreign policy, they do recognise threats to their interests from decisions 
made by the FPE. They lobby and act to counter-balance the ability of the FPE to 
make unitary decisions. These consist of both niche groups that rally around single 
issues, as well as actors with broad instruments, such as the media. In this sense, the 
societal elite represents a domestic variation on balance of power. The FPE 
ultimately makes decisions but must make calculations about the response and 
preferences of the societal elite. 
For this thesis, I do not treat the media as a central variable. This case is made 
elsewhere and in detail in the communications and public diplomacy literature.260 
For example, Steven Livingstone described the so-called ‘CNN effect’ in the early 
1990s, framing the media as central to policy agenda setting.261 Rather, I favour 
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Norrin Ripsman’s interpretation of the role of the media. This claims the media 
‘mould public opinion […but…] ultimately travel the same causal path’.262 Similar 
arguments are found in Jack Snyder’s Myth of Empire, which frames the media as 
part of the political structure that elites exploit for self-serving purposes.263 
Sources 
The claims within this thesis are made using an array of sources. These include 
diplomatic histories, documents generated by government and their agencies, 
scholarly research, data collected by third parties, and media coverage. I avoid 
primary research because decision-makers and elites make unreliable narrators. They 
are constrained in their ability to make transparent statements. Indeed, part of this 
thesis aims to demonstrate how decision-making is driven independent of agency. As 
a result, too much emphasis on primary research would prove unhelpful. This is a 
common approach used by similar academic work such as Walt’s The Origin of 
Alliances, Buzan and Waever’s Regions and Powers and Schweller’s Deadly 
Imbalances, where no interviews are conducted. Indeed, a notable edited volume on 
the theory covered in this thesis, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign 
Policy, does not contain any primary research at all.264  
Changes in public opinion and sentiment at the domestic level are harder to describe 
and capture.265 Nonetheless, a few established methods exist to measure perceptions 
and ideas. Many credible sources routinely publish public opinion polls within each 
country, such as Pew, the Roper Centre, Gallup, alongside institutional outputs from 
organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the World Bank. Some content analysis is 
used, but with caution and in context. This is because media ownership and ideas are 
covariant in many examples. These are assessed within each case and any notable 
conflicts of interest are noted and contextualised.  
Each case has variations with the data available. Australia has a long history of 
strong public opinion polling, and therefore few obstacles exist when interpreting the 
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public mood on a wide number of issues. Mexico also has a thorough databank of 
public opinion polls via resources such as the Latin American databank provided by 
the Roper Centre.266 Turkish data is less reliable in this sense, but its general political 
movement towards Europe has been accompanied by the need for transparency, 
resulting in widely available surveys from reputable agencies. 
More considerations that are practical include language translation. However, in the 
current research environment this is not a substantial issue. Most of the applicable 
data is translated by default, while both Mexico and Turkey have high quality and 
reputable journals and news outlets that publish in English, such as Insight Turkey, 
Turkish Review, Journal of Turkish Weekly, Hürriyet (‘Liberty’) and, until 2016, 
Today’s Zaman. Furthermore, approximately forty daily newspapers are available 
online in Turkish, which are accessible in English via online translations. Many top 
European political journals also cover Turkish issues. Mexico is covered by 
reputable area studies journals including the Journal of Latin American Studies, 
Latin American Politics and Society, Latin American Research Review, while its 
proximity to the US results in coverage from US sources. Apart from this The News 
publishes in English and again online translation services coupled with a workable 
understanding of Spanish by the author means that access to data is not a substantial 
obstacle. 
Chapter Structure 
Using this collection of tools, I survey notable events across the cases, both 
domestically and internationally to probe for examples that: (a) demonstrate a 
noticeable disconnect between domestic sentiment and foreign policy outputs; (b) 
threaten security by introducing damaging rhetoric into the public sphere, and; (c) 
trace the decline of domestic forces that threaten to poorly amplify security threats.  
This involves a chapter structure that begins with an overview of the historical and 
material considerations of the case. Each chapter provides an overview of the general 
security environment; relative security and security competitors; the security and 
foreign policy responses to external security dynamics; and an overview of the 
domestic environment and elites with the case. I follow this with the application of 
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the framework in the following order: deflection, dilution and inflation. Each chapter 
ends with an analysis of the broader implications and outcomes after applying the 
typology. 
Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed the literature and established a framework that can answer 
the research question. It has also addressed several secondary questions. First, it has 
explored how external pressures can drive the security stances of middle powers. 
Second, it established an empirical framework that can manage and place myriad 
domestic factors without fetishizing variables. Third, as a theory based framework, it 
has shown how this thesis will contribute to neoclassical framework in pivotal 
middle power setting. Finally, I have presented a chapter structure which has the 
goal of understanding the security dynamics at play at the international level, and 
how these interface with the domestic rhetoric of elites. With the framework 
established, the cases commence in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3: AUSTRALIA 
This chapter applies the neoclassical realist framework of deflection, dilution and 
inflation outlined in Chapter Two to the case of Australia. I begin with an overview 
of Australia’s security environment. This initial section outlines the external 
pressures that Australia has faced and shows how they have responded as expected 
under a material reading. It does so by demonstrating how Australia has adapted its 
security and foreign policy posture in line with three major changes to the 
international political environment. These are: (1) the period following the Second 
World War, when Australia’s key alliance switched from the UK to the US267; (2) 
the Cold War period; and (3), the post-Cold War period, where Australia has viewed 
political and economic integration into the Indo-Pacific as a core part of the national 
interest into the twenty-first century. The last set of strategic changes coincides with 
the rise of China as a great power, and an intensification of security dilemmas, 
focused on North Asia. This helps contextualise the wider pressures shaping 
Australia’s security environment, and demonstrates how systemic pressures in large 
part guide Australia’s foreign and security policy.  
The central part of the chapter places issues that cross the domestic-international 
nexus including China, Indonesia, resources and terrorism within the typology of 
deflection, dilution and inflation outlined in Chapter Two. This allows us to make 
connections between the systemic pressures identified above and shows why elites 
must reorder debates that threaten to harm the national interest.  
The first type, deflection, uses evidence from Australia’s relationships with the US, 
China, India and Indonesia to show how these critical security discourses are 
handled in a sensitive way by elites and key political actors. Next, I apply dilution to 
several examples, including the fringes of the political left and right in Australian 
politics. More specifically, I assess certain minor and fringe parties and domestic 
political actors who have sought to act as political entrepreneurs, and therefore have 
the potential to hijack debates in ways problematic for security policy. Dilution 
demonstrates how such actors and their problematic discourses have been pulled into 
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the centre, frequently by taking on parts of core messages and reframing them 
around less problematic debates. 
The final type, inflation, is applied to issues including immigration and terrorism. 
These dominate Australia’s domestic debates, despite a lack of evidence that they 
present a significant existential threat to national security. This focus demonstrates 
that elites prefer the public to focus on benign security threats. By concentrating on 
these less important issues that present few security risks, they obfuscate other 
higher order threats that do have substantial security implications, such as the 
emergence of China as a central actor in the Indo-Pacific and the state of the US-
Australian alliance. 
An analytical section is the third main part of the chapter. This argues that the 
typological approach, based on a neoclassical realist framework, is well equipped to 
explain the difference between Australia’s security and foreign policy practice and 
its domestic debates, and that it can provide rich descriptions of how a state in a 
pivotal middle power setting acts.  
Historical and Material Context 
Security Overview 
While Australia is a relatively powerful country in pure material terms, having the 
world’s twelfth largest nominal global GDP in 2014,268 three larger states—the US, 
the PRC and Japan—all have a stronger regional security presence.269 This produces 
a complex security environment in which major power competition has been a 
continuing feature of East Asian geopolitics. Despite this, broad regional stability 
has held since 1945, and Australia has no immediate military challengers. This is 
largely due to the continued presence of the United States, with whom Australia is a 
key strategic ally, and its commitment to the region. 
To understand Australia’s security posture, it is useful to explore three 
reconfigurations of Australia’s foreign and security policy whereby Canberra has 
responded to external security pressures. The first is the period following the Pacific 
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war (1941-1945), when attacks on Australia dramatically highlighted the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) inability and unwillingness to act as Australia’s external security 
guarantor.270 The second period revolved around the emergence of regional Cold 
War politics that enmeshed the US—and by proxy Australia—in Indo-Pacific 
security.271 The subsequent rivalry between the US and the USSR dominated 
Australian security and foreign policy for the next forty years. Australia responded 
with support for the US alliance in several ways, including participation in the 
Korean and Vietnamese Wars. Most recently, following the demise of the Soviet 
Union, the rise of the PRC has dominated Australia’s security concerns, which have 
been visible in documents such as the 2009 Defence White Paper that identified 
China’s rise as a key threat to the national interest.272 Ultimately, each period 
represented a distinct set of external pressures that forced Australia to adapt its 
security stance and each has been a focus of literature on Australian foreign and 
policy.273 
What is notable is that despite considerable security challenges, each period has 
elicited what can be termed ‘appropriate’ security responses from Australian elites. 
‘Appropriate’ means that Australia has responded as would be expected under a 
realist reading of international politics. An ‘appropriate’ response at the domestic 
level is therefore when foreign and security elites have successfully undertaken 
substantial changes in security posture with little push-back or protest from the 
domestic population. For example, John Curtin’s speech of 27 December 1941 stated 
that ‘Australia look[ed] to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or 
kinship with the United Kingdom’274 can be interpreted as an appropriate response to 
the security environment given regional security was increasingly scarce following 
the UK’s retrenchment from the region. In contrast, Australian foreign and security 
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policy functioned smoothly and consistently when the UK was one of the key global 
security actors. During this period the UK was largely responsible for the foreign 
policy of Australia. However, events in the Pacific, including the fall of Singapore, 
Churchill’s indifference to requests to deploy Australian reinforcements closer to the 
Antipodes, the sinking of the ships Prince of Wales and Repulse, and attacks on 
Darwin in 1942 shifted Australia towards independence in foreign policy.275  
The process of Australia’s foreign and security policy adaptation to external security 
pressures was also visible in the post-World War II environment, which was 
dominated by Australia’s participation in the US regional security architecture and a 
clear position on Cold War politics. In essence, the newly formed US alliance 
became the ‘insurance policy’ for Australian security following UK retrenchment.276 
A striking feature of this period was general bipartisanship, where domestically 
contentious issues (such as participation in the Vietnam War) were supported across 
a number of successive, yet different Parliaments and Prime Ministers. These 
included Menzies (the Liberal Party), Harold Holt (Liberal), John McEwen 
(Country) and John Gorton (Liberal). This foreign and security policy continuity 
flowed into a range of security arenas. For example, Australia has provided military 
and intelligence infrastructure for US bases in Exmouth since 1963277 and Pine-Gap 
since 1966.278  
The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the PRC as a regional power 
represented a third period in Australian foreign policy and strategic thinking.279 
During this time, Australia continued to value pragmatic security decision-making, 
demonstrated by its close alignment with US strategy as East Asia grew in relative 
power. A key way that Australia renewed its commitment to the US alliance 
occurred after the 9/11 attacks and subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
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where John Howard formally invoked the ANZUS treaty.280 So, despite a public and 
popular focus on institutional engagement on Asia and an emphasis on cultural and 
soft diplomacy, the case can be made that in security terms US and Australian 
forces, objectives and interests are closer than ever, and remain the backbone of 
Australian strategic policy.  
Relative Power and Security Competitors 
The pressures exerted on Australia by North Asia have continued, creating a 
challenging environment for Australian security planners despite the US military 
presence. For instance, while Australia’s military budget has doubled since 1995, the 
PRC’s military budget has increased more than tenfold. In direct dollar terms this 
equates to Australian military spending growing from USD$13.1 billion in 1989 to 
USD$27.8 billion in 2015, while Chinese spending expanded from USD$16.6 billion 
to USD$214 billion.281  
The PRC is not the only potential challenger for regional hegemony. Elsewhere, 
India more than doubled its military budget (in constant USD) from twenty billion in 
1995, to fifty-one billion in 2015.282 States such as Thailand and Indonesia, with 
considerable populations and territory are also expected to grow economically and 
military into the future, further eroding Australia’s relative position.  
Optimists may argue that Australia’s strong economy mitigates many of these 
security concerns. For example, Australia’s economic outlook is excellent, having 
avoiding a severe downturn during the global financial crisis of 2008. In contrast, the 
neighbouring economies of the PRC, India, Thailand and Indonesia all experienced 
recessions, while there are lingering questions about whether the PRC’s growth is 
sustainable, as demonstrated by high levels of economic volatility during 2015.283 
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Nevertheless, even positive assessments of Australia’s economy still result in a 
declining relative capacity. The PRC’s economic growth highlights this trend. The 
PRC’s economy was twice the size of Australia’s in 1995. Now it is six and a half 
times larger.284 India, too, has experienced substantial growth, surpassing the PRC as 
the world’s fastest growing large economy in the first quarter of 2015.285 The likely 
outcome under most estimates is that Australia will experience a decreasing share of 
relative wealth and military power over the next century, which creates a regional 
security dynamic less favourable to Australia over the long-term. 
These factors all affect Australia’s security outlook and feed into a secondary set of 
long-term questions. One central concern is that the US may retrench from the 
region. The drivers here include increasing Chinese power and the maintenance of a 
security architecture in the Pacific that is increasingly high-priced and often 
prioritised over US domestic arenas.286 It is unlikely the US will go as far as Barry 
Posen’s scenario where the US might end its ‘unnecessary, ineffective, and 
expensive hegemonic quest with a more restrained grand strategy’.287 Instead it is 
more likely that it will, as Posen later suggests, ‘recast its alliances so that other 
countries shared actual responsibility for their own defence’.288 
A supplementary concern about US decline is Australia’s place within any new 
regional security order. Even in the absence of dramatic US retrenchment, there are 
signals, from both the US and Japan, that the current security framework requires 
retooling. On the Japanese side, this is visible in debates on military 
normalisation.289 These discussions naturally draw in Australia, given full Japanese 
military normalisation is likely to lead to frictions between Tokyo and Beijing. As it 
stands, Canberra continues to engage closely with Japan in both economic and 
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military affairs. For example, in July 2014, Japan-Australian relations improved 
considerably with the completion of a free trade agreement and a memorandum to 
share defence technology.290 The defence deal initially paved the way for 
cooperation on the sharing of submarine technology. This was originally of interest 
to Australia, due the replacement of the ageing Collins class fleet,291 although the 
tender was eventually awarded to the French company DCNS in April 2016.292 
Any readjustment of the US-Japanese relationship could also affect neighbouring 
states, such as North and South Korea. This again challenges Australia’s interests. In 
this instance, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is Australia’s fourth biggest trading 
partner, with over AUD$30 billion trade during 2012-2013.293 At the same time, 
tensions on the Korean Peninsula have consistently threatened regional stability and 
any prospect of war naturally draws in the PRC and the US, which favour the North 
and the ROK respectively.  
Competition in North Asia complements strategic posturing by the PRC in South 
East Asia and the Pacific, where they will soon be the second largest individual 
donor to the Pacific islands behind Australia.294 However, sub-regionally, most aid 
to the Pacific now comes from the PRC in the form of concessional and interest-free 
‘soft loans’, often tied to restrictive conditions.295 For example, recipients of Chinese 
aid must recognise the PRC over Taiwan, and the loans are conditional on the use of 
Chinese contractors and materials.296 The first condition concerning Taiwan 
automatically politicises the relationships between the PRC and its Pacific aid 
recipients. This in turn creates an environment where Taiwan uses the region to 
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assert and test its political power, by providing aid to Nauru, The Marshall Islands, 
Kiribati, Tuvalu and Palau in exchange for political recognition. This has fostered a 
political environment in Australia’s immediate region where Pacific states play great 
powers off against each other to maximise aid.297  
This type of competition is also visible in Papua New Guinea (PNG)—Australia’s 
closest neighbour—which is the largest Pacific recipient of PRC aid totalling 
USD$440 million since 2006.298 Chinese interests include resources like nickel, 
which is used extensively for stainless steel production. Chinese state-owned 
enterprises helped construct and develop the USD$2.2 billion Ramu nickel mine.299 
This can be juxtaposed against a relatively strong economy with consistent growth at 
8 percent, and predictions of 15 to 20 percent growth with the fruition of the PNG 
Liquid Natural Gas project.300 However, the undiversified nature of PNG’s economy 
also creates opportunities for rapidly changing patronage. For instance, PNG 
dropped its One China policy briefly in 1999 after a large offer from Taipei for 
aid.301 This followed a period of electoral violence and poor economic management. 
The move was quickly reversed when Prime Minister Bill Skate was deposed soon 
after.302 More directly for Australia, concerns emerged in 2008 when Port Moresby 
began training PNG military officers in the PRC,303 although later in 2013 Defence 
Minister Fabian Pok claimed that China wanted to be seen as ‘not being too involved 
in our military issues’.304 
Chinese engagement is also causing concerns for Australia in Fiji. Indeed, Fijian-
Australian relations have been problematic since the 2006 coup that removed Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase. His replacement, Frank Bainimarama, was a vocal critic of 
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Australia, accusing Alexander Downer in 2006 of ‘inciting Fijians to violence’ 
during the coup.305 Bainimarama made these claims despite John Howard rejecting a 
request from Qarase to intervene during the coup process.306 Overall, Fiji’s military 
government was believed to prefer the PRC to be more active in the region as it will 
be less concerned with governance issues, preferring stability and increasing trade 
relationships.307 Subsequently, relations remain strained, and Fiji has lobbied for the 
removal of Australia from the Pacific Islands Forum, further problematizing 
Australian security. 
Timor Leste is a focus of the PRC too. This was visible when Dili purchased naval 
boats from the PRC that were manned by Chinese sailors.308 It has also involved the 
PRC on issues concerning oil and gas reserves, in an effort to diversify the Australia-
dependent relationship brought about by the contentious Timor Gap treaty.309 
Domestically, Timorese elites have used the treaty as a way to justify Chinese 
cooperation, with Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão proclaiming that the ‘Timorese 
must unite to stop Australia stealing their wealth as it did in 1989’.310  
When viewed together, this group of smaller states combines to complicate 
Australian security by forming a so-called ‘arc of instability’.311 This, in turn, invites 
renewed great power competition that complicates Australia’s interests. For instance, 
the US has generally deferred to Australia over Pacific aid since the 1990s, but it has 
re-entered the Pacific in order to counter the PRC’s bullish aid attitude.312 The PRC, 
for its part, is countering this US pivot by weakening established mechanisms such 
                                                 
305 Malcolm Brown, “Fiji Chief Accuses Downer of Inciting Violence,” The Age, last modified December 12, 
2006, accessed July 14, 2015, http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/fiji-chief-accuses-downer-of-inciting-
violence/2006/12/11/1165685616262.html. 
306 US Embassy Canberra, “Australia Declines Fiji’s Request for Military Intervention; Plans to Cut Defense Ties 
and Impose Travel Ban on Bainimarama and Supporters,” Wikileaks, last modified December 6, 2006, accessed 
July 14, 2015, https://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/12/06CANBERRA1940.html. 
307 Campbell Cooney, “Fiji Shuns Pacific Forum Membership,” ABC News, last modified April 29, 2014, 
accessed July 14, 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-29/fiji-shuns-forum-membership/5418014. 
308 Lindsay Murdoch, “Relations Strained as East Timor Buys Chinese Navy Boats,” last modified June 7, 2010, 
accessed August 6, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/world/relations-strained-as-east-timor-buys-chinese-navy-
boats-20100606-xn5y.html. 
309 Ibid. 
310 Ibid. 
311 See Robert Ayson, “The ‘Arc of Instability’ and Australia’s Strategic Policy,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 61, no. 2 (2007): 215–231; Graeme Dobell, “The ‘Arc of Instability’: The History of an 
Idea,” History as policy: framing the debate on the future of (2007): 85.  
312 See Jonathan Greenacre, “Growing Chinese Aid to the South Pacific: New Political Dynamics,” Centre for 
Law, Markets & Regulation, UNSW, accessed July 14, 2015, http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/article/risk/growing-
chinese-aid-south-pacific-new-political-dynamics. 
90 
 
as the Pacific Island Forum in favour of its own groupings such as the ‘Melanesian 
Spearhead Group’.313  
These examples help demonstrate how China—and to a lesser extent Indonesia and 
India—are increasingly active in the region, and therefore more central than ever to 
Australia’s security outlook. All have grown in material terms, and China’s rise in 
particular is threatening to shift the stances of some of Australia’s core security 
partners: most notably, the US and Japan. This is also problematic for Australian 
elites, as China has shown a willingness to exploit avenues such as soft power, aid 
and development support for strategic purposes. Consequently any Australian 
criticism in these areas can be framed through a variety of antagonistic lenses to 
Chinese domestic audiences, including neo-colonialism and US subservience. For 
example, even a minor issue, such as when Australian swimmer Mack Horton 
publicly called fellow Chinese competitor Sun Yang a drug cheat at the Rio 
Olympics, can quickly become a powerful political tool.314 In this instance, the 
Chinese media outlet, Global Times, stated that Horton’s attitude was typical of 
Australia’s need ‘to be completely accepted by the Western world’ and that ‘in front 
of Asian countries, it cannot help but effuse its white supremacy’.315 As a result, 
Horton received over half a million ‘hate’ messages on social media site Instagram 
after Chinese state media, including Xinhua, publicised the issue.316 The lesson from 
this incident is that Australian elites must be highly attuned to the consequences of 
problematic rhetoric as these public incidents can be exploited for strategic gains. 
Security and Foreign Policy Responses 
These shifts create an environment where Australia’s core interests—preventing an 
attack on the mainland, ensuring regional and international stability, and fostering a 
strong international economy—are increasingly threatened when viewed over the 
long-term and in the context of wider international developments.317 But, 
importantly, Australia has responded as would be expected under a traditional realist 
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reading to most these new challenges. The Australian-US security relationship is 
strong, and Australia is increasingly embedded within the post-Cold War US 
military structure. Military relations are arguably more enmeshed than ever on issues 
such as intelligence, where the Five Eyes Agreement (FEA), comprising Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States has become a 
critical security tool in the information age. Australia has also committed to the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter project with the Australian variant able to land on US carriers, 
while also enabling high-level interoperability with US command and control 
networks.318  
Additional responses include the acquisition of Boeing-P8A Poseidon aircraft that 
rely on shared intelligence networks. The Australian government has committed to 
the purchase of eight of the aircraft at a cost of AUD$4 billion.319 Similarly, the 
government is acquiring MQ-4C Triton drones, designed to work in parallel with the 
P8A. The combination of the P8 and MQ-4C provides high-level interoperability 
with the US Navy on maritime surveillance.320 Further interoperability and 
modernization in line with US forces comes from the use of the Aegis combat 
system on three new Hobart class destroyers, the first of which is due for completion 
in 2017.321 These complement two new Canberra Class ships with helicopter decks, 
which fulfil an amphibious assault role, but also extend Australia’s ability to deliver 
humanitarian assistance in the region.322 The decks also allow for the short take-
off/vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the F-35 in the future, permitting US carriers 
and Australia’s Canberra class ships to act in concert.323 
In terms of broad policy responses, the 2009 Defence White Paper outlined the 
reasons for force modernisation and cast them as a response to changing balance of 
power in the region. The 2013 Defence White Paper also supported this trend and 
identified Sino-US tensions as the most important factor in Australia’s future 
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strategy. Moreover, while defence spending decreased to a low point of 1.59 percent 
of GDP in 2013-2014, spending is again on the rise after the 2016 Defence White 
Paper allocated another AUD$30 billion to the defence budget over the coming 
decade.324 In fact, overall, spending has been consistent since 1948 at 2.7 percent 
real growth, with small periods of increased spending to compensate for military 
actions in Korean, Vietnam and Iraq.325  
Institutional enmeshment in the Indo-Pacific complements hard defence capabilities. 
Australia is active in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and the East Asia Summit (EAS), all of 
which are derived from the US order. On the other hand, the institutional sphere 
allows Australia to hedge against US dependence with few risks, and it does so 
primarily via economic engagement. This includes membership of the newly formed 
Asian Investment Bank (AIIB) and the ongoing China-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (CHAFTA), which entered force in December 2015.326 These 
complement other bilateral frameworks such as the Australia-China Council and 
human rights dialogue. These allow engagements and cooperation on highly visible 
areas that might lie under the scope of ‘smart’ power327, such as student exchanges 
and broad notions of Asian cultural literacy. These have bidirectional logic too: they 
pacify the PRC’s threat perception of Australia and its relationship with the US, 
while also calming Australian citizens’ domestic concerns about the PRC.328 More 
recently, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has become a 
focus after President Donald Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) on the 23rd of January, 2017, shortly after he took office.329 
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At the economic level, Australia has a comprehensive investment regime that 
integrates tightly with the security infrastructure. Of these, the Foreign Investment 
Review Board (FIRB) is most visible. For example, the 2007 takeover proposal by 
China’s Minmetals for OZ Minerals was rejected on security grounds due to its 
proximity to the Woomera Prohibited area.330 Similarly, a 2011 application by China 
Nonferrous Metal Mining for a majority stake in Lynas, a major extractor of rare 
earths—a resource The Economist termed the ‘oil of the twenty-first century’331 and 
essential in the manufacture of technology such as mobile phones—was withdrawn 
when it became clear it would not meet regulatory requirements.332 Canberra has 
also prevented PRC companies from accessing major infrastructure projects. For 
instance, the Chinese firm Huawei was blocked from tendering during the 
construction of the National Broadband Network (NBN) due to security concerns.333 
At the same time, debates have emerged about the efficacy of the investment 
regime’s ability to understand the wider security environment after a AUD$506 
million May 2016 deal by Chinese company Landbridge to control the Port of 
Darwin was widely criticised, given it could allow the company (which is closely 
linked to the PRC) to collect intelligence about ADF and US Marine forces who 
operate in the area.334 
These responses reinforce the important claim at the centre of this thesis: Australian 
foreign policy and security planners face a number of challenges, but the evidence 
suggests they are responding to the regional environment largely as expected when 
using a reading grounded in material factors. Australia has consolidated the US 
alliance in terms of procurement, defence materiel and access to bases, in response to 
increasing security scarcity. Further responses include military support for actions in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and the war on terror, in order to demonstrate its commitment to 
the US regional order and alliance. At the same time, Australia engages the PRC 
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economically and institutionally, while also maintaining a rigid framework to 
balance foreign direct investment (FDI) concerns with national security in a way that 
is expected under a structural reading.  
Domestic Environment and Elites 
Paradoxes begin to emerge when we move to the domestic level and explore how 
debates there intersect with pragmatic decision-making on diplomacy and defence. 
Very quickly it becomes apparent that the uncertain security environment is at odds 
with many domestic conditions and attitudes. Unlike many other neighbouring Asian 
states, these attitudes are shaped by high developmental metrics. Australia ranks 
tenth in GDP (PPP), ahead of substantial powers such as Japan, Germany, France 
and the UK.335 It is also second on the Human Development Index (HDI) rankings, 
sitting only behind Norway.336 Its quality of health is fourth in the world, above the 
US. Australia is also one the ‘happier’ countries in the world (ranking tenth, above 
all great powers).337 Furthermore, Australia has enjoyed a twenty-five-year period of 
uninterrupted economic growth.338 Consequently, Australian attitudes can be 
described as post-materialistic, with few concerns about the scarcity of goods, 
leading to a domestic political environment increasingly focussed on values and 
identity.339 
These metrics inform and shape Australia’s political system, which is the most plural 
and open of the three cases assessed in this thesis. For example, the 2016 Freedom 
House Index rates Australia first on all their available indicators.340 The 2012 
Economist Intelligence Unit ranked Australia at number six globally: it scored a 
perfect ten in electoral processes and pluralism, and it was the highest-ranked G20 
member.341 Compulsory voting and a rigid political system underpin these 
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democratic credentials. The government consists of a bicameral legislature, with the 
High Court having judicial review over Federal and State laws, in addition to 
constitutional interpretation. The state is a constitutional monarchy, although in 
practice the monarchy’s power is largely symbolic. The only domestic event of note 
to cause any political consternation was the Whitlam ‘dismissal’ of 1975 where the 
Governor-General dismissed the Prime Minister in controversial circumstances.342 
Despite this, there have been few revolutionary events in Australian political history, 
and the domestic political environment is highly stable. 
Politically, the government is organised as a federation, with state and national 
governments given sovereign authority over specified areas of policy. All security 
and foreign policy decisions are taken at the federal level. Only once (if terrorism 
related issues are set aside) has a national security issue crossed into domestic 
politics during 1983, when Gareth Evans sent F-111Cs for surveillance on the 
Tasmanian Gordon Dam project.343 This was undertaken because of fears that 
construction of the dam inside the World Heritage Area was breaking Australia’s 
obligations under the Convention concerning the Protection of the World’s Cultural 
and Natural Heritage.344 
Federal level domestic politics revolves around a two-party system, with occasional 
third players entering the fray. The two key entities are the Australian Labor Party 
and the Liberal/National Coalition. The Liberal and National parties have formed a 
permanent coalition since 1923, and represent the centre-right. The Labor party has 
its basis in the social movements of the early 20th century. The Greens emerged as a 
third minor force in Australian politics at the turn of the millennium. While holding 
little power in the House, the nature of the Senate has meant the Greens have held 
the balance of power on a number of occasions, and have therefore enjoyed 
considerable weight in negotiations concerning the passage of bills. 
Security matters themselves are handled by a wide variety of organisations.345 The 
core organisations for security matters are the Department of Foreign Affairs 
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(DFAT), the Department of Defence (DOD), the Attorney-General’s Department 
(AGD) and the Office of National Assessments (ONA), which coordinate the 
assessment of threats gained from intelligence, assess risk, and provide coordination 
of responses. ONA assessments are for the use of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
and are deliberately detached from DFAT and DOD in order to allow independent 
advice. Together, these three organisations serve Australia’s nation security interests 
and receive broad bipartisan support. This means they have been relatively 
impervious to domestic politicking. In addition, although DFAT has been subject to 
substantial budget trimming, with AUD$7.9bn of cuts forecast for the five years 
following 2014,346 this has been partly offset by increases in intelligence spending 
and the expansion of agencies such as ASIO, ASIS and the AFP.347  
Taken together, this domestic political structure can present problems for foreign and 
security policy makers. While Australia’s transparency is enviable when viewed 
through a liberal democratic lens, it is arguably less beneficial under the neoclassical 
realist position and when viewed strictly in security terms. This is because high 
levels of pluralism make Australian debates porous and open to a wide range of 
messengers and potential political provocateurs. This contrasts with other security 
competitors in the region, including China, and to a lesser extent Indonesia,348 where 
debates can be controlled more easily by elites, enabling decisive actions to counter 
security threats. The corollary is that Australian elites need to be subtle and careful 
when invoking certain discourses, because they are difficult to control once they are 
released into wider political narratives. 
Applying the Framework 
The first section of this chapter has established the security threats to Australia and 
how the balance between China and the US is a major force behind the direction of 
Australia’s foreign and security policy. It has also outlined the porous nature of 
Australia’s political system and how this can present problems when addressing 
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security issues. At this point, I move away from a materially based assessment, and 
instead probe how elites respond to issues that may intervene with foreign policy 
decision-making that has the goal of maintaining Australian security.  
Deflection 
As detailed in the previous chapter, deflection occurs when problematic foreign 
policy debates are removed from the political agenda because short-term reactions to 
these issues can affect long-term security outcomes. The most prominent way this 
occurs in the Australian case is via bipartisanship on critical security issues. This has 
created a political environment where, in general, and as Derek McDougall points 
out, there is scant parliamentary debate on issues of Australia foreign policy.349 
The deflection of foreign policy debates has a long history in Australia and is visible 
in responses on defence policy, where, as Daniel Flitton claims, bipartisan agreement 
is the norm.350 Further back, in 1988, Trevor Matthews and John Ravenhill provided 
strong evidence to suggest that Australian elites exhibited strong bipartisanship on 
policy towards the PRC, Japan and the US.351 More recently, Matt McDonald’s 
review of Australian foreign policy from 1962 to 2012 found numerous examples of 
bipartisanship, including contentious and arguably easily exploitable issues for 
political gain, including the Indonesian annexation of East Timor.352 What this 
suggests is that the foreign policy competitions that do occur between the major 
parties in domestic debates on are often on ‘softer’ or less ‘traditional’ topics, such 
as immigration or terrorism. 
A more recent and specific example of how certain debates are removed from 
domestic political competitions was Julia Gillard’s 2011 announcement that US 
Marines would be stationed in Darwin. The implications of a permanent US military 
presence in Australia were considerable, with experienced commentators such as 
Hugh White arguing that this was ‘potentially [a] very risky move for Australia’ 
given China’s sensitivity concerning attempts to contain its military presence in the 
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region.353 Indeed, as the analysis of potential antagonisms earlier suggested, Chinese 
threat perceptions of Australia are a critical element of Australian security. Hence we 
witnessed a bipartisanship response in support of the placement of US marines on 
Australian territory, which has kept it from deeply penetrating the domestic agenda. 
In fact, former Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s only complaint about the US presence 
was that two and a half thousand troops were not enough, and that the Coalition 
‘would be happy to see the establishment of another joint facility so that these 
arrangements could become more permanent’.354 Chinese officials did express 
concern over the plan, with the state news outlet The People’s Daily warning that ‘if 
Australia uses its military bases to help the US harm Chinese interests, then 
Australia itself will be caught in the crossfire’.355 But, overall, muted domestic 
debate from within Australia helped prevent the PRC from promoting or highlighting 
any particular damaging discussions. 
Later, in mid-2016, China again demonstrated its sensitivity concerning military 
issues, this time in the South China Sea, which is strongly linked to both nationalist 
and hard security concerns for Beijing. After an arbitration ruling against China by 
the International Court of Justice, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop warned the PRC of 
harm to its international reputation, and was rebuked by various Chinese sources, 
with a Chinese foreign minister spokesperson stating he was ‘shocked’ by Bishop’s 
comments.356 Bishop moderated her language later that month, clarifying that ‘we 
don’t take sides in the various claims’, 357 but an opinion editorial in the government-
owned Global Times followed soon after which called Australia a ‘paper cat’. It 
claimed Australia had ‘unexpectedly made itself a pioneer of hurting China’s interest 
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with a fiercer attitude than countries directly involved in the South China Sea 
dispute’.358  
Fear of this type of Chinese response contributes to a political climate where matters 
concerning general defence policy, such as strategy and materiel procurement, that 
can antagonise security competitors, are generally restrained. For example, while the 
purchase of multirole F-35s for the RAAF has been flagged by some media 
commentators, both parties have downplayed this in the political rhetoric given this 
is a core security and defence issue. This is despite attempts to politicise the matter 
by the media, including criticism from defence experts with engineering and flight 
backgrounds. Peter Goon, a former RAAF flight-test engineer, has been one such 
prominent critic, claiming the F-35 design is ‘riddled with single points of failure’.359 
Similarly, journalist Jamie Seidel has publicised the F-35’s shortcomings, and 
especially its inferiority in simulated combat with the in-service SU-35.360  
While these deficiencies are potentially concerning, there have been few moves to 
politicise the issue by the established parties, even though electoral currency has 
been available. For instance, while the 2014 budget was widely criticised for its cuts 
to areas such as social services, education and health, the Opposition Leader Bill 
Shorten refused to criticise the government’s commitment to the F-35 procurement, 
stating instead that: 
‘Labor does think that the addition to our air force is the right way to go. 
These are a very long-term purchase. The acquisitions are over a very long 
period of time. So these defence purchases are necessary for our forward-
security plans over a number of decades’.361  
This helps create a domestic environment where issues that might normally be 
highly contentious, such as the US presence in Darwin, have warm acceptance. 
Indeed, 55 percent of Australians were in favour of the US base according to a 2011 
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Lowy poll.362 This issue also subsequently failed to rate at either the 2013 or 2016 
elections. 
Similar logic appears within critical overseas appointments with security 
implications. In 2014, then Liberal Prime Minister Tony Abbott extended Labor 
party stalwart Kim Beazley’s term as US ambassador—the most senior foreign 
policy posting within the Department of Foreign Affairs—after coming into power. 
Yet, ten years before that Beazley and Abbott had frequently clashed as Opposition 
Leader and Health Minister respectively, with Beazley then claiming that Abbott 
treated ‘the Australian people with contempt’363 and that Abbott’s decision making 
(in regards to health policy) was a ‘class A, rolled-gold, world’s-best-practice piece 
of deceit’.364 In this example, there is evidence the adversarial approach used within 
‘softer’ domestic issues disappears when actors engage within a foreign policy 
structure. Indeed, Abbott’s attitude to the posting was in stark contrast to other 
domestic contests involving high-level bureaucrats. For example, the arena of 
‘values’ driven diplomacy has been contested as it presents few immediate 
existential threats to Australia. This was visible when Tony Abbott attacked Gillian 
Triggs as head of the Australian Human Rights Commission, publicly questioning 
her ‘extremely questionable judgment’ and ‘bizarre rulings’.365 
Japanese-Australian relations also exhibit clear signs of deflection, despite highly 
publicised contests on the subject of whaling. The most obvious example is that the 
rhetoric on whaling has rarely intervened in higher-level diplomatic negotiations, 
despite its prominence in Australian domestic discourse. For example, the issue had 
no impact on the signing of the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement 
(JAEPA), which was signed on July 8th, 2014, and allowed free trade on 97 percent 
of goods between the two states. This bilateral agreement raised the threshold of 
‘non-sensitive sector’ investment from AUD$248 million to AUD$1,078 million.366 
This was undertaken with broad bipartisan support, although Labor’s Penny Wong 
                                                 
362 Fergus Hanson, The 2011 Lowy Institute Poll (Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 20, 2011), 
accessed August 5, 2012, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2011-lowy-institute-poll. 
363 “Abbott Admits Govt Knew of Medicare Blow-Out,” ABC Lateline, last modified April 15, 2005, accessed 
July 29, 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2005/s1346592.htm. 
364 Misha Schubert, “Abbott Sorry, Denies Health Lie,” The Age, last modified April 16, 2005, accessed July 30, 
2015, http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Abbott-sorry-denies-health-
lie/2005/04/15/1113509926735.html. 
365 Sarah Whyte, “Tony Abbott Attacks Gillian Triggs for ‘Bizarre Ruling,’” The Sydney Morning Herald, last 
modified January 8, 2015, accessed July 31, 2015, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/tony-
abbott-attacks-gillian-triggs-for-bizarre-ruling-20150108-12k3us.html. 
366 Australian Government, “Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA),” 7.Japan-AJK 
101 
 
argued that it ‘it fell well short of what Australia “should have had”’.367 More 
importantly, the Japanese and Australian leaders signed a defence research 
agreement to allow joint development of military technology.  
Consequently, inflated issues, such as whaling, can be interpreted as largely 
immaterial within the higher order security agenda and largely a function and tool to 
appease domestic audiences. This acts to deflect the focus away from diplomatic 
engagement on matters such as FTAs, which help reinforce the existing security 
order in the region (which is central to the interests of both Japan, Australia and the 
US). From this position the use of whaling as political topic is bidirectional. For 
Japan whaling is one of the few assertive ways Tokyo can engage internationally 
without falling afoul of its restrictive constitution, giving its citizens a (relatively) 
benign issue to focus on. This is not to discount genuine concerns about Japanese 
whaling practices, but under the reading here, foreign and security policy elites are 
likely to prefer political conflicts about oceanic mammals rather than more critical 
security matters. 
But while Japan and Australia share an important strategic partnership, it is 
ultimately the role of the PRC that is central to Australia’s security concerns. Here 
Australian deflection of issues about China is informative. It is no surprise that the 
China threat thesis lies at the heart of Australia’s strategic outlook. The 2009 
Defence White Paper opaquely identified the PRC as the key future threat to 
Australia, while in 2009, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, stated (to a Retired 
Serviceman’s League [RSL] conference) that ‘the pace, scope and structure of the 
PRC’s military modernisation have the potential to give its neighbours cause for 
concern if not carefully explained’.368  
In a similar manner, the PRC was the focus of the 2012 Australian Defence Posture 
Review, which noted that most of Australia’s weaknesses are relative to its ability to 
‘support current and future abilities […] in Australia’s North and West’ and that it 
must be able to sustain operations into ‘the wider Asia-Pacific region’.369 This 
attitude complements the broader US ‘pivot’ to Asia to contain the rise of China, 
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where Barack Obama had pledged to deploy 60 percent of its Navy by 2020 in the 
Pacific, including six aircraft carrier strike groups,370 while President Trump has 
pledged to dramatically expand the US navy’s ship numbers from 272 to 350.371 In 
this context, Australia’s participation is vital, given it possesses a number of 
emerging alliance competitors for the US military umbrella, most notably India.  
The most recent 2016 Defence White Paper has followed this trend by identifying 
the U.S.-China relationship, military modernization, and rivalry in the Indo-Pacific 
as central challenges to security.372 This allows a situation where Australia—despite 
its domestic narrative about ‘good international citizenship’—is an increasingly a 
major military player in the Indo-Pacific, and is now the world’s sixth-largest arms 
importer.373 Consequently, Australia’s security policy has increasingly focused on 
integration with US force capabilities in order to counter PRC expansion and 
maximise its relevance to the US over the long-term. 
What makes these strategic positions especially curious, and supports the thesis here, 
is that issues concerning the PRC are routinely deflected away from public debates. 
This results in their position within the concerns of foreign and security policy elites 
rarely correlating with their position in the domestic agenda. In fact, despite the rapid 
rise of the PRC’s material capabilities, Sinophobia or concerns about China’s rise are 
largely absent in domestic debates when compared to attitudes towards those of 
Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian origin. For example, the 2014 Lowy Institute 
Poll found that 31 percent of Australians viewed the PRC as Australia’s ‘best friend’ 
in the region.374 In contrast, Lowy’s ‘thermometer’ poll—that measures ‘feelings’ 
for other countries, with zero degrees meaning ‘cold’ and one hundred degrees 
‘hot’—showed that in 2014 Australians were generally unfavourable to the key 
suppliers of asylum seekers, such as Iran (thirty-nine degrees) and Afghanistan 
(thirty-eight degrees), when compared to important strategic regional powers of 
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Indonesia (fifty degrees), the PRC (sixty degrees), Japan (sixty-seven degrees) and 
the US (seventy-one degrees). 375 Additionally, the ‘temperature’ for Iraq in 2011—
the last time this was polled—was thirty-five degrees.376 
In the context of the PRC, the risk for Australian foreign and security policy elites is 
that domestic discourses may be used by Beijing to test its relative position. 
Australia is an attractive target for several reasons. It is weak in relative military 
terms and cannot directly challenge the PRC. Similarly, its role as a virtual US 
security proxy makes it an excellent test case for US reactions. This type of 
behaviour has precedents. In recent history, a great deal of the PRC’s assertive 
rhetoric has been directed towards Japan, especially in reference to the atrocities of 
the twentieth century. Notably, Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
which houses the bodies of fourteen Class A war criminals, are frequently used by 
Beijing as a domestic rallying point.377 Similar debates emerged after Japan began 
using a set of  new historical texts in schools, which downplayed the role of the 
Nanjing Massacre and promoted a view of the Japanese as liberators of colonial 
dependencies.378 These events, combined with Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), culminated in a series of anti-Japanese 
riots in China and heightened tensions within the region.379  
Another concern for Australia is that anti-Western discourses within the PRC are 
arguably unfocussed, leaving Australia as a potential target. For example, Beijing 
has shown a willingness to harness the ‘unfair treaties’ rhetoric as a rallying point to 
justify its revisionist agenda. But so far, Beijing’s anti-Western discourses have 
rarely been backed with hard power. For instance, attempts to do so during the 
Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1996 failed when the US deployed two carrier groups, 
highlighting the PRC’s poor naval capabilities and strengthening military ties 
between Japan and the US. Nonetheless, Beijing continues to harness emotive 
language about Japan-US engagement with an emphasis on abstract concepts, such 
as ‘hurt feelings’. While this political logic is rarely used in the West, the Chinese 
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government will often use the notion of feelings as a core component of national 
identity.380 For our purposes, this demonstrates the risk to Australia’s security, 
whereby the PRC may focus on softer targets, should domestic populations demand 
responses to security competitions. In other words, this logic helps explain why 
elites act to ways to deflect issues with security implications. 
The broad deflection of issues to prevent Australia becoming a target of PRC 
rhetoric is described in a RAND report detailing the positions of US allies. 
According to the report, the ‘Labor party had seldom criticised [John] Howard’s 
approach to China, which in theory mirrored the China policy [...] of Paul 
Keating’.381 The report further claimed that ‘few Australian policymakers or 
commentators promote a China-threat school of thought’. At the same time, it 
stresses that Australian decision makers ‘do have concerns about China’s growing 
economic and military power, but these concerns do not enter into partisan 
debates’.382 
These processes of deflection are not new or exclusive to the current international 
political environment. Indeed, cruder examples existed before the multicultural 
discourses promoted by leaders such as Bob Hawke and Paul Keating became 
normalised. For example, before the 1970s, the PRC was viewed with trepidation, 
and crude Cold War paradigms dominated Australian debate. Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies, in particular, was vehemently anti-communist in public debates, repeatedly 
arguing that leftist insurgencies in Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam were Chinese 
aggression by proxy and part of a larger ideological threat to Australia.383 A 
similarly primitive notion of ‘forward defence’ was also promoted as the best way to 
fight the so-called ‘yellow peril’.384 The logic was that fighting offshore kept the 
battle away from Australia’s own immediate security environment.385  
At the same time, Menzies’ xenophobic rhetoric was accompanied by pragmatism 
and diplomatic progressiveness, such as when he and his foreign minister Richard 
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Casey opened legations in Chongqing and Tokyo in the 1940s, which helped 
Australia’s intelligence gathering and strategic statecraft efforts within the region. 
Later, and contrary to the populist Anglophile view of Menzies, he and his Minister 
for External Affairs, Percy Spender, engaged extensively in Asia through several 
institutions, including the newly-formed UN, the Colombo plan386 and Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), while initiating a strategic trading relationship 
with Australia’s former enemy Japan.387 Menzies’ actions contributed to increasing 
strategic knowledge of the region, and his posture on Vietnam eventually revealed 
the tenuous nature of claims about Chinese expansionism.388 
These earlier pushes into the region set the foundation of Gough Whitlam’s 
engagement with the PRC in 1972. He formalised the One China policy, which 
forms the basis of bilateral relations that exist between the two countries today.389 
While these moves are often framed as progressive in a domestic setting, an equal (if 
not better) explanation is that these actions were based on hard pragmatism. Even 
though Whitlam’s foreign policy emphasised shared ideas, institutions and 
understood the important role of cultural sensitivities390, using the model advanced 
here, we can interpret Chinese engagement as strategic acceptance of the growth of 
the PRC and therefore its future role in the regional security order. In fact, the 
ideational backdrop to Chinese engagement can be framed as way to minimise 
Australia’s threat perception given its history of xenophobia and Sinophobia. 
Contrasting foreign policy positions support this argument. It is therefore not 
surprising that while Whitlam loudly protested French nuclear testing in the Pacific, 
he only quietly rebuked similar Chinese tests.391 
This trend has existed not only in diplomatic and defence matters, but also in 
economic affairs concerned with the PRC. One example was the proposed Rio Tinto 
and Chinalco deal in 2009, worth approximately USD$20 billion dollars, collapsed 
                                                 
386 The Colombo plan was an early Indo-Pacific organisation, formed in 1950, and originally consisting of 
Commonwealth countries with a focus on Southern Asian states, such as India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  
387 Andrea Benvenuti and David Martin Jones, “Myth and Misrepresentation in Australian Foreign Policy: 
Menzies and Engagement with Asia,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 4 (2011): 57–78. 
388 Harold Ford, Thoughts Engendered by Robert McNamara’s In Retrospect (Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, n.d.), accessed October 5, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100327051619/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v39i5a12p.htm. 
389 Maysing H. Yang, Taiwan’s Expanding Role in the International Arena (M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 56. 
390 Rawdon Dalrymple, “Looking for Theory in Australian Foreign Policy,” Australian Review of Public Affairs, 
Symposium: Advancing the National Interest? (April 28, 2003), accessed October 5, 2009, 
http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2003/04/dalrymple.html. 
391 T. B. Millar, “From Whitlam to Fraser,” Foreign Affairs 55, no. 4 (July 1977): 858. 
106 
 
ten days before the FIRB could make a decision.392 Rio withdrew from the deal after 
heavy lobbying of the government by BHP, although leaked US government cables 
claimed the Chinalco proposal ‘made clear that [the US] considers the Rudd 
government’s reluctance to approve the deal [as] one of the major reasons for its 
collapse’.393 Soon after the failed deal, Rio Tinto executive Stern Hu was arrested in 
Shanghai, in what some perceived as ‘payback’ after the rejection of the Chinalco-
Rio Tinto deal and the bullish 2009 Defence White Paper.394 From the Australian 
end, the domestic response was quiet, and discussions of Stern Hu’s detainment from 
political elites were commonly framed in terms of abstract human rights concerns. 
Kevin Rudd specifically used muted language, claiming that the PRC had ‘missed an 
opportunity to demonstrate to the world at large transparency that would be 
consistent with its emerging global role’.395 At the same time, there is no evidence to 
suggest that Tony Abbott, as opposition leader, made any statements at all about the 
affair.396 
As a result, these substantial issues with security implications that link foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the PRC’s strategic ambitions rarely resonate deeply outside 
financial and political circles. Hence, while Australians are concerned about Chinese 
investment (with 78 percent opposed to the PRC trying to buy a major stake in a 
controlling company)397, it has seldom become a central issue in domestic political 
debates. Indeed, those who are outspoken on investment issues are often 
admonished. For example, when then leader of the National Party in the Senate, 
Barnaby Joyce, criticised the FIRB in 2012, then Prime Minister Abbott rapidly 
deflected the issue because of the potential for politicization. He did so by stating 
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that any criticism was constructive, and was ‘not [meant] to be critical of any of the 
current members of the FIRB’.398 
Indeed, the FIRB itself provides a notable example of deflection. The fact it still 
exists testifies to this despite John Howard’s 1988 initial ‘future direction’ policy 
seeking to abolish it.399 Yet, after his election in 1996, the FIRB was kept. In fact, 
the board became more assertive under the Howard government, with a 20 percent 
increase in rejected proposals during his first year in office.400 This supports a 
broader trend where, more generally, economic matters—most notably the 
liberalisation of the economy under Hawke, Keating and then Howard—were not 
subject to polarizing internal debates because they were viewed as critical to 
Australia’s longer-term security position.  
Resources and FDI have provided a second core arena for security antagonisms to 
play out between Australia and its competitors in the region, and have often required 
deflection by foreign and security policy elites. Australia is rich in natural resources, 
with three main natural assets: minerals, natural gas and oil. Other strategic 
resources, including uranium and gold, complement them.401 As early as 1934, the 
head of BHP, Essington Lewis, travelled to Japan to lobby for increased iron ore 
trade using the reasoning that entwinement would ameliorate potential Japanese 
aggression towards Australia. This led to substantial disagreements between Lewis 
and the Minister for External Affairs, John G. Latham.402 The standoff was first 
resolved when BHP committed to using funds from Japanese iron ore sales to 
develop the Australian arms industry.403 Nonetheless it was only in 1938 that 
strategic reasoning triumphed, nearly a year after Japan had launched a full-scale war 
on Mainland China as part of its vision of a unified, and Japanese controlled East 
Asia. Eventually Australia banned iron ore exports to Japan in May 1938 because of 
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the implications of Japanese expansionism.404 John Curtin finally justified the ban, 
stating that ‘iron ore may be used for the manufacture of munitions and for 
aggressive purposes by warlike countries [...] but such action [to ban mining and 
export] carries with it also a definite danger to the peace of the world’.405 
Though smaller in scale, this resembles similar concerns that arose throughout the 
1980s when Japanese investment increased in Australia because of neoliberal 
reforms. The rapidly growing Japanese economy created incentives to invest in 
Australia, and FDI throughout 1985 to 1996 increased from USD$63 billion to 
USD$360 billion.406 The rapid investment growth created a number of domestic 
schisms whereby established parties struggled to reconcile populist sentiment with 
the practicalities and wide benefits of increasing FDI. One result was the emergence 
of populist micro parties, such as the Advance Australia Party. This party, which 
relied on protectionist rhetoric and thinly veiled nationalism, had a small but 
substantial impact, gaining 12.8 percent of the vote in a by-election for the Federal 
seat of Cunningham in 1993.407 Other populist organisations, such as ‘Heart of a 
Nation’ led by Bruce Whiteside, protested Japanese investment in the state of 
Queensland. These populist parties garnered support via increasingly antagonistic 
language from sources including the radio ‘shock jock’ Ron Casey and the 
prominent Victorian RSL President Bruce Ruxton, whose controversial views about 
immigration were widely publicised.408 The visibility of these actors in domestic 
debates led the then Prime Minister Bob Hawke to reassure Japanese Prime Minister 
Takeshita Noboru both personally and publicly that Japanese investment in Australia 
was still welcomed.409  
While antagonisms about resources remain minor, certain other issues are 
informative. The attempted 2009 Chinalco USD$19 billion investment deal with Rio 
Tinto is one such event. Here, a Chinese review of the failed bid stated that ‘BHP 
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Billiton [which opposed the deal] took full advantage of its skilful mass media 
propaganda and its lobbying capacity to arouse public emotions and influence the 
judgements of government policy-makers’.410 It further claimed that BHP 
highlighted Chinalco’s political elements and widely advertised its state ownership 
in order to create domestic blowback.411 In this instance, companies such as BHP are 
detached from the national interest, and therefore harder to deflect issues away from, 
which can lead to problematic diplomacy (and by extension, security). 
These same corporate considerations conflict with security aims and are challenging 
because the Australian resources sector is relatively undiversified, relying primarily 
on iron ore, coal and natural gas, which together totalled 40 percent of Australian 
exports in 2013-2014.412 Companies like BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Woodside 
Petroleum are also publicly owned, and have diversified shareholder bases. This 
allows individuals with concentrated wealth to exploit opportunist narratives in 
domestic debates, which can pitch national interests against those of individuals. For 
example, Fortescue Metals chairman Andrew ‘Twiggy’ Forest, whose personal 
wealth was estimated at USD$2.5 billion in 2016413, has proposed a resource 
production gap in order to maximise the price of iron ore, and has called for 
Australia to support the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.414 On the resource 
front, he was a highly visible opponent of the Minerals Resource Rent Tax, which 
was successfully repealed in 2014, even though the tax was implemented with a 
number of national interest tests in mind. 
A more overt example of resources fuelling security concerns was visible when 
Chinese consortium Shandong Ruyi purchased 80 percent of Cubbie Station, a key 
producer of cotton and an irrigation station possessing fifty-one water licenses in 
South-West Queensland. The purchase went through largely unchallenged despite 
many security considerations including food security concerns. The National Party 
leader Barnaby Joyce did raise the concern that ‘under this deal, a company with 
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clear connections to another nation’s government will own Australia’s biggest farm 
by value, biggest water licence’.415 Still, in terms of political positions, Ticky 
Fullerton identified that the Cubbie Station deal revealed a strange divide. To her, in 
one corner was: 
‘Most of “thinking Australia”, left and right: Dr Ken Henry, Bob Carr, 
Malcolm Turnbull, Saul Eslake, Peter Drysdale, most businessmen and most 
of the media. And in the other corner? Barnaby Joyce. Oh, and a few Nats 
and Greenies’.416  
Joyce made similar claims in an opinion piece on the Cubbie deal, where he 
suggested that ‘people will try to impugn your character by dragging in a caustic 
inference towards you. In this one it is xenophobia’.417  
This reveals not only the difference in public and private debates, but the difference 
between economic and political debates, given the PRC’s use of resources as a 
political tool. This is attractive to investors, but worrying to security planners. 
Resources are an important political instrument because the PRC has grown at an 
average of 10 percent over the past three decades, and this has occurred despite 
Beijing possessing relatively few natural resources. The result has been strategic 
acquisitions targeting resources in Africa, Central Asia and Australia.418 For 
example, in June 2014, Baosteel, a Chinese state-owned company, acquired a 60 
percent interest in ASX listed company Aquila Resources.419 Aquila has a 50 percent 
stake in the West Pilbara iron ore project, which will include the construction of a 
port near Karratha.420 Rapid consumption of iron ore is likely to continue for another 
fifteen years with other mineral companies such as Rio Tinto planning its operations 
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in the context of a 2030 peak. In 2012, it had a predicted future annual production 
rate of one billion tons.421 In addition, while Russia and Brazil are alternative 
suppliers, a weakened Australian dollar, combined with political, economic, and 
societal stability, makes Australian procurement likely to be a preferred long-term 
source of minerals for Beijing. 
While competitions for resources are visible in press coverage, they do not resonate 
in the immediate way that an issue such as the property market does. In fact a recent 
concern for Australia’s domestic audiences is Chinese investment in real estate, 
driven by Australia’s status as a safe haven for Chinese capital.422 Problematically, 
Australian homebuyers and families are beginning to perceive Chinese investment as 
pricing them out of property markets, especially in the major cities of Melbourne and 
Sydney, leading to anti-Chinese narratives. For instance, an opinion piece by Paul 
Sheehan in the Sydney Morning Herald claimed that ‘cashed up Chinese are pricing 
the young out of the property market’ and that this results in a situation that is ‘not 
culturally healthy’.423 This has been reinforced by the emergence of xenophobic 
rhetoric, linked to foreign real estate investment, where minor protests have been 
held to stop ‘invaders’ that were perceived to be ‘pricing locals out of the market’.424 
Australian strategic analysts have also warned that these types of local issues could 
emerge as problems in the future, with Mark Beeson claiming they resonate with the 
PRCs narrative about the ‘struggle for status’.425 
Consequently, topics with Sinophobic undertones can be dangerous to Australia’s 
wider perception in East Asia, and this is visible by the fact that even new stamp 
duty charges in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland were reported widely by 
Chinese newspapers as evidence of Australian racism.426 This has occurred despite 
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Chinese investment concerns being exaggerated. For example, a joint survey by 
KPMG and the University of Sydney on Chinese investment highlighted Australia’s 
favourable and welcoming environment for Asian investors. It also stressed that 
Chinese investors were attracted by a ‘mature and highly regulated developed 
economy’.427 It continued that from a domestic position, that ‘despite strong public 
interest, little detailed factual information has been previously available about the 
actual nature and distribution of the PRC’s outbound direct investment (ODI) in 
Australia’.428 Overall, it found a perception from Chinese investors about negative 
media portrayal of the PRC, and only 16 percent of those surveyed thought that the 
media was supportive of Chinese investors. 
Away from the PRC, Indonesia presents the greatest immediate potential challenge 
to Australia’s interests. From a security position, there are concerns about its 
population (approximately 258 million versus 24 million for Australia)429, and its 
geographical position, which hems Australia in from the rest of Asia. These figures 
combine with substantial cultural differences. Indonesia is the largest predominantly 
Muslim state in the world, and harbours a few radical groups, such as Jemaah 
Islamiyah and Al-Qaeda who seek to exploit anti-Western sentiment.430  
Events such as the two terrorist bombings in Bali during the 2000s underscored these 
problems. This is because they created opportunities for xenophobic domestic 
entrepreneurs in both countries. For example, polling in 2012 by Fergus Hanson 
found that a third of Indonesians believed Australia ‘poses a threat to the security of 
Indonesia’ and 12 percent were in favour of encouraging ‘militant groups to attack 
Australia’.431 On the other hand, Australian sentiment was more measured. Those 
saying that it was ‘very likely’ Indonesia would attack Australia in the future 
dropped from a high of 31 percent in 2001 to 16 percent in 2013. At the same time, 
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the number of people not viewing Indonesia as a security threat at all jumped from 
27 percent in 2001 to 48 percent in 2013. 
One would expect a more antagonistic view of Indonesia from Australians, but as 
Graeme Dobell has noted, the use of careful wording about close regional actors is 
instructive. Indeed, he claimed the term the ‘arc of instability’ was used by foreign 
policy elites as a ‘polite way to refer to Indonesia’, as it prevents strategic discourse 
concerning Indonesia entering populist domestic debates.432 Moreover, messages 
aimed at domestic audiences have often been framed in bipartisan ways. After 
frictions between Canberra and Jakarta in during 2014 and 2015 both the Prime 
Minister and opposition leader both frequently used the term ‘Team Australia’ when 
discussing Indonesia. Opposition leader Bill Shorten claimed he was on ‘Team 
Australia’ regarding the revelation that Australia had bugged the phone of 
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,433 and later announced that ‘no 
one side of Australian politics owned the Australia-Indonesia relationship’, 
suggesting a willingness to deflect the issues of the political agenda.434 
Earlier in the bilateral relationship, Indonesia demonstrated the extent of Australian 
elites’ discursive control. For example, Gough Whitlam is often perceived 
domestically as an ideationally driven leader. Yet in foreign affairs, and during the 
Indonesian takeover of East Timor in 1975, he made few criticisms of Jakarta’s 
actions. Later, leaked documents quoted Whitlam as telling President Suharto that 
‘Portuguese Timor should be integrated into Indonesia, but this should not be done 
in a way to upset the Australian people’.435 His policy of disengagement from Timor 
was driven by the fear of a weak and unstable state on Australia’s borders inviting 
great power competition.436 Thus, although approximately 60,000 perished over the 
course of the occupation437, a geopolitically grounded assessment suggests that 
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Whitlam was highly pragmatic when making decisions about security and foreign 
policy. This can be compared to his deputy, Jim Cairns, who appealed to domestic 
sentiment when he called US actions in Vietnam ‘the most brutal, indiscriminate 
slaughter of women and children in living memory’ only two years previously.438 
The corollary is that Whitlam and his Cabinet’s closed-door decisions (which were 
classified at the time) were in stark contrast to his external posturing on other 
regional issues such as Vietnam. We can assume the motive classifying the actions 
was to prevent morally problematic decision making penetrating domestic political 
debates. 
More recently, this type of political deflection was notable in the Australian political 
response to the execution of Myuran Sukuraman and Andrew Chan in 2015 for drug 
trafficking. An editorial in the Jakarta Post claimed that the ‘Australian media is 
engaged in a surreal form of hypocrisy’.439 In this instance, the response to 
Indonesia’s legal system has been in stark contrast to domestic voices criticising the 
PRC and its high number of executions. Similarly, the editorial pointed out that the 
Australian government were not opposed to the Indonesian legal system when it 
sought to execute the Bali Bombers Amrozi bin Nurhasyim and Imam Samudra.440 
Therefore, within Indonesia there is a perception that Australia has double standards 
and invokes human rights to demonstrate that it is somehow exceptional in Asia.441 
While the issue was prominent in the media, political leaders’ statements were firmly 
worded but used tempered language. Opposition Leader Bill Shorten released a 
statement demanding only ‘a strong response from the Australian government’.442 
Tony Abbott did lodge a formal protest, by removing the Ambassador, but relations 
were normalised soon after the initial protests subsided. Eventually, the Ambassador 
returned only five weeks after being withdrawn.443 In this instance, a great deal of 
domestic political responses can be interpreted as theatre, with political leaders 
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needing to cater to their domestic constituents, and respond with the motive of 
maintaining domestic legitimacy, given Australia has a strong anti-execution norm. 
Other less obvious areas, such as the live cattle trade, have also created domestic 
concerns within Indonesia. In 2011, Australia banned the live export of cattle to 
Indonesia after concern about abattoir standards.444 The concerns themselves came 
from a documentary broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) 
rather than regulatory bodies, featuring workers hitting and eye-gouging cattle.445 In 
response, Indonesia threatened to submit complaints to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). As Louise Staley highlighted, this was a significant double 
standard given that there had been a notable lack of Australian criticism of poor 
conditions in US slaughterhouses.446 At the same time, the Jakarta Post pointed out 
that food and culture were closely linked, with the live export industry largely reliant 
on the Islamic concept of halal.447 Countries such as Indonesia have a strong 
preference for halal slaughter of live animals and distrust of Australian halal 
abattoirs, despite the fact these are regulated by local Islamic accreditation 
agencies.448 Hence, attempts by Australia to intervene, ostensibly in a regulatory 
manner, were perceived as a form of cultural interventionism by Indonesian 
domestic audiences. 
Overall, this means that Australia must be highly sensitive when invoking discourses 
that focus on Indonesia, because Australia is the state most strongly identified with 
the West in the region. And, as demonstrated above, cultural issues are open to 
misperception and exaggeration. Indeed, these themes have emerged in numerous 
forums including a Jakarta Post editorial that claimed Australia is perceived as ‘as an 
arrogant neighbour that has a strong sense of superiority toward Indonesians’.449 
Indonesia’s nascent democracy has amplified these concerns, where there is no clear 
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balance between major parties, and minor secular and Islam parties vie 
opportunistically for power, increasing the chance of entrepreneurs harnessing anti-
Australian sentiment.450 
Australia’s relationship with India—another key regional power—often ranks lower 
in Canberra’s foreign policy priorities than China, but is increasingly problematic. 
For example, narratives about Australia are often used negatively in Indian domestic 
debates. Hate crimes directed at Indian students in Melbourne during 2009, for 
instance, fuelled significant anti-Australian sentiment. Indian media coverage of 
those attacks resulted in a 46 percent drop in the number of Indian student visas the 
following year.451 Yet student numbers recovered as the controversies abated, 
experiencing a 38 percent increase during 2013-2014,452 thereby demonstrating the 
pertinence of messages projected abroad to Australia’s economic and soft power in 
the region. It is also instructive that the controversy about violence directed at Indian 
students correlated with a decline in Indian-Australian relations. This was 
demonstrated by New Delhi’s tepid response to Kevin Rudd’s 2011 suggestion of a 
trilateral security pact with the US and India.453 Even though this was predominantly 
informed by high-level security considerations, these domestic perceptions fed into 
India’s own political debates. Consequently, at a time when US-India relations have 
deepened, Australia-India relations remain lukewarm at best, despite attempts by 
Canberra to repair the relationship through initiatives like the formalisation of an 
agreement on uranium exports in September 2014.454  
The relationship has been further complicated because India competes for US 
military loyalty in the region, possessing an equally strategic position and with the 
potential to devalue Australia’s security position in the future. India’s own security 
posture is driven by an ‘Act East’ policy that stresses integration with Eastern 
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Asia.455 This is partly driven by a post-Soviet world order in which India is no longer 
able to hedge via the non-aligned bloc. Thus, India has pursued closer integration via 
organisations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and agreements such as the India-
ASEAN free trade agreement, which was codified in 2009.456 Furthermore, India 
hopes to strengthen ties using its historical cultural links to South East Asia within 
countries such as Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia. A longer-term goal of 
India is membership of the UNSC, which is unlikely, but if successful would create a 
substantial change in the normative security dynamics of the region. 
Despite these problems, Australian foreign and security policy towards India is 
informative. India has a strategic need for reliable uranium supplies, which helps 
underpin its development ambitions. At the same time, Indian security is upheld by 
its nuclear program, which sits outside of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). Furthermore, Australia has used uranium to improve relations with India, in 
recognition of its importance strategic role in the Indo-Pacific. John Howard 
broached the initial deal in 2006 as part of an Indian memorandum of understanding 
on Defence Cooperation. The private component of the Howard government’s 
deflection strategy came to light in a leaked US cable that stated ‘We are […] struck 
by the openness of the GOA [Government of Australia] to the US-India civil nuclear 
deal despite the strong anti-nuclear sentiment at home’.457 This underpinned a 
strategic positioned that aligned Australia with the US and its position on the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), where India was granted an exemption under the 
123 Agreement, giving India access to nuclear markets, the only country outside of 
the NPT to do so.  
Deflection here works on two levels. As Matthew Sussex has noted, at the 
international level Australia’s interests shape its behaviour. But its discourse about 
upholding rules and norms as cornerstones of middle power diplomacy is 
questionable when viewed in the context of the 123 Agreement, especially where 
Canberra could (but did not) block the agreement. At a domestic level it helped 
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appease deteriorating relations between the two states where Indian officials stated 
that Australia was engaged in ‘pathetic hypocrisy’ and Australia was attempting to 
‘cosy up to the world’s largest autocracy [the PRC], while nullifying a decision [...] 
to help build a closer rapport with the world’s biggest democracy’.458 Despite this, 
support for the 123 Agreement eventually helped repair the relationship.459 
Domestically, Kevin Rudd’s initial public statements concerning the deal can be 
interpreted as a way to appease the party base, given he later quietly supported the 
broader 123 agreement and supported a number of pragmatic security decisions.460 
After Julia Gillard replaced Rudd, she advanced the deal, which was eventually 
signed by her Coalition successor Tony Abbott.461 Notably there was little public 
dissent about the deal, despite 39 percent saying they were ‘strongly against’ selling 
uranium to India in the 2012 Lowy poll.462 
This evidence suggests that deflection is frequent and creates an environment where 
debates about security competitors in the region are regularly downplayed by the 
major parties. The way that the major parties deal with China is instructive, as is the 
carefulness concerning Indonesian issues. This demonstrates a high level of 
bipartisan rationality behind Australian decision-making, given Jakarta and Beijing 
are prone to exploiting contrary ideational messaging from Australia to enhance their 
own rhetorical positions. 
Furthermore, deflection occurs not only during the administrative period of 
government, but also during election campaigns. This results in a phenomenon 
whereby authentic foreign policy debates during election campaigns are very rare. 
As Geoffrey Garrett observed in 2010, ‘foreign policy has played virtually no role in 
Australia’s race to the polls on 21 August beyond the domestic hot button issues of 
asylum-seekers and immigration’.463 In a similar manner, Peter Jennings declared 
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defence policy as largely bipartisan at Federal elections, from 1987 through to 
1998.464 And during the 2016 Federal election campaign, Russell Trood claimed that 
there were few choices to be made about foreign policy given the ‘high degree of 
consensus, […] among Australia’s mainstream political elites’.465 Taken together, 
these examples focused on generalised foreign and security policy show quiet 
approaches to sensitive issues with the PRC, Indonesia and India, and demonstrate 
how problematic discourses that may intervene with security matters are deflected 
away from public debates.  
Dilution 
Although established players will often seek to deflect discourses with security 
implications, sometimes they can quickly gain in currency. This allows for their 
exploitation by political entrepreneurs. As the Sukuraman and Chan case 
demonstrates, deflection is particularly problematic when unexpected crises have 
occurred that force a populist response, or required Australian elites to take sides on 
issues that may clash with more immediate security concerns such as human rights 
norms, or contentious issues in the region such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. 
This means that a range of problematic discourses with security implications can and 
have become popularised despite attempts to deflect them. This can occur when 
niche, populist or radical actors not previously exposed to the security implications 
of political rhetoric opportunistically hijack debates.  
Indeed, the dangers of populism and idealism leading to irrational foreign policy are 
widely described by international relations theorists. For example, George Kennan 
warned that public opinion about foreign policy is not necessarily democratic, but 
rather ‘the expression of the interests of special highly vocal minorities’.466 More 
recently, Zbigniew Brzezinski presented a similar warning as domestic constituents 
often sought ‘simplistic sources of comfort and clarity’ and warned against elected 
representatives tendency to be ‘stunningly ignorant to pursue an intelligent policy 
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that does justice to the complexity of the world.’467 In other words, popular voices, if 
followed uncritically, created unhealthy foreign policy.468 
With this as context, the alternative to deflection, then, is to dilute. Elites may do so 
for various reasons, but the objective is to remove the ability of rogue rhetorical 
actors to derail discourses with security implications. Consequently, dilution 
recaptures problematic narratives, and then repackages them in ways that are less 
challenging to the security interests of the state. This involves reinterpreting fringe 
issues in ways that seize the populist sentiment underpinning the issues, and then 
repositioning the most problematic part of those narratives in ways that mitigate any 
security consequences. 
Dilution can be observed in the Australian setting in several arenas related to foreign 
and security policy. Xenophobic populists, such as the One Nation Party in 
Australia, are a key target of dilution. As demonstrated by the resurgence of far 
right-wing parties world-wide, and the re-emergence of One Nation as a political 
force in 2016, the sentiments these new actors espouse are, as Richard DeAngelis 
claims, unlikely to disappear, and are more commonly ‘absorbed and integrated’ into 
the system.469 Across various cases populists share a number of similar beliefs, such 
as anti-elitism and fear of outsiders, alongside a belief in a number of ‘facilitating 
conditions’, such as anxieties about globalisation and economic insecurities.470 Often 
their grievances are linked to international pressures, blaming their perceived 
marginalisation on forces such as Islam and immigration.471 In a European setting, 
including in Denmark and Austria, where anti-immigration parties have experienced 
successes, the security considerations are less pertinent because of the architecture of 
NATO. Similar patterns have emerged in the US where Donald Trump was elected 
on a platform with a strong immigration focus, including substantial restrictions on 
entry to the US for Mexicans and Muslims.472 However, in Australia, permanent 
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isolation and reliance on bilateral relationships can underscore the perception of 
security vulnerability. 
The experience of the One Nation party, which rapidly emerged in the 1990s with an 
anti-immigration and anti-foreign investment stance, is instructive here. Pauline 
Hanson’s maiden speech typified the target audience, when she stated ‘I believe we 
are in danger of being swamped by Asians’, and that immigration must be stopped to 
prevent ‘unskilled migrants not fluent in the English language’.473 By 1998 One 
Nation’s unsophisticated and indiscriminate xenophobia captured approximately 8 
percent of the national vote at the 1998 Federal election, and almost 23 percent at the 
1998 Queensland state election.474 
The core concern of Australia’s elites was that ‘Hansonism’ damaged Australia’s 
security position and clashed with the ideational and cultural discourse promoted 
through the 1990s, via concepts such as ‘good international citizenship’, which had 
the motive of securing the national interest at the regional level.475 As a result, the 
response of dilution was visible when the Howard government took on a number of 
‘Hansonite’ positions in a moderated form, with the end goal of recapturing the anti-
immigration vote at the following federal election. The process began with Philip 
Ruddock’s claim in 1999 that the issue of asylum-seekers was a ‘national 
emergency’ and an ‘assault on our borders’476, thereby courting the attention of the 
marginalised bloc. Similarly, the coalition exploited the Tampa Affair in 2001 as 
part of a wider strategy to dilute One Nation’s vote. In a widely publicised speech, 
John Howard proclaimed that ‘we decide who comes into this country and the 
circumstances in which they come’.477 Indeed, dilution was accidentally described 
by Pauline Hanson herself, who complained that she was ‘castigated a racist by the 
media and major politic parties’, but viewed this as hypocritical because the ‘same 
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policies […] advocated back then are now almost populist policy, being advocated 
today by the federal government’.478 
In the aftermath of Tampa and the coalition’s tougher line on immigration, One 
Nation’s vote halved to 4.3 percent at the 2001 election, while the Liberal Party’s 
primary vote increased 3.19 percent.479 In essence this validated Stephen Brooks and 
William Wohlforth’s neoclassical realist premise that ‘a crisis creates a window of 
opportunity by discrediting old policies and the ideas associated with them’.480 In the 
case of the Liberal/National Coalition, this can be viewed not only as an attempt to 
‘outbid’ One Nation, but also an attempt to redirect xenophobic sentiment towards 
asylum-seekers, often of Afghani or Iraqi descent, rather than Hanson’s blanket 
dislike of ‘Asians’, which was accompanied by potentially harming trade and 
security. 
Of course, the opposing view suggests that Howard and Foreign Minister Downer 
were simply opportunistic. But Australia’s foreign policy at the time actually 
demonstrated a keen awareness of regional security. For instance, under Howard 
two-way trade with the PRC increased six-fold, and he successfully managed several 
potentially problematic areas including East Timor, the Bali Bombings, the Asian 
Financial Crisis, and a period of Indonesian instability with four different Presidents 
in six years.481 Given the prudent management of these issues, it is unlikely, then, 
that the Tampa Affair was the result of reactionary or reckless foreign policy. 
Instead, we can view this as the response of dilution working to correct problematic 
security narratives from entering the domestic discourse. 
Similar efforts to dilute can be found on the left wing of the political spectrum. The 
Australian Green Party’s policies were initially problematic from a (relatively minor) 
strategic point of view. After gaining popularity in Tasmania during the 1980s, the 
collapse of other third party actors (such as the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) in the 
1960s and 1970s and the Australian Democrats in the 1980s) created a third party 
electoral vacuum ultimately filled by the Greens. While initially focused on 
environmental issues, its early approach to the PRC and human rights was of note. 
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For example, earlier Green policies included directives to ‘restrict co-operation with 
governing regimes that violate human rights’.482 While such claims are valid in other 
contexts, this particular narrative was one that could have had a direct impact on the 
Chinese relationship if actualised or popularised. These worries were amplified by 
the Australian Green’s leader Bob Brown’s relationship with the Dalai Lama, and by 
a covert trip by Brown to Tibet, which was criticised by Chinese authorities after he 
called it the ‘world’s largest militarised colony’.483  
Despite Brown’s rhetoric, which included the claim that Julia Gillard was ‘another 
prime minister kowtowing to the communist bosses in Beijing rather than standing 
up for this nation’,484 the Greens’ role as the third party has been accompanied by a 
softening of its foreign policy attitudes. Hence, for the Greens, there has been a shift 
away from direct references to the PRC, and a preference for more distant national 
security issues. For example, the ‘peace and security’ policies of the Green party, as 
of 2015, featured three cornerstones: withdrawal from Afghanistan; independence in 
foreign policy; and voting before war.485 These opaque sentiments appeared after a 
shift in its policies toward the centre after 2001, when its federal vote increased from 
4.96 percent (up from 1.86 percent in 1993) and more specific references to policy 
concerning the PRC were removed.486 
Similarly, rogue elements of the Greens are increasingly reprimanded for loose 
rhetoric about foreign policy issues as the party captured a larger domestic audience. 
For example, in 2015 Bob Brown censured NSW Greens senator Lee Rhiannon 
because of her views on Israel and support for a boycott of Israeli goods. He 
criticised her publicly, stating that her foreign policy positions were ‘damaging to the 
Greens campaign, […because…] they had very good policies on transport, preschool 
education, [and] renewable energy’ and that the ‘NSW Greens have taken to having 
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their own shade of foreign policy’.487 This was in contrast with Kerry Nettle’s period 
as foreign affairs spokesperson for the Greens in the early 2000s, which was vocally 
pro-Palestinian, and included the claim that ‘one of the most powerful military 
machines in the world is waging war on an occupied people’.488 Other parliamentary 
statements by Nettle suggested that Israel was engaging in ‘indiscriminate killing: 
bulldozing, shooting and blowing up men, women and children’ and that it was the 
instigator of ‘fifty years of violence’.489  
The trend then, within the Australian Greens, has seen moderation on several foreign 
policy issues as it sought a position closer the centre, and hence closer to the realities 
of power. This broader trend was evidenced by the fact that popular Green 
politicians Rhiannon, Adam Bandt and Scott Ludlam, were overlooked for the party 
leadership in 2015, in favour of moderate Richard Di Natale, who has publicly 
advocated a desire to appeal to the political mainstream.490 
This differs from the example of the political Right by virtue of the Greens’ self-
moderation, although this is partly explained by a traditional party analysis, where 
the Greens have moved to capture a disenfranchised, progressive section of the 
Labor party. Nonetheless, the broader political forces have incentivised the shift to 
the centre on security issues, including the extension of invitations from 
establishment think-tanks like the Lowy Institute for Richard Di Natale to present 
the Greens national security platform.491 In doing so, he was forced to engage with 
the traditional rubric of Australian security issues, including the US alliance, 
submarine capabilities and maritime security. Mark Beeson claimed this was an 
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example of The Greens ‘growing up’, forcing the party to ‘dirty their hands in the 
polluted waters of traditional security issues’.492 
Established actors have also exhibited similar traits of dilution when using 
problematic rhetoric. For example, in 2003 Mark Latham was highly critical of 
Howard’s relationship with George W. Bush, calling John Howard an ‘arselicker’ 
and a ‘yes-man to a flaky and dangerous American president’.493 Yet on his 
elevation to the leadership of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), Latham was quick 
to praise ANZUS.494 In fact, an opinion piece by the journalist Gerard Henderson 
highlighted the drastic difference between Latham’s first foreign policy statements at 
the Lowy Institute in April 2004 and then in July the same year, going so far as to 
label them ‘Latham Mark I’ and ‘Latham Mark II’.495 The corollary is that Latham, 
who had used populism dependent on a maverick narrative to secure leadership of 
the Labor Party, was now attuned to the political implications of his rhetoric. Thus, 
Latham ‘Mark II’ softened his foreign policy polemics, publicly supported ADF 
actions in Afghanistan, and backed Howard’s use of the ANZUS treaty in the 
context of the 9/11 to justify military assistance to the US. 
The process of dilution is also visible in the shifting stances of newly elected leaders, 
who may initially be unaware of the material realities of their newfound position. 
For example, Alexander Downer’s initial handling of the Indonesia relationship in 
the 1990s came under scrutiny, especially over the aftermath of the Suharto regime 
and the ascension of President B.J. Habibie. This included the delivery of a letter to 
Habibie demanding that he ‘negotiate directly with the East Timorese and consider 
the option of an act of self-determination after a substantial period of autonomy’.496 
Downer also attempted to cancel the Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF), 
which prompted protests from the PRC, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines.497 
Yet after becoming familiar with his role Downer managed to control the 
relationship, allowing better deflection of ideas through prudent management of his 
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communications to the domestic audience. For example, he was widely praised for 
his approach to the Asian financial crisis, his deepening of bilateral relations with 
Japan and the PRC, and his role in embedding Australia in important regional 
forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS).498 
A similar trajectory can be found in the career of Bob Carr as Labor foreign minister, 
who used one of his first press conferences in 2012 to propose sanctions against 
PNG for its delays in holding elections. He boldly claimed that there was ‘no 
alternative but to organise the world to condemn and isolate Papua New Guinea’.499 
Carr’s comments, after only two days in the job, resulted in PNG calling in the 
acting High Commissioner, Margaret Adamson, to complain.500 The next day Carr 
released a statement claiming the remarks had been taken out of context, noting that 
‘PNG is a robust democracy with a proud history of holding elections as provided 
for under its constitution’.501  
This process can even be seen within administrations typically framed as more 
radical. For instance, Gough Whitlam’s bullish positions on regional foreign policy 
that antagonised US planners were only temporary. Privately, during the 1970s, the 
US was concerned over Whitlam’s ‘continuing turn to the left’, thanks to public 
comments from influential figures such as Deputy Prime Minister Jim Cairns, who 
raised concerns in Washington when he stated he wanted to ‘get Australia out of the 
big power military system’.502 Nonetheless, a few the populist actions attributed to 
Whitlam, including the removal of Australian troops from Vietnam, had already 
begun under his predecessor McMahon. Hence, a number of Whitlam’s public 
deviations from the US alliance were short-lived, and by mid-1975 American 
diplomats were expressing pleasure with the way that Whitlam administration had 
‘matured in its views’.503 The process was complete in 1975 with the release of the 
Defence of Australia document, which Graeme Dobell claimed was ‘delivered by 
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Fraser, but built by Whitlam’.504 The document reaffirmed the role of the US in 
Australian affairs, while removing the lingering undertones of xenophobic and 
western-centric messages attached to the notion of ‘forward defence’ in prior White 
papers. 
Dilution therefore occurs in two ways in the Australian setting. First, when political 
parties gain access to power, they are exposed to the realities of the policy decisions 
about security. The result is a moderation of their position on security and foreign 
policy issues. In the case of the Greens, foreign policy platforms have diluted as a 
matter of pragmatism, while One Nation’s position required dilution via hijacking 
and marginalization. Similarly, the major parties have acted to moderate their own 
elite’s views if they start to risk intervening in national security issues and rein in 
rogue voices. 
This helps explain an important aspect of the international-domestic nexus in the 
Australian context. It explains why actors in the centre may act in ways that initially 
seem paradoxical, such as when Howard engaged the alienated constituents that 
Pauline Hanson exploited in the 1990s, and who she again successfully courted in 
the aftermath of the 2016 election, with the reformed One Nation party gaining four 
seats.505 Indeed, similar patterns are likely to emerge in pluralistic democracies, and 
many liberal democracies possess anti-establishment third parties sitting outside of 
the centre. This includes groups such as the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP), the National Front in France, the Freedom Party of Austria and most 
prominently the rise of the ‘alt-right’ movement during the campaign of Donald 
Trump during the 2016 Presidential election campaign. Indeed, in the aftermath of 
the Brexit vote, politicians from both sides of the House of Commons worked to 
dilute rogue messages that were successfully exploited by nationalist entrepreneurs, 
such as Nigel Farage. This included actors such as Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, 
who in January 2016 ordered Labour MPs to vote in favour of Brexit Bill through 
Parliament, essentially supporting the Conservative position.506 
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However, we can also observe that dilution only works to an extent. Taking on a 
fringe actors messages does not always remove the political concern within the 
electorate. The answer, then, is take on these rogue messages and then obfuscate 
them with the amplification of other issues that are similar, but ultimately benign to 
the national interest. And, as the evidence above demonstrates, Australian elites have 
been able to successfully do so on numerous occasions. 
Inflation 
In this section, I present evidence showing several key instances of the inflation of 
benign security threats to Australia by elites. As this case has shown so far, Canberra 
possesses a number of substantial security pressures that could be exacerbated by 
problematic domestic narratives. In this section I argue that the focus on immigration 
and terrorism is politically expedient and highly visible in domestic debates for the 
simple reason that they present few existential risks to Australian security when 
compared to the larger geopolitical factors at play in the region. 
The most overt example of inflation in Australian politics has been over 
immigration. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin 
leveraged ‘invasion anxiety’, linking this to national security.507 Similar fears were 
used by Arthur Caldwell to popularise the notion of ‘populate or perish’, which was 
linked to fear of the large populations of Asia when compared to Australia.508 In 
recent history, Peter Costello invoked a similar theme when he told citizens to have 
three children: ‘have one for the father, one for the mother and one for the 
country’.509 The implication was that low birth rates influenced the future security 
and economic prospects of the nation, with the subtext that Australia’s value system 
was also at risk if not populated from within. 
These anxieties have often manifested themselves as xenophobia. Early in the 
twentieth century, Minister for External Affairs Billy Hughes exploited this 
sentiment, and opposed the ‘racial equality proposal’ during negotiations to form the 
League of Nations. In more stark terms, the populist notion of the ‘yellow peril’ 
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became embedded in domestic narratives, resulting in a unique literary genre—
‘invasion novels’—with inventive titles in the late 19th and early 20th century 
including The Yellow Wave and The Australian Crisis.510  
These cultural narratives helped legitimise the ‘White Australia Policy’ set of laws 
established to protect an Australian ‘identity’, which began with the 1901 
Immigration Restriction Act. In the context of the time cultural and racial 
homogeneity were viewed as critical to national security given Australia’s place in 
Asia. For Alfred Deakin ‘these people differ[ed] from us in such essentials of race 
and character as to exclude the possibility of any advantageous admixture’. 511 He 
continued with the claim that non-Europeans ‘do not and cannot blend with us; we 
do not, cannot and ought not to blend with them’.512 
In the domestic context, these xenophobic narratives helped justify strong alliances 
with the UK and then the US. Hence, to the domestic audience, foreign and security 
policy elites were not averse to the presentation of a cartoonish ‘evil’ and unknown 
force to the North. This was so deeply embedded that many of these views still 
penetrate debates, as evidenced by the section on dilution earlier. The paradox is that 
those narratives were perpetuated despite Australia’s defensive posture being 
complex and nuanced when addressing regional matters. For instance, under 
Menzies, Australia was actively engaged in many contentious events, including the 
Korean War, the Malaysian Emergency, and the Indo-Malay ‘Konfrontasi’.513 In 
addition, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter, every Australian leader since 
Menzies had made small and incremental steps towards engagement with Asia. In 
fact, this progression supports the broad neoclassical realist notion that material 
considerations drive long-term outcomes in foreign policy. 
One result has been that newer discourses informed by xenophobia have been shifted 
to areas that have a lesser effect on Australian security. Specifically, Australia has 
moved a great deal of its discourse on immigration to target more far and distant 
actors, and specifically those of African or Middle Eastern heritage, rather than those 
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of Chinese origin. The turning point for this recent inflationary process was the 
Tampa incident in August of 2001, when a Norwegian freighter picked up 438 
Hazari refugees. The boat was subsequently denied entry to Australian waters, and 
the government threatened to prosecute the Norwegian captain for people smuggling 
if he proceeded. The widely publicised act, shortly before the November 2001 
Federal election, had the effect of turning immigration into a highly politicised issue. 
However, despite concerns over Australia’s commitments to international laws, and 
a diplomatic dispute between Norway and Australia, the action was popular with 
domestic audiences. 
A second event public event linked to immigration occurred in October of 2001, this 
time after the 9/11 attacks, when the ADF and Australian Coast Watch intercepted a 
vessel carrying 223 passengers, believed to be operated by people smugglers.514 
Ministers claimed that children had been thrown overboard by asylum-seekers in an 
attempt to force a search and rescue operation by Australia, thereby allowing them to 
enter the country.515 The claims were eventually proven false, but not after 
substantial debate, spurred on by the events of Tampa. Though controversial, 
domestic responses to the Howard government’s stance were broadly supportive too. 
Howard’s popularity increased dramatically after the incident, and his net 
‘satisfaction’ rating jumped ten points.516 These events helped initiate a shift in 
domestic sentiment against those of Middle Eastern heritage, and the 2001 
Australian Electoral Survey, taken soon after the events found that 54 percent of 
respondents believed that Australia should ‘accept some less or a lot less’ migrants 
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from the Middle East.517 This was in comparison to 15 percent who believed that 
there should be less British immigration, and 36 percent against Asian migration.518 
These opinions are at odds with the realities of immigration. In fact, the 
superficiality of asylum-seekers as a ‘security’ issue is demonstrated by the fact that 
the PRC is the top source of people seeking asylum in Australia.519 However, this is 
largely unknown because Chinese asylum seekers arrive predominantly by plane. 
For example, in the 2008-2009 financial year at the height of the asylum ‘crisis’, 84 
percent of asylum applicants arrived by air.520 In contrast, Afghani and Iraqi refugees 
were the dominant groups featured in media coverage throughout the 2000s.521 This 
divergent perception is driven by a combination of media and elite messages, where 
29 percent of the ‘authoritative’ viewpoints used by the media were from politicians, 
compared to 12 percent from professionals working with refugees.522  
Inflation as an elite response is therefore visible in the actions of domestic political 
parties that set agendas using topics such as immigration. In short, rhetoric is the 
main difference between the parties, with each party appeasing a certain domestic 
bloc: Labor frames its position as compassionate on asylum-seekers; while the 
Coalition acts as a catchall for the ‘stop the boats’ contingent. For example, the 
Labor Party has externally painted itself as the more compassionate party, providing 
a neat cleavage between those for and against the issue. Yet closer examination of 
the actual policy changes on these issues reveals that they are minimal. On paper 
Labor ended the Pacific Solution and abolished temporary protection visas.523 
However, in practice it retained the Migration Zone set up by the Howard 
government, which included the mandatory detention of all people entering illegally 
by sea.524 Furthermore, despite the fanfare surrounding the end of the Pacific 
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Solution, Labor moved to set up a ‘regional processing centre’, first in Timor Leste 
and then again in Malaysia. Both had many similarities to Howard’s policies. 
Eventually, in July, party leader Bill Shorten decided to back the government 
approach to turn back boats, while moving the political debate to Australia’s refugee 
intake numbers.525  
One further paradox is that national security considerations, which are meant to be at 
the heart of the debate, are handled in a relatively bipartisan manner too. For 
example, the security element of immigration was transferred to ASIO via the 
Security Referral Service (SRS).526 Hence, processes that addressed the central claim 
in the asylum debate—that illegal immigrants are a threat to Australia’s national 
security—were handled in a way that was deliberately detached from public debate. 
Furthermore, in the case of the SRS, the scheme had transitional government 
support. It was initiated by the Coalition Howard government in mid-2007 and 
continued by the Labor Rudd government.527 Later, in 2013, Tony Abbott launched 
‘Operation Sovereign Borders’, which despite its controversial status was successful 
in policy terms. Eighteen months after its launch there was only one ‘irregular’ boat 
arrival, no deaths at sea, and all asylum-seeker claims were redirected through 
established immigration channels.528 Therefore, despite the centrality of the 
immigration debate, the only substantial differences in general policy have been the 
stance on boat turnarounds, and the denial of permanent visas to any sea arrivals. 
Overall, this suggests that the core framing of the immigration debate has occurred 
through a security lens, but this lens is largely detached from the one used by 
national security elites in Canberra. Moreover, as the framework for this thesis 
suggests, this ultimately works to the benefit of security planners, who can then 
address the core security concerns unencumbered by domestic populism. In contrast, 
the narrative of immigration is one that is easily exploited, with the benefit that it 
creates few existential threats to Australia’s security position. In short, the inflation 
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of a threat that is far and distant, such as asylum seekers in small and ageing boats 
from Iraq and Sri Lanka, is preferable to the inflation of a more immediate threat 
such as China or Indonesia. 
A further example of inflation, which has become closely linked to the immigration 
debate, has been the profile of terrorism in domestic discourses. Terrorism and 
asylum seekers are often linked surreptitiously in the post 9/11 environment with 
Peter Slipper declaring in 2002 that ‘there is an undeniable linkage between illegals 
and terrorists’.529 In fact John Howard’s popularity that had jumped because of the 
Tampa incident increased another eleven points in the aftermath of the attacks on 
New York and the Pentagon.530 Yet, much like immigration, fears about terrorism 
diverged substantially with the pragmatic risks of any potential attacks.  
This has helped created highly visible debates concerning terrorism that exaggerate 
the threat and security implications. For instance, John Mueller has assessed the risk 
of being killed by terrorism (in the US) at one in 3.5 million over any year.531 
Applying this logic in an Australian setting brings equally low odds, with a 2015 
article showing 113 terrorism related deaths over the period 1978-2014.532 This 
equates to an average of 3.13 causalities per annum, resulting in roughly a one in six 
million chance of dying from an attack in any one given year. Terrorism is in fact 
less dangerous than daily life threats such as falls from beds, which killed 417 people 
from 2003-2012.533 Indeed, on Australian soil, there have been only four terrorist 
incidents of note: the Sydney Hilton bombing in 1978, the assassination of the 
Turkish Consul General in Sydney in 1980, the failed car bombing of the Turkish 
consulate in 1986, and the 2014 Martin Place siege. Significantly, none of these 
events explicitly targeted Australian political interests, with the Hilton bombing 
aimed at the CHOGRM (Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting) 
meeting being held there, while the Turkish attacks were linked to Armenian 
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groups.534 Indeed, Australia has never suffered any type of mass terrorist attack on 
its territory and the most existential threats of note for Australian security planners 
stemming from this region are not from terrorism, but rather from instability in 
resource markets.535  
Nonetheless, the terrorism debate, along with immigration, has dominated domestic 
discourses thanks to reactions to failed events such as the 2009 Holsworthy Barracks 
terror plot and the 2005 Sydney terrorism plot. This is even though the first two of 
these plots did not progress past the planning stage. In the Sydney plot, twelve guns 
had been stockpiled, along with various chemical materials, but no bombs had been 
assembled. In the Holsworthy plan, a group planned to use automatic rifles to 
massacre as many as possible in an al-Shabaab inspired attack, but claimed they had 
not yet obtained an appropriate fatwa to carry out the mission.536  
Other attacks included the Sydney Martin Place siege, where three people (including 
the attacker) died, and received saturation coverage that framed the siege as 
terrorism linked to ISIS. However, in the aftermath the motive was frequently linked 
to the mental health of the perpetrator or reinterpreted as a ‘lone-wolf’ attack.537 
Regardless, security elites such as Foreign Minister Julie Bishop used this and other 
similar events abroad to unfairly claim that groups such as ISIS ‘wield great global 
power that would threaten the very existence of nation states’.538 Similarly, former 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott consistently used the term ‘death cult’ when describing 
ISIS in order to reinforce and amplify threat perception.539 Overall, this trend in the 
inflation of terrorism has created undue and disproportionate fears. The 2010 Lowy 
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Poll found 73 percent of voters viewed combating terrorism as the most important 
issue behind protecting jobs and protecting the economy, up from 65 percent in 
2007.540 In the 2014 poll, the figure remained comparable, with 65 percent viewing 
international terrorism as a critical threat, versus 41 percent for China.541 Similarly, 
in 2015, 69 percent viewed ‘the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’ 
and the highest-ranked threat to Australia, while only 20 percent viewed conflict 
between the US and China as a ‘high risk’.542 
From the position of the neoclassical realist framework outline in Chapter Two, 
inflation fulfils several functions at both the domestic and international level. For 
one thing, it allows politicians to push through security legislation. In the Australian 
case, fifty-four laws focused on terrorism were passed after 9/11, with a new law 
passed on average every seven weeks under John Howard.543 These included the 
2004 anti-terrorism act that made it an offence to be a member or promoter of a 
terrorist organisation. Further measures were introduced in 2005 including measures 
to allow preventative detention and control orders as well as preventing ‘reckless’ 
funding.544  
The focus on terrorism works on another level and has justified shifts in financing 
security. For example, ASIO’s newfound importance in counter-terrorism was 
demonstrated in a budget of AUD$717 million in 2009-10545 compared to 
AUD$62.9 million in 2000-01, despite no terror attacks occurring.546 In a similar 
way, the Australian government spent over AUD$11.5 billion on counter-terrorism 
between 2001 and 2005 to counter perceived threats during the war in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan.547 While this may seem wasteful on the surface, it has consolidated 
Australia’s domestic security in line with wider material pressures at an international 
level. Hence, it has helped unpin the US alliance loyalty, high-level interoperability 
and intelligence sharing. Using this lens, Australian support for counter-terrorism, 
and military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, were not driven by a need to secure the 
immediate self-defence of the state, but rather to access a wide form of security 
currency via the US.  
Analysis and Implications 
The framework laid out in Chapter Two, when applied to Australia, demonstrates 
how elites’ public and private responses to security issues vary, depending on the 
issue at hand. They do so because Australia’s position in international politics is 
largely reactive due to its power status which logically seeks to maintain the status 
quo. Therefore, it must adapt to wider systemic changes, and simultaneously 
minimise interference from domestic populism. 
It is worth repeating the key theoretical points and interpretations of Australia policy 
used by this thesis. Using a security reading, Australia could be interpreted as a 
vulnerable country that is largely invested in traditional defensive capabilities and 
operations. Its defence budget for 2013-2014 was AUD$25.5 billion, and this is 
increasing to AUD$30.8 billion in 2016-2017.548 Australia ranks thirteenth globally 
in terms of defence expenditure, above Turkey and just below Brazil.549 More 
tellingly, Australia has been engaged in in eight direct military conflicts in the post-
World War II environment.550 This hardnosed assessment is rarely seen in domestic 
debates, nor is it promoted by Australian elites. Interestingly too, Australians exhibit 
relatively high levels of nationalism internally when compared to other states. The 
2012 World Values Survey found 61.8 percent of Australians were ‘very proud’ and 
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28.5 percent ‘quite proud’ of the country.551 This contrasts with states that are 
commonly viewed as nationalistic, such as Japan (25.1 percent and 40.2 percent) and 
Russia (28.6 percent and 47.5 percent).552 This suggests that despite Australia’s 
democratic system, there is relative social cohesion and a unified national identity 
and discourse. 
Consequently, what the framework reveals is the security and foreign policy elite’s 
role in shaping public debates. This results in a situation where despite Australia’s 
weakening relative position and growing regional threats, Australian citizens do not 
exhibit proportional fears about hard security issues. As shown earlier, terrorism 
dominates Australian fears about security. The 2015 Lowy Institute poll found that 
69 percent of Australians viewed ISIS as a high risk to their security, whereas 
conflict between the US and China was viewed as the lowest worry of eight separate 
options (coming in at 20 percent).553 What quickly becomes visible is that the focus 
of domestic ‘security’ debates is often concerned with ‘softer’ security issues such as 
immigration, climate change, terrorism and whaling, rather than ‘hard’ issues such as 
China or the US alliance. 
Aside from terrorism, immigration has been (and remains) a core concern of 
domestic audiences. In recent years, the subject consistently ranks highly as a 
perceived risk to Australian society in opinion polls and media measures. In Ipsos 
content analysis reports, immigration was placed in the top five of all issues from 
November 2010 to November 2012.554 This contrasts with issues on defence, which 
peaked at 6 percent in October 2012, despite Australia’s strong military capability 
and geopolitical security concerns. This trend continued into 2013, 2014 and 2015 
where Ipsos reports showed that over 20 percent of Australian’s viewed immigration 
as the top security issue facing Australia.555 Over the same period, concerns about 
defence increased, from 3 percent in 2013 to 16 percent in 2015, although this 
increase was potentially linked to the conflation of terrorism and defence considering 
                                                 
551 Ian McAllister and Juliet Pietsche, World Values Survey, Australia (Canberra: Australian Data Archive, The 
Australian National University, 2012), accessed July 13, 2015, 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp. 
552 Ibid. 
553 Oliver, The Lowy Institute Poll 2015. 
554 Dan Evans, The Top Five Issues Facing Australia, Ipsos Social Research Institute Issues Monitor, November 
2012, accessed July 13, 2015, http://ipsos.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/top-five-issues-facing-
australia.pdf.  
555 Dan Evans and Julia Knapp, IPSOS Issues Monitor June 2016 (IPSOS, July 2016), accessed August 20, 2016, 
http://ipsos.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Ipsos-Issues-Monitor-April-to-June-2016-National.pdf. 
138 
 
the increasing prominent of ISIS. Nonetheless, in 2015, immigration still ranked 
higher as a political issue than education, housing and poverty.556  
Similar polling taken on the Tampa incident and 9/11 are instructive. In the 
aftermath of both events, news time spent on terrorism and asylum-seeker issues 
accounted for more than all other election issues combined.557 A similar survey in 
the lead-up to the 2010 election found that refugees and asylum-seekers were an 
‘important issue’ for 75 percent of voters, while only 5.5 percent viewed defence in 
the same light. In fact, the resources tax, industrial relations, the environment and 
unemployment were all viewed as more important issues than defence.558 In this 
instance, the inflation of a relatively benign security issue became a prudent security 
tool. Some 438 refugees were a relatively small overall number considering the 
extent of the conflict in Afghanistan, and when compared to other similar 
humanitarian crisis, such as that during the war in Indochina, where Australia 
accepted approximately 95,000 refugees in the period between 1975 and 1985.559 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that many of the threats that have 
preoccupied Australian domestic audiences are detached from the concerns of the 
security community, especially in regard to strategic competition in East Asia, where 
more Australians see China as a better friend regionally than any other state.560 
Thirty-one percent see China as Australia’s ‘best friend’ in the region, above Japan 
at 28 percent. Some 65 percent of respondents to a 2015 Australian National 
University (ANU) foreign policy poll believed Chinese growth was a positive 
development for Australia, while only 30 percent saw China as a potential military 
threat.561 At the same time, military defence was viewed by only 0.3 percent of those 
surveyed as the most important policy issue to Australia.562 Similar trends are visible 
in Australian-Indonesia relations. Even though Indonesia is viewed as a source of 
                                                 
556 Ibid. 
557 David Denemark, “Information Flow and Voter Decision Making in the 2001 Australian Federal Election: 
The Role of International and Domestic Issues,” Political Research Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 2005): 397. 
558 Ian McAllister et al., Australian Election Study, 2010 (Australian National Univeristy, May 6, 2011), 75, 
accessed August 9, 2012, http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/research/projects/electoral-surveys/australian-
election-study/aes-2010. 
559 “Fact Check: Will Australia’s Refugee Intake in 2015-16 Be the Highest since WWII?,” Text, ABC News, last 
modified September 29, 2015, accessed January 18, 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-29/fact-check-
syria-largest-refugee-intake-julie-bishop/6786074. 
560 Greg Earl, “China Pips Japan as Australia’s Best Friend,” Financial Review, last modified June 4, 2014, 
accessed July 13, 2015, http://www.afr.com/news/world/china-pips-japan-as-australias-best-friend-20140603-
ivz3i. 
561 Ian McAllister, ANU Poll (Canberra: The Australian National University, September 2014), 6, accessed July 
13, 2015, http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ANUpoll_Foreign_policy.pdf. 
562 Ibid. 
139 
 
instability within academic circles, in the domestic population over 70 percent of 
Australians viewed Jakarta as either ally or ‘friendly but not an ally’, versus 19 
percent who viewed Indonesia as unfriendly or an enemy.563 
The perception of safety amongst the Australian populace is helped by emphasising 
threats that are far and distant. Most notably, asylum-seekers dominate threat 
perceptions, with 76 percent of respondents in a Lowy report stating they were 
concerned about asylum-seekers entering Australia via boat.564 Similarly, Media 
Monitors analytic services ranked asylum-seekers, along with climate change and 
Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan as the most-mentioned foreign policy issues 
during 2009.565 At the same time, only 40 percent of people polled viewed China as 
a threat, despite 90 percent perceiving China as the leading power in the region.566  
Correspondingly, fears about immigration and asylum seeking have little correlation 
with their real position in the hierarchy of threats. The vacuous nature of the 
immigration debate is revealed when examining the data closely. For example, only 
2,726 people arrived by boats in 2009 (up from 161 in 2008)567 compared to 53,900 
overstaying their visas.568 Together, those numbers only account for a small 
percentage of the 203,874 people on permanent visas that entered Australia in 
2008.569 In this respect Australian immigration numbers are comparable to several 
other Western countries. For instance, in 2008, the UK inflow of asylum-seekers was 
31,315, while France took in 35,404 people.570 
The other inference from the evidence here is that discussions about defence matters 
enjoy broad support. There is a perception that Australia’s security and strategic 
positions are generally appropriate because of their management within the domestic 
discourse. The ANU’s 1987-2013 Trends in Australia’s Political Opinion survey 
supports this position, where 90 percent of the population believed Australia spends 
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the right amount, or needs to spend more on defence.571 Despite this acceptance of 
security spending, Australians feel safer, and in 2013 48 percent saw Indonesia as a 
‘not very likely’ security threat. Similarly, only 14 percent of voters in 2013 saw 
China as a ‘very likely’ security threat. This figure dropped to 9 percent in 2001 and 
8 percent in 2004 at the height of the immigration debate in the aftermath of Tampa 
debate and the Howard administration.572 
Consequently, the findings in this case also help demonstrate why elites are driven to 
address potential antagonisms. The deflection of issues about Indo-Pacific politics 
away from domestic debates establishes an appreciation from Australian elites of the 
dangers of rhetoric. This is designed to mitigate the use of emotive language by 
growing states, and to facilitate their own changes in security posture. Current 
maritime and territorial disputes in East Asia are particularly instructive in this 
context. For example, the Spratly Islands have become source of tension between 
China and other states in the region, both at an international and domestic level. This 
is because their ownership is disputed by China, Vietnam, Brunei and the 
Philippines, who all have claims stemming from a mix of cultural, political and 
material factors. On one level, Chinese brinksmanship concerned with the Spratly 
Islands can be interpreted as testing expansionism, with a focus on gas and oil 
resources and controlling strategic choke points such as the Malacca Straits.573 Yet, 
on another level, it unpins a broader attempt by China to avoid US containment. On 
a third level, the islands resonate with domestic symbolism. Here, Beijing asserts its 
claims on the islands are justified, being lost as the result of ‘foreign intrusions’,574 
with these sensitivities being exposed after the 2016 arbitration decision on the 
South China Sea by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the subsequent 
outbursts in the China media against Australia’s role.575 
The lesson is that small and seemingly insignificant issues, such as China’s use of a 
map showing islands in the South China Sea on the cover of its passports, can be 
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problematic for security. In this instance, there was a domestic furore within 
Vietnam and the Philippines over the map used, which, in turn, acted to consolidate 
China’s nationalistic domestic pronouncements.576 Indeed, even before the 2016 
arbitration decision, there were revelations in 2015 that had China warned off 
Australian RAAF AP-3C Orion aircraft over the South China Sea. This was kept 
secret by the government, but eventually revealed by the BBC.577 Following the 
revelation, a stern editorial in the Chinese language version of the Global Times 
emerged. It warned that ‘it would be a shame if one day a plane fell from the sky and 
it happened to be Australian’.578 The English version eschewed the strong language, 
but this suggests that papers, such as the Global Times, which is widely viewed as a 
strong pro-government voice, are willing to engage American allies such as 
Australia in regard to issues in the South China Sea. A final point is that while these 
actions are challenging for Australian security planners, they do not seem to 
represent a unified grand strategy from China. Hence, for Fergus Hanson China is 
‘stumbling through the region’, and while expanding its influence, it lacks a focus.579  
Consequently, the main relevance for Australian security planners is to understand 
how states such as China are increasingly using the islands dispute to enable broader 
strategic objectives, as the work by Schweller, Pu and Sterling-Folker has previously 
described.580 From a neoclassical realist position, this means Chinese leaders often 
order and dictate the ideas that are fed down to the domestic audience. The risk for 
Australia is that China’s large population means that ideas are often carelessly used 
by elites. Fareed Zakaria has described this as dangerous nationalism, because elites 
stoke the flames of domestic audiences, but then panic when reactions get out of 
control. The CCP has used this ‘pragmatic nationalism’ alongside ‘patriotic’ 
education as a way to mobilise opinion against Japan, which has contributed to 
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events such as the anti-Japanese riots in Beijing in 2005.581 Hence, the concern is 
that Australia may become a focus this type of pragmatic nationalism. Indeed, 
Australia is attractive within this context. It is symbolic of the Western legacy 
Beijing often invokes, while also being a relatively weak military actor.  
It also demonstrates why issues like the Taiwanese question present substantial 
strategic dilemmas in the future for Australia and demand careful management of the 
accompanying discourses. US commitments via the Taiwan Relations Act and 
ANZUS automatically enmesh Australia in any regional crises. Although sometimes 
ambiguous in its wording, the ANZUS treaty specifically declares that ‘armed attack 
in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and 
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with 
its constitutional processes’.582 This was tested in 2004 when then-Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer claimed that Australia might not automatically help the US 
defend Taiwan if it were attacked.583 This led to the US Ambassador, Tom Schieffer, 
restating that the treaty commitments of ANZUS. He reiterated that the US and 
Australia ‘are to come to the aid of each other in the event of either of our territories 
are attacked, or if either of our interests are attacked, our home territories are 
attacked or if either of our interests are attacked in the Pacific’.584 
In this context, Australia’s role is further complicated given Washington has made it 
clear that the US is pivoting towards Asia. In 2010 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
stated that ‘America’s future is linked to the Asia-Pacific and the future of the region 
depends on America’.585 It follows that regional structure and the rise of China 
presents not only security, but normative problems for Australia. Australia is at risk 
of becoming normalised domestically as antagonistic to Beijing if it sides too 
strongly with the US. If China ‘needs’ to be aggressive, there are concerns that 
Australia could become a proxy for this aggression. Finally, it demonstrates why 
Australian domestic discourse sometimes veers into xenophobic rhetoric on the 
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surface, since the method of dilution has the goal of controlling problematic 
messages being used by external actors. 
Chapter Conclusion and Implications for Middle Power study 
In this chapter I have examined how Australian security and foreign policy elites 
have reacted to changes in the external security environment. I have also 
demonstrated that domestic elites and decision-makers reorder internal ideas to 
prevent interference occurring between the domestic and international arenas. 
Furthermore, this chapter has shown that Australian elites prefer the promotion of far 
and distant threats. Hence, immigration has consistently been used as a domestic 
security tool, despite little evidence to suggest that it is a significant problem. As a 
maritime actor, Australia has many natural advantages, and this prevents the high 
numbers of immigrants seen in other states, such as Pakistan, the US and Europe. In 
contrast, when issues that are problematic for security appear, such as those about 
Indonesia, China and the US, they are deflected or diluted by elites. 
One further finding of this chapter is that Australia is a largely passive, status quo 
actor, rather than active middle power when framed through a material and security-
driven analysis. This is not to deny the important role of institutions, but in a security 
setting it is very much a status quo player, which is a consequence of its pivotal 
middle power position. The contrasts with the established orthodoxy on Australian 
foreign policy and the corresponding middle power literature that suggests 
Australian foreign policy is grounded in activism. This account instead suggests that 
a great deal of Canberra’s core security and foreign policy objectives, in both 
material and ideational terms, sit on the defensive end of the offensive-defensive 
spectrum. 
This also contrasts with a body of Australian academic literature on foreign and 
security policy which assigns disconnects between policy and discourse to domestic 
factors such as history, culture and identity. In fact, a number of scholars see cultural 
factors as the genesis of foreign policy formulation. For example, Anthony Burke 
has designated ‘fear’ as driving a political culture of xenophobia and 
homogenization586 Similarly, Stefano Gulmanelli has articulated how John Howard 
reshaped Australian foreign policy narratives about the ‘Anglosphere’, and in doing 
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so rejected multiculturalism in favour of British-derived values.587 Richard Devetak 
and Jacqui True have also ascribed Australia’s foreign policy to ideational factors, 
claiming that Australia pursues an inconsistent and opportunistic trajectory towards 
international affairs.588 From this position actions, such as implementing stricter 
immigration controls are the result of ‘different governmental worldviews and 
conceptions of state identity’.589  
But as the account here suggests, these important contributions are less useful when 
assessing why elites respond to domestic concerns (such as immigration) in one way, 
while smoothing over contentious rhetoric that influences relations with important 
strategic competitors such as China. They do not address the puzzle where China is 
not a target of xenophobic entrepreneurs despite incentives to do so. In addition, if 
xenophobia is a driving force behind Australia’s security agenda, then why are 
threats being constructed in reference to asylum-seekers from distant countries such 
as Afghanistan and Iraq, rather than more immediate strategic competitors? More 
puzzling is why Australian foreign policy has followed a highly stable and bipartisan 
trajectory. If ideational and socio-historical factors are important variables, then we 
might expect evidence of generally divisive and dangerous policy outcomes given 
Australia’s regional security environment.  
In contrast, the evidence presented here using the neoclassical realist framework 
suggests the opposite. Through this lens Australia has managed its regional position 
with pragmatism. Overall, Australia has had good relations with key regional players 
and has faced no serious strategic threats since the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 
Furthermore, despite the prominence of xenophobia as a variable in critical analyses, 
security competitors, such as China, are far from the focus of political hyperbole. 
Indeed, China—once publicly viewed as the key ‘threat’ during the Menzies era 
(when it arguably was not)—is now viewed by the public as ‘Australia’s best friend 
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in Asia’.590 Paradoxically, this corresponds with a period in which security planners 
in both Australia and the US designate it as the key regional security challenge.591  
This also reveals why the ‘pivotal’ passive middle power interpretation is useful. It 
tells us that while Australia does engage in middle power activism, it is primarily 
undertaken in the context of material concerns. It means that when understanding 
Australia as a middle power, one must assess the role of, and intersection between, 
domestic politics and the wider security environment. 
In conclusion, the evidence presented here proposes that political rhetoric from elites 
encourages domestic audiences to engage in debates that have benign outputs for 
security. This allows the underlying state mechanisms to work and respond to 
external threats as expected while giving the domestic audience national security 
issues to ‘own’. A further reason for inflating ‘soft’ issues is that those parts of 
Australian policy pertinent to national security can become problematic if they are 
too keenly politicised. In this circumstance, there can be a ‘win-loss’ whereby an 
internal political party can ‘win’ on a politicised issue, but this can spill over and 
affect the states’ threat perceptions. For example, the Prime Minister or Opposition 
Leader could notionally increase their electoral chances by providing a critical stance 
towards the US relationship or by overstating China’s military and economic threats. 
Yet neither does so because this has great implications for higher-level games in 
which critical issues such as state survival dominate. With this in mind, I move to the 
case of Turkey.  
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CHAPTER 4: TURKEY 
This chapter applies the neoclassical realist framework developed in Chapter Two to 
Turkey. Turkey is an instructive case because it fulfils the criteria of a pivotal middle 
power also outlined in Chapter Two. It also exhibits many of the inconsistent 
paradoxes between public and private security discourses that were found in the 
Australian case. Indeed, the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates how 
Ankara’s rhetoric is frequently vocal concerning many populist topics for domestic 
consumption, yet its actual foreign and security practice have remained largely 
pragmatic.1 
Prior to the ascent of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkýnma Partisi or Justice and 
Development Party), the notion of ‘Kemalism’ dominated public discourses about 
security. This facilitated a clear and unambiguous outlook on matters of national 
security, grounded in a political framework geared towards Western integration and 
secular modernity. This came at the expense of freedom of expression, and for most 
of the twentieth century Turkey’s domestic discourses were highly controlled, 
assisted by a lack of communication mediums to disperse alternative views.  
Furthermore, as this chapter demonstrates, parties and leaders deemed to be hostile 
to Kemalism were routinely banned and jailed. For example, only twenty years ago, 
in 1997, Turkey’s military removed Necmettin Erbakan from office after he used 
language and policies deemed too close to Islamism, and in violation of the states 
staunchly isolationist foreign and security outlook.2 Similarly, in 1998, then Mayor 
of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was jailed for ‘inciting hatred’ after citing a Ziya 
Gőkalp poem linking politics and Islam.3 In both these instances, foreign and 
security policy elites were simply enforcing a long held norm in Turkey that political 
Islam was a threat to Turkish security as it aligned Ankara with ‘regressive’ forces in 
the Middle East, thereby inviting intervention in Turkish affairs.4 
These discursive contests have been more pronounced since the AKP gained power. 
Here, the content of the security rhetoric from elites has changed in line with the new 
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regional order. Additionally, the avenues for the delivery of rhetoric have changed, 
with the growth of the internet and social media. In turn, these have facilitated new 
alternative political narratives. Consequently, the previous emphasis on secularism 
and isolationism now provides a stark contrast with today’s environment, in which 
loud revisionist oratory is the norm, with the motive of recapturing and centring 
political narratives to encapsulate the new security dynamics facing the Turkish 
state. Former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu used this type of revisionist language 
in 2013 when he invoked a ‘neo-Ottoman’ discourse and sought to ‘tie Sarajevo to 
Damascus, Benghazi to Erzurum and to Batumi’.5 President Erdoğan was even more 
outspoken in 2014 when he used pan-Islamist language to claim that the AKP 
election was not only a victory for Turkey, but that ‘Islamabad, Erbil, Beirut, 
Sarajevo, Skopje, Hama, Homs, Ramallah, Gaza, Jerusalem, have all won’.6 
One way to understand these changes is by replicating the framework used when 
analysing the Australian case. This allows us to examine how the shifts in language 
employed by Turkish elites intersect and relate to the broader changes bearing down 
on the Turkish security environment. Consequently, the neoclassical realist 
framework presented in this thesis allows us to ascertain the extent to which the 
agency of prominent current and former elites, including Erdoğan, Davutoğlu, 
Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım are 
responsible for changes in Turkey’s traditionally isolationist foreign and security 
policy. Using this framework allows us to explore whether rhetoric from Turkish 
elites is a way to seek ‘permission’ to allow pragmatic responses to the emerging 
security environment, or alternatively, whether they are the result of simply 
ideological shifts as some of the Turkish literature on the topic suggests.7  
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If the patterns of deflection, dilution and inflation observed in the Australian case 
hold, the typology should reveal that the rhetorical and discursive tools used by 
Turkish elites have the function of reordering security concerns to adapt to the new 
regional security environment. In the context of pivotal middle powers, this will 
allow us to understand how discursive tools are employed by middle powers in 
environments with intense security dynamics and with differing ideational 
frameworks. 
As in the previous chapter, I start with an overview of Turkey’s security 
environment. This is shaped by its geographical position, wedged between the 
Middle East, Russia, Central Asia and Europe. The security dilemmas this position 
present are outlined via a description of three major periods in Turkey’s security 
history and an overview of the corresponding policy responses. The first is the end of 
the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of Turkish isolationism, which was used to 
maintain the security of the Turkish state in a volatile geopolitical environment. The 
second and third periods—the Cold War and the post-Cold War period—correspond 
to those used in the Australian case. During the Cold War period, Turkey remained a 
hesitant, but reliable US ally for pragmatic reasons, while during the post-Cold War 
period Turkey has pursued a more assertive foreign and security agenda, which is 
understandable given the ambiguities that emerged from the surrounding security 
setting. 
The middle part of the chapter applies the typology to incorporate domestic level 
variables to highlight the nexus between the domestic discourses and Turkey’s 
external security dynamics. In this section, I present examples of Turkey deflecting 
discourse concerning the Kurdish question, Iran, China and Greece. I subsequently 
show how each has presented distinct challenges to Ankara and its regional outlook, 
and how each has been subject to the reordering of political rhetoric by elites in ways 
that complement the respective security challenge. Next, I find evidence of dilution 
when exploring Islam, fringe political actors, established actors and the military. In 
contrast to the Australian case, I find that the Turkish examples of dilution are much 
more explicit, because the comprehensive power of the military and the centralised 
nature of their political and military system can easily manage rogue actors and 
political parties viewed as detrimental to the security of the state.  
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Finally, I demonstrate processes of inflation visible in Turkish positions on 
Kemalism, social media, anti-Westernism, Israel and Gülenism. Inflation in Turkey 
is more obvious when compared to the Australian case. This is because the Republic 
of Turkey has a long history of inflating threats—most notably the question of 
Kurdish statehood—and using them as a tool to maintain domestic unity. Hence, I 
find inflation is highly focused when compared to the Australian case, where only 
vague ‘out groups’ (primarily immigrants and ‘terrorists’ of Middle Eastern heritage) 
were targeted. Nonetheless, the overall patterns have important similarities: 
obscuring and redirecting public narratives away from the most pertinent security 
concerns, leaving elites free to enact pragmatic policies unencumbered by domestic 
pressure.  
The third section provides a wider analysis of the findings revealed by the typology. 
It presents arguments for why Turkey’s foreign and security policy practice is often 
at odds with the language found in domestic debates. As with the Australian case, I 
find patterns in which Turkish elites have attempted to rearrange the hierarchy of 
domestic debates about foreign and security policy to meet external security 
challenges. However, there are important differences. The most notable is that the 
frequency of the reordering in the Turkish case is higher. To explain this I attribute 
this frequency to the proximity and intensity of Turkey’s threat environment. 
Historical and Material Context 
Security Overview 
A great deal of the enduring security rhetoric about Turkey’s independence was 
fuelled by the post-World War I climate, and the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire. Notably, the 1919 Treaty of Sèvres unfavourably partitioned post-Ottoman 
territory, leading to fears that Turkish identity would be destroyed.8 Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk harnessed this sentiment to lead a Turkish nationalist movement that 
culminated with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, with Atatürk 
as President. Although infused with nationalistic narratives, Atatürk’s immediate 
foreign and security policy was highly pragmatic, and revolved around the 
withdrawal of all foreign interests not core to the immediate security of the state. 
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This included troops in Africa, the Middle East and in the Balkans, thereby avoiding 
the diffusion of military resources and expenditure on now-futile imperial legacies.9  
To accompany this, Atatürk emphasised domestic reform as critical to security. This 
included a radical modernization project and attempts to deeply integrate into the 
emerging international order, rather than relying on material strength alone.10 As a 
result, Atatürk’s ‘reforms’ emphasised foreign policy isolationism, the secularization 
of Turkish politics, the introduction of a representative democracy, and educational 
and economic reforms.11 These were designed to engage Turkey deeply with the 
West, thereby removing certain avenues for interventionism that had created 
instability and fractured states elsewhere in the Middle East. 
Turkey’s second major security period occurred during the Cold War, when 
isolationist norms became unsustainable in the face of increasing competition 
between the Soviet and US spheres of influence. Events during the late 1950s helped 
Turkey shift closer, albeit reluctantly, towards the US. The outcome was that without 
strong US support, Turkey risked becoming a target of Soviet expansionism and 
adventurism. This culminated with the deployment of US Jupiter missiles on Turkish 
soil as part of NATO’s nuclear deterrence efforts.12 The Turks accepted the missiles, 
despite the risks, moving Turkey closer to the centre of NATO’s concerns. In the 
process, this consolidated Turkey’s place within US strategic thinking, while also 
providing an element of regional prestige during a time of flux.13 
At the same time, and as demonstrated by unrest in Cyprus, Turkey remained 
nervous about the role of the US. In June 1964, Turkey planned to intervene in the 
geopolitically important Mediterranean island. However, US President Lyndon 
Johnson was concerned that this would create an unnecessary Soviet-US conflict on 
NATO’s south-eastern flank and warned Prime Minister İsmet İnönü against 
unilateral action.14 This, in turn, caused Turkey to reconsider its pro-Western 
position and investigate rapprochement with the Soviets. As a result, Soviet Leader 
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Nikita Khrushchev briefly engaged with the Turks, helped by the Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko’s support for the Turkish position on Cyprus, by 
acknowledging the ‘the legal rights of the two national communities’.15 
Similar themes of Turkish vulnerability emerged during and after the First Gulf War, 
underscoring Turkish concerns about relying on the US security guarantee in the 
longer term. The academic literature at the time also suggested NATO was likely to 
disband in the absence of the Soviet threat, which further worried Turkey’s security 
elites.16 This was accompanied by fears about new nuclear states emerging in the 
post-Soviet environment, although the Nunn-Lugar Act was ultimately successful in 
constraining further proliferation after the breakup of the USSR.17  
Nonetheless, technological advances in warfare meant that a few smaller states, 
including Iraq, had acquired ballistic missile capabilities.18 Turkey’s vulnerability in 
this new environment was apparent during 1991 when NATO was slow to provide 
protection to Turkey against possible Iraqi ballistic and chemical missile attacks.19 
More pertinently, this occurred during a period when intelligence suggested that Iraq 
was developing a nuclear weapons program. Although this was later discovered to be 
in its infancy, Turkey was sufficiently concerned to look beyond the US and NATO 
for assistance. In 1997, it signed a defence cooperation agreement with Israel, with 
the goal of participating in the Arrow ballistic missile defence system, even though 
the project later faltered due to US objections.20 Elsewhere, Turkey signalled a pivot 
in its foreign policy stance and began acting more proactively towards EU 
membership. It signed a customs agreement in 1995 and entered the membership 
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candidature list in 1999.21 Together, these shifts in Turkey’s policy signified its 
concerns about its place in the post-Cold War security architecture. 
This has led into the third (and current) phase of security, in which Turkey has 
sought to revise its position in the international order. It has done so by moving away 
from isolationism, especially in relation to the East, and becoming more assertive in 
international affairs by actively pursuing a so-called ‘neo-Ottoman’ agenda.22 This 
period has been typified by a muscular foreign and security policy, with Turkey 
beginning to engage more comprehensively with not only Europe but also Central 
Asia and the Middle East. Ahmet Davutoğlu, then former Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister, was the key architect of this revisionist foreign and security policy. 
The hallmarks of the policy included practical engagement with key Middle Eastern 
actors, including Iraq, Syria and the Palestinian Territories. Other symbolic gestures 
that signified a departure from Kemalist secularism included the AKP sending a 
‘Turkish flag, a Turkish dictionary and a Quran to every person of Turkish origin’ in 
Macedonia, in an attempt to use soft power and public diplomacy to exploit its rich 
cultural history with the Balkans.23  
Notably, this revisionism was also visible in official speeches, in which Davutoğlu 
claimed that Turkey ‘will reintegrate the Balkan region, Middle East and Caucasus 
[…] together with Turkey as the centre of world politics in the future’.24 Later in the 
same speech he stated: 
‘What is Turkey? Turkey is a small Balkan, a small Middle East, a small 
Caucuses […] Why do we have all of this? Because of the Ottoman legacy. 
For all these Muslim nationalities in these regions Turkey is a safe haven’.25 
This shift in rhetoric that invoked the pre-Kemalist imperial period accompanied a 
broader security-based doctrine known as ‘Strategic Depth’. In the broadest sense, 
Davutoğlu had asserted that Turkey must use its power—predominately soft 
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power—to act as a player of regional (and potentially global) significance.26 For 
him, Turkey was naturally suited to this role given its geopolitical place in 
international affairs. 
To the North and North East, Central Asia was designated as a core area designed to 
add ‘depth’ to Turkey’s foreign policy. In practical terms this meant Turkey 
embarked on strategic partnerships with post-Soviet states, including Kazakhstan, 
with whom it had developed deep economic ties, culminating in Turkish support for 
its entry into the WTO.27 Ankara also improved its ties to Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan, despite their weak economic positions, because they provided strong 
cultural and geopolitical links into the central Asian heartland helped by a shared 
Turkic heritage.28 
At an institutional level, Turkey has been active in Central Asia multilateralism via 
the Black Sea Economic Organisation (BSEC), the Council of Turkic Speaking 
States (CTSS) and the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), the latter of 
which was designed to place Ankara at the centre of a common market consisting of 
over 500 million people.29 In 2013, Turkey was also instrumental in forming the 
Organization of the Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with Military Status 
(TAKM) with Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, with the goal of tackling 
transnational crime issues within a policing framework.30  
An important security motive for more extensive Turkish engagement with Central 
Asia has been the emerging role of China in the region. Overall, China’s main 
regional interest is energy, with neighbouring Iran the third largest supplier of crude 
oil to China, supplying approximately 10 percent of its consumption.31 This provides 
a small, but important, source of energy diversification for Beijing. More 
importantly, close relations with Turkey facilitate secondary routes and sufficient 
redundancy to transport energy away from Russian and US sources. This type of 
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thinking had led China to heavily invest in infrastructure, such as Pakistan’s Gwadar 
Port, which links into the Iran-Pakistan pipeline currently under construction.32 This 
enables China to access Iranian gas without entering the Persian Gulf, while also 
providing an alternative to the US-backed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India 
(TAPI) pipeline.33 These energy competitions have implications for Turkey, which is 
resource poor, but attempting to leverage its central transit position and consolidate 
itself as critical to any future East-West energy corridors. 
Consequently, these shifts in Turkish foreign and security policy make sense when 
viewed in the context of the wider security pressures bearing down on Ankara. 
Furthermore, when detached from the often-hyperbolic rhetoric of Turkish elites, the 
switch from Kemalism’s isolationism towards regional activism in the Middle East 
and Central Asia suggests a deep level of pragmatism, driven by the material 
realities of the region rather than one guided by personal ambition, as many Turkish 
analysts have claimed.34 
Another argument that supports the view of Turkish security policy as essentially 
pragmatic—despite its increasingly outlandish rhetoric—is its recent economic 
record. It has experienced rapid growth over the past fifteen years because of 
economic reforms and closer integration into a variety of markets, including Europe, 
China, the Middle East and Central Asia. Turkey is now a substantial regional power 
with the seventeenth largest nominal GDP globally ($751 billion as of 2016).35 This 
gives it the largest material capacity of any Middle East state, sitting above Saudi 
Arabia ($618 billion) and over double that of Iran ($386 billion).36  
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Turkey’s most recent economic successes have derived from AKP economic policies 
designed to attract large-scale investment. One of the AKP’s first major policies was 
to substantially increase FDI.37 This was a departure from earlier Kemalist positions, 
in which FDI was viewed with suspicion, thanks to a population ‘culturally 
conditioned against foreign economic influence’.38 But, as Ioannis Grigoriadis and 
Antonis Kamaras argued, the bankrupting of many older and ‘less reputable’ Turkish 
companies associated with the old guard, helped dismantle the domestic norm 
against economic liberalisation.39 
These changes have helped the Turkish economy grow at average rates of 4 percent 
a year since 1999.40 Furthermore, the AKP has exploited these economic conditions 
for domestic gain by backing various ‘mega’ projects designed to highlight the ‘new’ 
Turkey, and advertise its successes to the region. These have included the Yavuz 
Sultan Selim Bridge across the Bosphorus, and close to the Caspian Sea. It also 
includes the Eurasia Tunnel, which opened in December 2016.41 This tunnel has 
formed a fifth crossing point across the Bosphorus and complements the recently 
completed Marmaray undersea rail link.42 Additionally, the ‘Istanbul New Airport’ 
will have the biggest passenger capacity in the world (two hundred million per year), 
including six runways.43 Finally, construction has commenced on ‘Kanal İstanbul’, 
which will supplement the Bosphorus by carrying tanker traffic into the Sea of 
Marmaray from the Caspian.44  
These projects complement the wider notion of the so-called ‘2023 vision’ designed 
to make Turkey a global leader in many areas by the centenary of the Republic of 
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Turkey.45 And they are in distinct contrast to the policies of the mid-twentieth 
century, when Turkey’s economic position was weak due to its lack of 
diversification. This period was typified by dependence on agriculture, combined 
with high spending on the military.46 Economic problems also contributed to 
domestic political instability, whereby fringe groups, including the ultra-right 
nationalist Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar) and the revolutionary left Devrimci Yol, 
harnessed discontent.47 Politically, this type of polarization had earlier created fears 
of the US and the Soviet Union exploiting domestic divisions for their own security 
gains. Indeed, it was one justification for the 1980 military coup, which ‘reset’ the 
political environment to the centre.48 Turkey eventually implemented economic 
reforms in 1983 after three years of military rule, with the goal of reintegrating into 
the global financial system, in recognition that economic progress would assist 
political stability.49  
Relative Power and Security Competitors 
Turkey’s assertive outlook has been accompanied by a foreign policy that 
emphasised a ‘zero problems with neighbours’ approach to regional engagement.50 
This—at least initially—involved a shift of Turkish political and security interests to 
the East, and deep engagement with rivals such as Iran, Egypt and Syria.  
The Syrian relationship ranks near the top of Ankara’s emerging concerns. Syria was 
initially one of Turkey’s new ‘friends’, but leader Bashar Al-Assad’s reluctance to 
acquiesce in the face of Turkish pressure concerning domestic political reform has 
led to friction. This included the cancellation of the free trade agreement brokered 
between the two leaders, resulting in trade falling 25 percent over the four-year 
period 2011-2015.51 The most recent tensions have concerned Turkey’s support for 
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the Free Syrian Army (FSA)52, the al-Nusra Front53, and its insistence on regime 
change as part of any Syrian peace deal.54 This is the result of attempts to install a 
regime favourable and sympathetic to Ankara’s ambitions in Syria (and therefore 
Ankara’s wider policy of strategic depth), including support for a ‘military’ refugee 
camp made up of defectors from the Syrian regime in Reyhanli.55 
Turkey’s interests in Syria are plentiful. Ranking highly is the role of the Kurds in 
Northern Iraq, in which the weakening security situation in Syria has provided 
incentives for Kurdish populations to gain international support for independence. 
This was demonstrated during the growth of ISIS from 2014 onwards, with its goal 
of creating a caliphate across the Levant region. One of Ankara’s core concerns has 
been that an increasingly chaotic Syria could result in the emergence of new Kurdish 
autonomous areas, which in turn could lead to renewed calls for a Kurdish state or a 
revival of Kurdish nationalism on Turkish soil.56 Success for the Kurds would affect 
Turkey’s vision under the strategic depth doctrine of a stable region in which it acts 
as a leader and regional unifier. 
Egypt presents a second potential threat, and poor relations between the two nations 
have revolved around Ankara’s refusal to accept the government of Abdel Fattah el-
Sisi. Instead, the AKP viewed Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim brotherhood as the 
legitimate Egyptian power centre,57 which was previously the recipient of a USD$2 
billion aid package from Ankara.58 Turkey’s troublesome relationship with Egypt 
has also revealed deeper geopolitical problems. These include the use of the Suez 
Canal as a political tool. Turkey was snubbed during the recent opening of the 
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canal’s upgrade59, and politics in regard to the canal have the potential to affect 
Turkey’s energy security. This is because an increase in the use of sea-lanes, as 
opposed to pipelines, reduces Turkey’s ability to position itself as a pivotal energy 
transit route.  
Further threats from Egypt stem from its advanced missile capabilities, including the 
R-300 Elbrus, with a 500km range.60, along with unconfirmed reports it possesses 
Chinese Silkworm missiles61 and it may have obtained a Buk medium range 
system.62 Egyptian air defences are hence well-developed, especially since they are 
underpinned by multiple Patriot systems supplied by the US government. 
A third, and more substantial concern for Turkey is emerging from Russia. Russian 
revisionism has been on display in Georgia and Ukraine after the annexation of 
Crimea. Moscow’s resurgence is also visible in Syria, where Russia has a naval base 
in Tartus.63 This provides an important strategic function for Moscow, by providing 
it with a Mediterranean presence, and acting as a counterbalance to the perceived 
encirclement of Moscow by NATO. More specifically, Turkey is viewed as part of 
the rim of the Russian sphere of influence, especially given the significance of the 
Caspian Sea and the Turkish sea-lanes into the Bosphorus. 
These issues have combined to create an intense set of security challenges for 
Ankara. In practical terms, they demonstrate that Turkey’s interests are now much 
more diverse than at any point in its recent history. In the past, the two core threats 
were focused on simple maintenance of the US alliance, to balance against Soviet 
expansion, accompanied by a clear Kemalist narrative of Kurdish nationalism as a 
risk to the state. But, as the examples above demonstrate, these pragmatic security 
concerns have widened to include Middle Eastern instability, the potential leadership 
of the emerging Middle Eastern political order, enhanced links with Central Asia, 
and attempts to manage China’s influence in the region. Importantly, this has 
corresponded with a domestic rhetorical shift towards Islamic and anti-Western 
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narratives that are consistent with Turkey’s strategic outlook and assist the national 
interest and state security policy. 
Security and Foreign Policy Responses 
It is interesting that across this wide range of security threats, and in spite of the 
discourse emerging from Ankara, Turkey is responding relatively consistently and 
largely as one might expect in terms of a neoclassical realist model grounded in 
geopolitics, as advanced by this thesis.64 At the international level, overall US-
Turkish relations are relatively positive, with US officials referring to Turkey as the 
‘anchor’ of the region.65 This is backed by the fact that Turkey has agreed to host a 
NATO anti-missile system66 and in 2015 cancelled a tender for a Chinese missile 
defence system, which was the subject of multiple US and European objections.67 
Even after the coup attempt of July 15 2016, and criticism of the subsequent purge of 
Gülenist sympathisers, Turkey-US relations have remained robust, and the ultimate 
security guarantee of the alliance—US nuclear weapons—remain at Incirlik in the 
country’s south, despite attempts by Russia to exploit the situation by inducing 
Ankara to change its strategic posture.68  
Similarly, while the use of ‘mega projects’ such as the Istanbul Canal have been 
criticised as being vanity projects, they have an important strategic function. The 
construction of the Istanbul Canal consolidates Turkey’s role as the key transit route 
for shipping into the Black Sea, adding a strategic advantage when dealing with 
states such as Russia and the Ukraine. Furthermore, development of these sea-lanes 
diversifies Turkey’s energy sources, allowing the transit of energy into the Caspian 
and potentially to and from China, given the development of the gas and oil pipelines 
across Central Asia. Finally, an increased role in Mediterranean security makes 
Turkey a naval pivot between Europe, Africa and the Middle East, adding to the 
overall enhancement of its strategic position. The construction of a new bridge and 
tunnel over and under the Bosphorus has also provided redundancy for transit links, 
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which is critical given Turkey’s wish to be central to the emerging geopolitical 
landscape, shaped by initiatives such as China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ project.69 
Acting as a pivotal transit state is increasingly important given the role of energy 
security in both Russia and China. Both have been developing energy corridors 
designed to underpin their own security interest, and Turkey has attempted to place 
itself at the centre of these new developments. The proposed Nabucco pipeline was 
to lie at the centre of an East-West energy corridor. Formal agreements to construct 
the pipeline between the stakeholder states were signed in 2009, while the pipeline 
itself stalled because of Russia’s use of pricing mechanisms to undermine the 
viability of the project.70 Indeed, both Russia and Iran have protested against the 
pipeline’s construction. In January 2013, the BP-led Shah Deniz II consortium 
committed to a 50 percent share in the pipeline on completion, which increased its 
likelihood of construction.71 This route traverses Baku through to Vienna via Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, and providing a direct energy conduit competitor to 
the Russian South Stream pipeline. Most recently, in October 2016, Turkey and 
Russia have renewed their commitment to build a natural gas pipeline under the 
Black Sea.72 Overall, this demonstrates the willingness and capacity of Ankara to 
engage the great powers and position it as a regional energy transit point, in an 
international environment where resources are playing an increasing central security 
role. 
The new centrality of energy politics has complemented a broader push to develop a 
stronger indigenous defence industry. Military modernization was initially 
undertaken during the 1980s, which, notably, resulted in the product of a Turkish F-
16 variant manufactured by Turkish Aircraft Industries (TIA).73 Similarly, 
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ROKETSAN was founded in 198874, but this capability was investigated with more 
rigour after the end of the Cold War, where programs to develop ballistic missile 
capabilities such as the J-600T Yıldırım system and HİSAR (İrtifa Hava Savunma 
Füze Sistemi) short-range surface to air missile attracted heavy state investment.75 
But Ankara has also accelerated its investment and capabilities in missile defence, 
viewing this as critical to maintaining security independence. Indeed, Erdoğan has 
claimed that Turkey’s plan is to ‘to completely eliminate external dependency on 
defence equipment supply with ongoing plans and investments until 2023’.76 This 
includes the development of the Göktürk-2 and 3 observation satellites, built with 
foreign assistance, and the fully indigenous Turksat communications satellites, with 
a target launch date of 2019, alongside an indigenous missile defence system.77 
The development of missile and communications assets not only provides hard 
defence capabilities, but also valuable currency when engaging with larger and more 
power security partners such as China and the US. For example, Turkey’s new 
capabilities led it to approach China to co-develop a missile defence system 
independently of NATO.78 Superficially, this seemed like a deliberate antagonistic 
move against the US. Yet it can also be interpreted as a form of signalling. This 
allows it a stronger negotiating hand when dealing with its NATO partners. Indeed, 
Turkey subsequently opened parallel negotiations with other suppliers, suggesting 
there is pressure on the US and NATO to accommodate Ankara’s concerns and 
provide concessions.79 Additionally, the later cancellation of the Chinese contract 
did not irritate Beijing substantially. This is because the arms industry is a secondary 
issue to Beijing regionally, with commerce and consolidation of energy transit routes 
a higher-degree concern in China’s objectives.  
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This hedging is understandable in a security context in which Turkey may need to 
revisit its place in the US-Turkish relationship due to changing regional security 
dynamics. Turkey has a powerful ally in the US, but the underlying realty is that this 
relationship has always been contingent on convergent interests in the region. 
Several incidents support this view. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Turkey was used as a pawn within regional brinksmanship, where it was provided 
with substandard Jupiter missiles to provide defence.80 Similarly, the ‘Johnson letter’ 
of 1964 told Inonu that Turkey would lose its security guarantee should it occupy 
Cyprus, and demonstrated that the US would only defend Turkey when their 
interests were closely aligned.81 Similar trends have emerged over the past few 
years, especially concerning the Syrian border, when NATO has signalled it would 
reject Turkish requests for assistance based on the notion of collective defence in 
Article Four and Five of the Atlantic Treaty.82  
This also helps explain Ankara’s fluctuating relationship with respect to Russia. 
Moscow’s attempts to revise its own position over the past decade have been critical 
to Turkish security. In 2014, Russia’s activities in the Crimean Peninsula 
demonstrated a shift in Russia’s strategy to one of active protection of its sphere of 
influence, and a posture that is prepared to push back against NATO and perceived 
US-led encirclement.83 Elsewhere, Russia has also signalled its intention to reassert 
‘sub-regional primacy’ through the establishment of new security architectures, 
including the SCO, CSTO, and the Eurasian Economic Union.84 In response to these 
shifts, Russia was identified as one of the two key ‘strategic partners’ of Turkey by 
Davutoğlu.85 
However, Russian-Turkish relations were severely strained by the downing of a 
Russian Sukhoi jet in November 2015. The jet crossed into Turkish airspace for forty 
seconds, triggering an attack by a Turkish F-16. The domestic responses were loud, 
with Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu asking ‘Russia to act as a more mature 
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state’86 and that Moscow had ‘put itself in a ridiculous position’ when it claimed that 
Turkey shot down the jet to protect its oil supplies entering via ISIS controlled 
pipelines.87 Despite the statement, initial blowback was primarily economic rather 
than security-focused. Russia imposed sanctions on Turkey, including bans on 
agricultural exports and charter holidays by Russians to Turkey.88 Elsewhere 
construction work on the Akkuyu nuclear plant was halted briefly, but resumed soon 
after.89 This is particularly important in regard to nuclear energy as Russia was 
assisting the construction of new plants designed to fend off energy dependence on 
external states. Despite this, Russia-Turkish relations improved as of July 2016 in 
the aftermath of the coup attempt against Erdoğan, to the extent that Çavuşoğlu 
began suggesting that Moscow and Ankara were investigating deeper military 
cooperation.90 
This context is informative for the analysis here since it demonstrates how quickly 
Turkey can become a tool and target of great power adventurism. At the same time, 
it also indicates that while Turkey faces substantial security challenges, it has 
addressed them largely as expected under a conventional realist reading. 
Importantly, this has occurred in parallel to an increase in hyperbolic language on 
certain topics from the AKP leadership.  
In short, Turkey seems to have acted appropriately in the context of the regional 
security dynamics. It continues to bandwagon with NATO and the US, while 
engaging in hedging via Russia and China. During the Cold War, these patterns were 
clear and largely unambiguous. Nevertheless, this clarity has now diminished over 
the past twenty years, with US influence potentially waning in the region, while 
Russia has become increasingly assertive. Therefore, the conditions are favourable to 
attempt the establishment of a new regional balance, which Turkey views itself as 
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naturally being at the centre of. These actions are backed by a shift in its hard-
military posture, with an increase in military spending to USD$32 billion in 2014, up 
from USD$9 billion (constant USD) in 1988.91 These general responses also align 
favourably with the processes found in the Australian case: a pragmatic response in a 
challenging geopolitical environment. And although critics would be quick to point 
out that Turkey’s responses are much more erratic, this stems from the fact that the 
security pressures are more intense and immediate that in the Australian case. 
Domestic Environment and Elites 
Justifying its security pivots to domestic audiences has represented a major challenge 
for Turkey’s security elites, and it is here where paradoxes between the domestic and 
international discourses emerge. The key mechanism for selling security decisions to 
the domestic audience in the past was the state ideology of Kemalism, which 
Menderes Cinar neatly characterised as a ‘shield against the outside in the aftermath 
of the Ottoman empire’s decline’.92 Another similar interpretation is that Kemalism 
reflected the rewriting of official history in the post-World War I environment, by 
distancing and rebranding itself as distinct from the Ottoman Empire.93 
While Kemalism described the broad state ideology and outlook, it also 
encompassed and embraced a wide range of domestic groups, and united them 
through the rejection of foreign interventionism and imperialism. Each had differing 
interpretations of Atatürk’s vision, and included an eclectic mix of the left, the right, 
and ultra-nationalist groups that incorporated the neo-fascist and Pan-Turkic ‘Grey 
Wolves’, and the nationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (the National Action Party). 
Elsewhere leftist parties combined Maoism and Kemalism, such as the ‘Patriotic and 
Revolutionary Workers Party’ led by the socialist Dogu Perincek.94 Consequently, 
many of the central pillars of Kemalism, including modernisation, nationalism, 
statism and secularism, were largely uncontested in the rhetoric emerging from the 
fringes of traditional left-right Turkish politics. 
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Perhaps more importantly, the narrow and state-controlled media was a key 
mechanism for communicating the concept of Kemalism to the domestic audience. 
Throughout the Cold War period, the media was routinely censored, allowing for 
easier manipulation of messages intended for popular consumption. Similarly, 
pluralism, combined with targeted censorship, has been a core part of the Turkish 
newspaper environment since media liberalisation in the mid-1980s, when Turkey 
began a stronger push towards European integration and began using liberalisation as 
a security currency.95 However, this new pluralistic environment was largely a 
façade, and Hürriyet (the ‘secularist’ paper), the sensationalist Posta, and upmarket 
Radikal were widely viewed as the mouthpieces of the Kemalist military.96 As 
Dexter Filkins has observed these allowed the ‘Kemalist élite and its allies in the 
deep state [to] employ the press to exaggerate threats to the state’.97 
In the first years of the AKP following 2003, attempts to refocus the media 
environment to reflect the new political agenda resulted in political meddling in 
popular news sources. Importantly, they differed from the military ‘resets’ of the 
news environment, and instead used coercive techniques mixed with conspiratorial 
narratives. For example, in 2009, Aydın Doğan (the founder of the Doğan Holding 
and publisher of Hürriyet), was fined USD$2.5bn for tax evasion and was forced to 
sell two of his papers. This included the pro-military Milliyet and strongly 
nationalistic Vatan, along with Star TV.98 Similarly, the Turkuvaz Group was 
pressured into selling its secular and nationalist station KanalTürk99 to an associate 
of Erdoğan after its founder Tuncay Özkan—a former Hürriyet journalist—was 
arrested and implicated in the Ergenekon scandal, and jailed from 2008 until 2014.100 
Overall, according to the European Journalism Centre, Turkey has 70 percent of the 
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media owned by a few cross-media groups, which are segmented into clear pro-
government or pro-military groups. This results in a ‘very biased and extremely 
nationalistic media landscape’.101 This also suggests that the AKP has switched from 
constitutional and legal methods of controlling discourses to ones that are grounded 
in coercion, with the motive of aligning public messages with its wider policies. 
Contrastingly, the AKP has used sympathetic media outlets to project its messages to 
both domestic and international audiences. For example, the AKP had become 
closely aligned with the Ciner media group, which runs the popular Show TV and 
Habertürk news outlets.102 Furthermore, in 2007, the Sabah was forcibly taken over 
and is now owned by Çalık Holdings, which has Erdoğan’s son-in-law Berat 
Albayrak as its CEO.103 Its English language version, Daily Sabah, has now become 
one of the most prominent sources for English-language news on Turkey, after 
Today’s Zaman was taken over and then shut down by the government in March 
2016.104  
Consequently, within Turkey a variety of contests exists to control the messages 
expressed by the media. This has become more pronounced under the leadership of 
Erdoğan, who has frequently been accused of trying to silence opposition. This is 
supported by the fact that 435 journalists were prosecuted in 2008105, and a further 
twenty-two of these journalists remained imprisoned in 2014.106 Following the July 
2016 coup, arrest warrants were issued for eighty-nine journalists.107 Prosecutions of 
journalists by both the AKP and the CHP before them have often relied on the 
Article 301/1 of the Constitution, and Law 5816 of the Turkish Penal Code. These 
make it illegal to insult Turkey, its institutions, or the ‘legacy of Atatürk’.  
When these domestic factors are assessed together, they provide logic for what often 
appears to be emblematic of authoritarianism to outside scholars. While Turkey has 
an open media environment in certain respects, the channels used to propagate 
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messages are prone to censorship and political manipulation. This demonstrates the 
AKP’s preference for takeovers, rather than outright censure of popular news outlets. 
It also provides important context for the next section, because it highlights some of 
the key mechanisms used by elites in Turkey to reorder debates to prevent them from 
clashing with wider national security interests. 
Importantly, the domestic environment also presents a clear difference to the 
Australian case. Australia’s media is more transparent, yet it is ultimately more 
concentrated, allowing politicians to court and focus on fewer rhetorical avenues. In 
contrast, Turkey sits in an environment of intense security competition, and its elites 
must contend with a highly diverse and polarised media environment.  
Applying the framework 
The discussion of Turkey’s historical and material context demonstrates that while it 
may seem like an unusual comparison of cases, Turkey actually shares many similar 
structural and geographical constraints to those faced by Australia, even though 
internal characteristics are very different. Both are in dynamic security regions and 
work as pivots between great power interests. Both must also be careful about the 
discursive content of their domestic politics lest it weaken their security positions 
and invite adventurism. But, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, Australian leaders are 
subtle in their approach to discourses that clash with the national interest. In contrast, 
Turkey’s media, domestic narratives, and the elites work within a system where 
norms concerning democracy, leadership and the role of the military are radically 
different.  
Put simply, Turkey has been compelled to constrain more radical and more variable 
narratives than Australia. Additionally, Turkey must also act more carefully so as not 
to alienate European institutions. Lurching too far towards censorship has the 
potential to harm its security outlook with important EU partners. In contrast, a truly 
free media environment has the potential to embolden rogue voices, thereby opening 
it up to interference from external actors with interests contrary to Turkey’s. 
Consequently, in this next section, descriptive richness comes from applying the 
neoclassical framework and the typology of deflection, dilution and inflation to the 
Turkish case in order to explore assess whether comparable behaviours exist. As 
with the previous chapter I identify how elites: (1) deflect problematic issues away 
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from debates; (2) dilute issues that have managed to penetrate debates; and (3) prefer 
to inflate benign threats. 
Deflection 
The first type of response, deflection, helps us understand the domestic foreign 
policy attitude to several external threats to Turkey from states including Iran and 
Syria, as well as the transnational threat of Kurdish groups. While threats from these 
actors should enjoy strategic primacy because they directly affect Turkish security, 
the evidence suggests they are increasingly managed within public debates. 
The Kurdish issue may seem a puzzling starting point for deflection as much of 
Turkey’s national narrative of the past century has revolved around the ‘threat’ that 
Kurds present to the Turkish state. Furthermore, tensions and conflict between the 
PKK and the government have re-emerged alongside the Syrian War after a series of 
bombing and attacks on targets in Ankara, had have renewed calls by the Kurds for 
independence and an attendant upsurge in Kurdish nationalism.108 Nonetheless, the 
Kurdish issue is instructive regarding the way Ankara manages discourses. Indeed, 
part of the original unity of Kemalism relied on the narrative of a common enemy, 
and the Kurds stood in the way of Atatürk’s cultural revolution.109 Given the 
complex and varied groups being tied together by Atatürk’s vision, Kurdish 
nationalism was viewed as a threat to Turkish territorial integrity, thereby 
perpetuating post-Ottoman instability and weaknesses.110   
Once elected, the AKP originally deflected this emphasis because it viewed anti-
Kurdish rhetoric as damaging to Turkey’s pro-European credentials. This made 
sense through a security lens in the early-mid 2000s to provide a hedge against 
overreliance on the US relationship, especially in the environment after 9/11 where 
core EU nations like Germany and France came to oppose to US interventions in the 
Middle East.  Consequently, during the period after the 2003 election there was a 
shift away from the politicisation of Kurdish issues. As Ömer Taşpınar pointed out, 
at a domestic level there was a shift in the political discourse to a situation whereby 
‘Neo-Ottomanism […under the AKP…] sees no major threat behind Kurdish 
cultural rights and the expression of Kurdish national identity, as long as Kurds 
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maintain a sense of loyalty to the Republic of Turkey’.111 Similarly, Muhammet 
Keleş has described a new ‘careful vagueness’ about Kurdish issues. In this instance, 
Erdoğan in particular had initially retreated from the use of direct language 
concerning the ‘Kurdish problem’ to indistinct sentiment about ethnic integration, 
which he later claimed were ‘all Turkey’s problem’.112  
Further processes of deflection during the apex of Ankara’s attempt to woo Europe 
were noticeable when Turkey acted against PKK positions in early 2008, sending 
10,000 troops ten kilometres into Iraqi territory and killing approximately 250 rebels. 
But in the context of Turkey’s European focused policy, publicity about the 
operation was muted.113 Instead, the action was only announced quietly via the 
military’s official website.114 This approach supported the notion that engaging 
gently with the Kurdish question was now in the Turkish interest. An additional 
interest was the increasing role of a future Kurdistan as a gas and oil exporter in the 
region, and the intense security environment in which Iraqi Kurdistan was viewed as 
a buffer between Turkey and Salafi Jihadists. In this sense, the deflection of PKK out 
of the mainstream discourse during this period can be viewed as consistent with the 
wider security challenges facing Ankara. 
In fact, one of the more interesting policy shifts during the late 2000s was the tacit 
acceptance of the Kurdish presence in Northern Iraq, which it subsequently came to 
see as critical to fending off the ISIS challenge. For example, the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) is now exchanging intelligence with the Turks.115 This contrasts 
with poor relations with the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Northern 
Syria with whom Turkey has been in active conflict, including cross-border shelling 
in February 2016, and airstrikes in August 2016.116 
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This runs in parallel to a wider electoral environment in which pro-Kurdish voices, 
through parties such as the HDP and its ethnic Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtaş, 
were originally welcomed into the political process by the AKP. This worked to the 
benefit of ruling elites in a number of ways. First, the dilution of members of the 
HDP was a useful tool in pacifying domestic concerns. This included HDP 
representatives visiting PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in jail, and helping draft a 
statement praising the election of Erdoğan as President. Öcalan’s widely-publicised 
letter claimed that the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government was 
almost over.117 Overall, these processes suggested that elites were behaving in ways 
that deflect the Kurdish issue away from the centrality of public security debates. 
Within the framework presented here, we can argue that the motive was to prevent 
the Kurdish issue being overly politicised at a time when European integration was 
increasingly a private security concern of elites.  
More recently, the initial acceptance of Demirtaş’ candidature for the 2014 
Presidential election also demonstrates deflection. Prior to 2000 it would have been 
unthinkable to have a Kurdish candidate lead a (relatively) major party in a national 
election, with some sources framing him as a ‘Turkish Obama’.118 In the end, 
Demirtaş came third in the 2014 Presidential elections, garnering 9.7 percent of the 
vote.119 One interpretation of this result is that anti-Kurdish rhetoric clearly lacked 
the power of the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps more importantly, Demirtaş’ popularity 
corresponded to the increasingly worrying security environment in the Levant. 
Again, there is a security motive visible, whereby the visibility of actors such as 
Demirtaş allowed Turkey to promote inclusive pro-EU credentials westward as a 
hedge in an uncertain security order. Moreover, and more practically, this meant that 
Ankara could at least initially use the popularity of politicians such as Demirtaş as a 
sympathetic voice to assist in the creation of a buffer between Turkey, Shia groups, 
and radical Sunni influenced by Salafist principles.  
                                                 
117 “PKK Terror Organization Leader Öcalan Credits Reconciliation Process,” Daily Sabah, last modified August 
16, 2014, accessed May 18, 2015, http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2014/08/16/pkk-terror-organization-
leader-ocalan-credits-reconciliation-process. 
118 “’Kurdish Obama’ Challenges Perceptions with Turkish Presidential Bid,” Sunday’s Zaman, last modified 
August 9, 2014, accessed May 20, 2015, http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_kurdish-obama-challenges-
perceptions-with-turkish-presidential-bid_355088.html.  
119 Constanze Letsch, “Erdogan Emerges Victorious in Turkish Presidential Elections amid Low Turnout,” The 
Guardian, August 10, 2014, sec. World news, accessed June 21, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/10/turkey-presidential-election-ergodan. 
172 
 
The rationale for deflecting certain discourses is also apparent when undertaking a 
critical assessment of Turkish foreign policy. For example, there was evidence to 
suggest Turkey was quietly supporting radicalism to fracture Kurdish groups, despite 
elites deflecting this away from public narratives.120 This took advantage of the 
porous nature of the Turkish-Syrian border during the rise of ISIS, and a perceived 
lack of government responses to address the problem. It also helped create the so-
called ‘Jihad’ highway: a key transit route for ISIS fighters and their supply lines.121 
In the other direction, materials from Syria have been moved to Turkey and 
exchanged for hard currency. In this context there are claims that the smuggling of 
diesel from seized Syrian refineries has benefited ISIS to the value of USD$800 
million.122 For Turkey, the strategic rationale was that quietly supporting radicalism 
also decreased the chances of an independent Syrian Kurdish region emerging in 
North Syria directly on the Turkish border, given both Turkey and ISIS view the 
Kurds as a common enemy. In this instance, the consolidation of Kurdish Rojava as 
an independent political entity in Northern Syria was likely to result in increased 
international calls for an independent Kurdish state, further harming Turkey’s 
regional ambitions.  
From this position, quiet support for radicalism also placed pressure on Washington 
to maintain a regional presence and therefore promoted Turkey’s ‘special’ role in the 
region. Additionally, limited instability stemming from radicalism in Syria can be 
perceived as advantageous for Turkey because Ankara wished to see the Assad 
regime fall. This antagonism emerged after Assad rejected a Turkish-modelled 
‘redesign’ of its government, incorporating more Sunni members,123 and therefore 
became an obstacle to Turkey’s broader regional goals. Consequently, Turkey has 
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hosted the Syrian rebel headquarters124 and has recognised the Syrian opposition 
coalition as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people.125 Ankara has also 
allowed the border area between Syria and Turkey to be used as a conduit for arms 
and supplies and has welcomed refugees, including former Syrian soldiers.126 
Turkey’s overall concern with Syria is driven not only by fears of instability via 
ISIS, but perhaps more pressingly by the fear of new Kurdish autonomous areas 
emerging, in turn leading to renewed calls for a Kurdish state or a revival of Kurdish 
nationalism.127 This would jeopardise Turkey’s vision of a stable, unified region 
acting in its own autonomous sphere of influence. 
Nonetheless, such a strategy grounded in the Kurdish question was risky and has 
resulted in blowback. Subsequently, changes in Ankara’s discourse in regard to the 
Kurds again emerged during the 2010s, when a resurgence of PKK activity 
demanded a public response, especially in the lead-up to the 2015 Parliamentary 
election. However, even here much of anti-PKK narrative used by AKP leaders was 
not as explicitly linked to fears of Kurdish nationalism as in the past, but instead to 
broader concerns about Islamic extremism and terrorism. In fact, the AKP attempted 
to woo Kurdish voters away from HDP via several populist measures, including the 
publication of a Kurdish language Quran.128 Government airstrikes in August 2015 
on the Qandil Mountains against PKK rebels are enlightening too.129 In this instance, 
the ‘terrorist’ narrative allowed Turkish elites to meld together two separate threats: 
ISIS and the PKK. This was effective at a security level because it deflected 
international criticism about Turkey’s attitude towards the PKK, and allowed it to act 
within a set of Western norms about countering Islamic terrorism. Moreover, it 
worked to strengthen US-Turkish relations during a period when regional security 
has become increasingly scarce. This, in turn, was designed to strengthen Turkey’s 
role as the US ‘anchor’ in the region, which had been threatened by improving 
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relations between the US and Iran. These processes suggested that elites were 
behaving in ways that deflected Kurdish autonomy issues away from the centrality 
of public security debates, and moved them instead to areas that were more 
favourable to Turkey’s broader security concerns. 
Turkish security and foreign policy elites have also been hesitant to invoke Iran as a 
domestic political issue. This is despite many reasons to do so, including a theocratic 
Iranian system that represents the polar opposite of the secular goals of Kemalism. A 
brief history of Iranian-Turkish relations helps contextualise this argument. Formal 
relations began in 1926 after a ‘friendship’ treaty was signed.130 This security 
agreement committed both states to neutrality in the event of attempts at foreign 
intervention. It was also designed to prevent renegade groups from disrupting the 
status quo with respect to existing borders. The Treaty of Saadabad, signed in 1937, 
expanded this concept to the wider region, and included Iraq and Afghanistan.131 
Those two states were also key members of the Baghdad Pact, later known as the 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), at a time when Iranian loyalties swung to the 
West. Both also had a common goal of containing Soviet influence and ambition to 
the South. Until 1979 there was a tacit understanding that either Iraqi Pan-Arabism 
or total subservience to the USSR would exacerbate any hostilities between the 
two.132 
Interestingly, the Iranian Revolution did not change relations dramatically, although 
it was very much expected. CENTO was disbanded, but the continuation of a 
common threat—Iraqi and Soviet influence—meant a cordial relationship endured. 
For Turkey, the fear was that the Iranian revolution would inspire domestic Turkish 
Islamist forces.133  
This provides the context for why the ruling AKP and opposition CHP (Republican 
People's Party) have been careful in their language about Tehran, and have 
traditionally deflected debates concerning Iran away from the public discourse. For 
instance, while CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu has been vocal in his criticism of the AKP’s 
broader regional agenda, he was careful not to politicise certain issues, such as the 
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NATO missile shield, which could antagonise Tehran.134 Similarly, the opposition 
CHP was broadly supportive of the AKPs role as moderator during the P5+1 nuclear 
negotiation, with Deputy Chairman Osman Faruk Loğoğlu announcing the deal was 
a ‘positive and promising development in terms of security and stability’.135 
One reason for the deflection of contentious issues about Iran is that Turkey is a 
main supplier of goods to Tehran. Iran-Turkey trade has been critical under a 
number of sanctions regimes: first in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution; second in 
1995 for its support of terrorism; and more recently in 2006 over its uranium 
enrichment program. Hence, Turkey has maintained a degree of security leverage 
over Iran by acting as a proxy international gateway to trade. Conversely, energy is 
critical to Turkey, which itself is energy poor. Thus, oil sales are a source of hard 
currency for Tehran, while Turkey provides many important materials for Iran’s 
domestic usage including coal, plastics and chemical goods.136 Meanwhile, Iranian 
assets, including the Tabriz-Ankara gas pipeline, have provided energy 
diversification for Turkey, decreasing its dependence on Europe and Russia.137  
This combination of variables creates a climate in which strategic interdependence 
creates incentives to deflect Iran-Turkish relations away from public debates, despite 
the fact they are regional competitors. This is highlighted by changes in US-Iranian 
relations and Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria. Indeed, the nuclear agreement 
framework and willingness of Barack Obama to engage Iran had created problems 
for Turkey’s regional agenda, given Iranian and US interests increasingly are 
aligned. This has sparked the fear that a detente may harm Turkey’s attempts to lead 
the emerging regional order. This also provides diversification away from Russian 
dependence for both states. Tourist dollars also provide hard currency for Tehran 
along with coal, plastic and chemical imports.138 
                                                 
134 “Turkey’s New Opposition Leader: Deciphering Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu,” Sunday’s Zaman, last modified 
February 26, 2011, accessed June 28, 2015, http://www.todayszaman.com/todays-think-tanks_turkeys-new-
opposition-leader-deciphering-kemal-kilicdaroglu_236792.html. 
135 Osman Faruk Loğoğlu, “İran Konusundaki Açıklaması,” November 24, 2013, accessed July 26, 2015, 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1lMwpJqNGlvHn6JZFXRpM2Y5Qb-
fgI2Aihdhp3X4PaJg/edit?pli=1&usp=embed_facebook. 
136 “Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy,” accessed March 18, 2014, 
http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&country=IR&region=4. 
137 See Olgu Okumuş, “Why Is Turkey Buying More Gas than It Needs from Iran?,” Al-Monitor, last modified 
February 28, 2014, accessed March 5, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/turkey-iran-
gas-import-consumption-erdogan-price.html. 
138 “Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy.” 
176 
 
The corollary is that Turkey’s public discourse about Iran is generally quiet and 
contained. Furthermore, Turkish public opinion is largely neutral on Iran through a 
security prism. In respect to Iran’s nuclear program, the Pew 2012 Public Opinion 
Survey found 29 percent of Turks supported it, while 54 percent were opposed, 
despite Iran’s program risking an arms race.139 This contrasts with public opinion in 
EU countries that arguably face a much smaller immediate threat. Here, the numbers 
opposed to the Iranian nuclear program were all above 90 percent.140  
As a result, disputes between Iran and Turkey have been limited, and when issues do 
arise, responses have tended to be muted. In one well-known episode, Iran criticised 
Turkey in regard to the Salman Rushdie Affair. A second was Iran’s comments 
about the ‘Turban’ affair and the use of headscarves in Turkish universities. Finally, 
there was the ‘Baqeri crisis’ in 1997, when Iranian ambassador Mohammad-Reza 
Baqeri criticised Turkey’s Security Cooperation Agreement with Israel and called 
for Turkey to implement Sharia law.141 This led to some tensions, but overall 
relations have been stable and uneventful considering the wider regional 
environment.  
Diplomatically, the Turks have also been broadly supportive of the Iranian nuclear 
enrichment program, with Ankara brokering a deal (along with Brazil) to move 
uranium outside of Iran for enrichment in return for fuel to operate a research 
reactor.142 More recently, though, Iran has taken steps to appease US interests by 
implementing the Geneva Agreements and reducing stockpiles of nuclear fuel.143 
This is also an interesting move, as it re-engaged Iran with the West and signalled 
the retreat from the near-complete disregard for institutions under Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad. At the same time, Turkey’s interests lie at the heart of these moves 
because Ankara has leveraged the nuclear issue to improve its perception in the Arab 
world, chiefly by presenting itself as a state prepared to stand up to the Israel and the 
US by supporting Iran’s nuclear rights.  
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Therefore, underneath these actions has also been an unusual popularity contest, 
linked to the broader geopolitical ambitions of each state. For much of the late 
2000s, Turkey was winning this competition. During the period after the Arab 
Spring, Erdoğan enjoyed the highest support of any leader in the region, with a 
personal ‘favourable’ view across the region of 65 percent according to a 2012 Pew 
Research Centre poll.144 Overall, some 70 percent of people surveyed viewed Turkey 
favourably. In contrast, despite Iran’s attempts to attach itself to populist regional 
messages, it has been less successful. More Middle Eastern people viewed Saudi 
Arabia as favourable (66 percent) than Iran (33 percent) in the same poll. As 
Larrabee and Nader observe, this means Iran’s image as the counterweight to US 
‘imperialism’ in the region has resonated less deeply in the current political 
environment.145 
One interpretation of this is that Ankara’s deflection of issues concerning Tehran 
means it can present itself as a rival to Iran when invoking anti-imperial discourses 
within the wider Middle East. Furthermore, given the important trade, energy and 
diplomatic issues identified above, Iran is unlikely promote anti-Turkish sentiment 
opportunistically. More generally, it suggests that conflict between Iran-Turkey in 
any sphere will result in a net loss for both states’ security positions, and therefore 
potential conflicts are downplayed and deflected away from public debates. 
Outside of the immediate region an increasingly important concern for Turkey is its 
management of its relationship with China. Numerous instances of deflection are 
visible in their wider engagement. Currently, trade is the key variable. In 2012, the 
two countries agreed on a goal to boost trade four-fold to USD$100 billion by 
2020.146 The primary driver of China in the region is its interest in energy, followed 
by an overall Chinese interest in regional stability, especially in Central Asia. From a 
cultural position, Beijing views stronger Turkish relations as a technique to pacify its 
ethnic Turkic-Chinese population. China and Turkey now formally have a ‘strategic 
relationship’, which includes the construction of Turkish industrial zone in Xinjiang 
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Uighur Autonomous Region.147 This relationship stems from the common ethnicity 
of the Turkic peoples that extend into Chinese territory, and has become more 
pertinent recently with sporadic outbreaks of violence from Turkmen separatists, 
such as that which occurred during the Ürümqi riots148 and the 2014 Kunming train 
station massacre.149 
Defence cooperation is also increasing. Originally China was tendered to build to the 
T-LORAMIDS missile defence system, despite objections from Europe and the US. 
One of the key arguments from Ankara was that the Chinese deal was preferred 
because of favourable technology sharing agreements. This has been central to 
Turkish policy since 1985, and a reaction against companies from both the US and 
EU that have been highly protective of their intellectual property, and their own 
research and development programs.150  
Despite the advantages of the Chinese missile defence deal, it was cancelled on 
November 18, 2015.151 The timing and events about the cancelation announcement 
are informative, and reveal a significant degree of opportunism by Ankara. The 
decision was announced only two days after the 2015 G20 conference held in 
Antalya, towards the end of Turkey’s role in the presidency of the group. At the 
time, Erdoğan was involved in meetings with Barack Obama and other Western 
leaders152 and it has been suggested that Erdoğan made the announcement due to 
pressure from NATO and the US during these meetings.153 But within the broader 
Turkish security environment, the tender cancelation made sense: Turkey’s new 
foreign policy approach was faltering, and relations with Russia and Syria were 
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increasingly problematic. Furthermore, a potential detente between the US and Iran 
would have left Ankara potentially isolated in the future. 
This has also posed a challenge for the management of domestic audiences, who 
were increasingly being told that China was a new key ally. This is because many 
problematic themes were emerging about Beijing. Notably, Turkey’s large textile 
industry had suffered because of a flux of cheap Chinese imports, while Beijing’s 
treatment of Turkic peoples in areas such as Xinjiang risked emboldening domestic 
nationalists.154 To counter this sentiment, Turkish elites engaged in several public 
diplomacy efforts to improve China’s domestic image. Most prominently, 2012 was 
named the ‘Year of Chinese Culture’ by Ankara. China reciprocated by announcing 
that 2013 would be the ‘Year of Turkish culture’.155 Turkey launched Chinese 
language courses within its universities, and two Confucius Institutes, funded by 
China, also opened.156 Additionally, Erdoğan had warned the public about embracing 
negative narratives about Beijing, linking them to the notion of corrupting Turkey, 
and to the vague notion of the deep state. Specifically, he asked the public ‘not to 
rise to the bait of provocateurs’ and warned that Gülenist media ‘have made this 
sensibility [the Uighur issue] prone to exploitation’.157  
Nonetheless, some attitudes towards China have remained problematic, especially 
after attacks on Chinese citizens in 2015, and when Devlet Bahceli, chairman of the 
MHP, made a series of racist remarks about Chinese tourists.158 This intensified an 
existing dispute with China over claims that Turkish diplomats were assisting 
members of the Uighur minority by providing travel documents.159 
                                                 
154 An overview of the role of the Uighur  in Sino-Turkish relations is found in Yitzhak Shichor, “Ethno-
Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations,” Policy Studies, no. 53 (2009): I. 
155 Jeremy Luedi, “Turkey’s Global Competition with China,” Global Risk Insights, August 23, 2015, accessed 
June 6, 2016, http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/08/turkeys-global-competition-with-china/. 
156 Altay Atli, “The Future of Turkey’s Relations with China,” Turkish Review 2, no. 6 (December 2012): 100. 
157 “Reports on Chinese Practices in Xinjiang Largely Inaccurate, Says Turkey’s Erdoğan,” Hurriyet Daily News, 
last modified July 10, 2015, accessed June 29, 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/reports-on-chinese-
practices-in-xinjiang-largely-inaccurate-says-turkeys-
erdogan.aspx?PageID=238&NID=85247&NewsCatID=510. 
158 Pinar Tremblay, “Attacks on Chinese Escalate in Turkey,” Al-Monitor, last modified July 20, 2015, accessed 
June 6, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/turkey-china-random-violence-become-
norm-in-lgbt.html. 
159 Shannon Tiezzi, “Uyghur Issues Cast Pall Over Turkey-China Relations,” The Diplomat, last modified July 
28, 2015, accessed October 4, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/uyghur-issues-cast-pall-over-turkey-china-
relations/. 
180 
 
Erdoğan visited Beijing soon after these events to appease Chinese concerns,160 and 
linked into wider bipartisan support of the China policy from the CHP, whose leader, 
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, has been a frequent visitor to Beijing. Indeed, during his 2013 
trip he was quoted by Hürriyet as saying ‘We don’t say anything different from the 
state’s policy regarding China. We, as the CHP, support strategic relations with 
China’.161 Overall, this signalled a wiliness to take advantage of China’s ‘One Belt, 
One Road’ initiative, given Turkey sits at the critical European gateway as an 
important resource pivot. 
By doing so, Turkey’s leadership demonstrated an ability and willingness to deflect 
anti-Chinese sentiment. Indeed, there have been domestic political gains to be made 
in this arena given that Turkish and Chinese interests clash in Central Asia. At the 
same time, those who have attempted such moves have not pursued them as 
rigorously as could be expected, and the tendency has been to pursue any 
contentious issues only insofar as they have appeased domestic audiences. 
Deflection extends to Greece too, with whom Turkey has an antagonistic history. 
The Greco-Turkish War and the so-called ‘Pontic genocide’ that resulted in the 
deaths of large numbers of Anatolian Greeks are important historical memories for 
both states.162 These inform the security competitions that occur around the Aegean 
Sea and Cyprus, such as the two hundred plus annual marine and airspace territorial 
violations by both states and that continue to plague relations.163 More recently, the 
emergence of SYRIZA in Greece has exacerbated these concerns, given that any 
potential Greek exit from the Eurozone would further harm Turkey’s geographical 
and institutional links to the EU.164 
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Despite these issues, Turkey has increasingly deflected issues about Greece away 
from the centre of debates. This can be understood better when viewed in the context 
of the politics concerning the EU and Turkey’s EU candidacy. The EU relationship 
has accelerated the liberalization of Turkish society and some of its political 
institutions because of the EU accession process and the acquis communautaire. 
This had required Turkey to unify its domestic conditions with the common body of 
EU political, economic and legal rules.165 Consequently, for Turkey, EU relations are 
critical for security purposes because there are considerable economic gains to be 
made, and EU engagement helps consolidate the NATO alliance. In contrast, any 
distinct lack of interest or institutional engagement with Europe potentially threatens 
the legitimacy of NATO, and therefore Turkey’s ‘special’ role. The potential for a 
European security community without Turkey was hinted at during the transition of 
the Western European Union’s (WEU) security functions to the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP), along with the ‘Berlin-Plus’ agreements. These gave 
EU states automatic access to NATO resources, yet Turkey’s ability to use such 
forces was only tied to the US.166 Turkey’s concerns about being on the fringe on EU 
security priorities were especially visible during the 2003 European Union Force 
(EUFOR) Concordia mission in Macedonia, during which Ankara could only 
provide minimal support because of institutional roadblocks.167 Thus, overall, 
Turkey’s security via NATO is increasingly linked to institutional engagement with 
the EU, or at least attempting to appear engaged in the processes of accession.  
More recently, the Greek financial crisis has helped fuel the emergence of radical 
right wing nationalist groups. The Golden Dawn movement in particular is prone to 
pushing nationalistic agendas, with Party leader Nikos Mihaloliakos stating that ‘we 
will take Istanbul, Izmir as well as the Black Sea back’.168 While such threats are 
easy to dismiss as empty rhetoric, any clumsy Turkish response from elites risks 
heightening tensions and the amplification of these issues in the public debate.  
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The answer has been to deflect these rather than promote them. For instance, Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Athens in October 2012 as part of a charm 
campaign laced with practical considerations considering the Greek Crisis.169 
Furthermore, a 2016 survey of Turkish elites by Kadir Has University found that 
pragmatic considerations ruled the relationship despite being taken soon after the 
2016 coup attempt, where military officers sought asylum in the Greek town of 
Alexandroupoli.170 In this survey, only 12.8 percent of the diplomats, politicians, 
journalists, businessmen and military officers question believed that current Turkish-
Greek relations were ‘bad or rather bad’.171 
This type of response has decreased public threat perceptions about Greece and 
suggests that although anti-Greek sentiment is still prominent in Turkey (indeed, a 
2011 poll found that 67 percent of Turks had negative views towards Greeks), they 
rarely view their neighbour as a high priority existential threat.172 In fact, another 
poll in 2011 on threat perception found only 2.3 percent of respondents viewed 
Greece as a threat, compared to 43 percent for the US and 24 for Israel. This is 
despite the fact that from a security driven position Greece arguably presents a 
greater immediate challenge to Turkey than Israel, when viewed in the context of the 
EU relationship.173 It—along with Bulgaria—is Turkey’s gateway into Europe. 
Turkey’s European credentials (especially concerning NATO) are assisted by both 
geographical continuity and good relations with members of the transatlantic bloc.  
Consequently, when viewed together, the examples of the PKK/Syria, Iran, China 
and Greece demonstrate how issues are reordered within the public discourse when 
they are seen to be problematic for the pragmatic security agenda. So, relations with 
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Iran, which possess many of the ingredients for exploitation, are rarely broached in 
domestic discourse. Similarly, anti-Chinese sentiment, which is ripe for 
manipulation about sensitive issues such as Uighur nationalism, is not exploited as 
widely as it could be (with the exception of the MHP) due to the underlying 
acceptance that China is key to Turkey’s future security prospects. Finally, 
management of the Kurdish question also displays evidence of deflection. This issue 
has been reordered multiple times in line with wider strategic pressures. 
These responses have parallels to those found in the Australian case. For Australia, 
the most intense security threats with existential potential (China and the US) are 
often deflected in debates. Likewise, the responses of Turkey’s elites show a similar 
pattern. Issues about close neighbours, such as Iran, are often deflected, while the 
Kurdish question was deflected for a period during the 2000s when it was harming 
Turkey’s wider strategic position. Even then, when issues require attention or remain 
in the public discourse, they are deflected to concepts that are more abstract. 
Dilution 
Dilution is highly visible in Turkey. In fact it has arguably been the most prominent 
way for elites to handle problematic narratives from gaining traction. The most 
compelling piece of evidence in this respect can be found in the various 
constitutional ‘resets’ of the political system, which were explicitly designed to 
moderate Turkish politics. This contrasts with the Australian case, where dilutive 
responses have been relatively fluid. In contrast, Turkey’s tools to dilute problematic 
discourse are more firmly codified in both law and ideology via the constitution and 
Kemalism.  
Religion is an important factor in Turkish politics given that approximately 99 
percent of the Turkish population identifies as Muslim174 compared to 6 percent 
across the EU.175 As a result, a central domestic security challenge of Turkish 
republic has been to incorporate Islam in a ‘modern’ form (sometimes described as 
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‘liberal Islam’).176 The reason for this is that political Islam is ripe for exploitation by 
European voices and this has been evidenced by the emergence of anti-immigration 
and nationalist parties including Austria’s Freedom Party, which often explicitly 
links Islam to extremism. For example, Golden Dawn lawmaker Ilias Kasidiaris has 
campaigned explicitly against the ‘the Islamization of Greece’ and ‘racism against 
Greeks’,177 while the Freedom Party suggested that radical Islam should be ‘rooted 
out’ at the Kindergarten level to stop Vienna becoming an ‘immigrant magnet’.178  
In fact, preventing the politicisation of Islam has always been a focus of Turkish 
security, and was one of the central justifications for Kemalism.179 In short, 
Kemalism attempted to align Turkey’s institutions, culture and outlook with its 
European neighbours, to avoid the poor security outcomes experienced by other 
Middle Eastern states after interference by great powers. Kemalism’s early successes 
were contingent on the aggressive use of historical memory180, and Turks often 
frame their wider security discourse through the lens of ‘Sèvres syndrome’.181 This 
narrative is based on perceived unfair treatment during the partition of the Ottoman 
Empire at the hands of the Western powers, leading to a humiliating end for a 
substantial empire that once controlled most of the Balkans and the Middle East. In 
particular, the handing of Turkish Thrace to Greece and a clause stipulating the 
establishment of a Kurdish state were viewed as an attempt by great powers to 
extinguish the Turkish identity.182 From the perspective presented here, we can 
interpret the use of Sèvres in the security narrative as a ‘permissive’ tool 
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underpinning many of the security discourses as a time when the state was under 
threat.  
Hence, Atatürk’s reforms were used to justify a number of illiberal concepts to 
facilitate the shift towards a modern secular democracy, with the assumption that this 
would provide the best security for the continuity of the Turkish state. Consequently, 
‘threats’ under Kemalism involved a range of ambiguous legal concepts, where 
vague but strong constitutional amendments—including insulting ‘Turkishness’—
became a powerful political tool to manage discourse. Indeed, Kemalism itself 
represented the inflation of a specific type of nationalism that was vague, internally 
focussed, but also potentially problematic in a security setting, because it allowed 
any rogue actors to be conflated with a security threat and therefore diluted with a 
level of legitimacy. 
Kemalism’s pillars—the so-called ‘six arrows’ consisting of republicanism, 
nationalism, populism, revolutionism, secularism and statism—can also be 
interpreted as a way to maintain general unity and engage the various post-Ottoman 
groupings. Taha Parla and Andrew Davidson have hinted at these processes in their 
work characterising Kemalism and its pillars to provide an ‘exclusivist account of 
Turkish national identity’.183 While Turkishness was a wide-ranging concept, 
encompassing a broad cultural, ideational and ethnic group, its limits were clearly 
demarcated.184    
Security objectives linked to narratives focused on Kemalism became more visible 
during the rise of tensions concerning the Cold War. A succession of Turkish coups 
d’état consolidated power in a more concentrated elite with the ability to act in 
‘appropriately’ when viewed in the context of wider structural pressures. For 
example, the 1960 coup and the subsequent execution of Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes and Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu were driven by concerns that 
Turkey was swaying too far towards political Islam, especially after Menderes 
allowed the re-entry of specific elements of religion back into the public sphere.185 
This included the restoration of cultural Islam back into the public space, the use of 
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Arabic in the call to prayer, and the reintroduction of İmam Hatip (prayer) 
schools.186 Menderes’ tenure was accompanied by numerous regional crises with 
potential to threaten Turkish security, including the Arab-Israeli War, the Suez 
Crisis, the end of the Baghdad Pact, and the Syrian and Lebanese Crises. Attempts to 
interfere in Iraq and Syrian affairs did not strengthen Turkish security as intended, 
but instead alienated Turkey from the Arab world.187 A revised constitution was 
implemented after the coup, which Serap Yazıcı viewing it as a consolidation of 
‘tutorship’ by the military, and enabling ‘extremely authoritarian mechanisms within 
the illusion of democracy’.188  
In the aftermath of the 1960 coup, Turkey reasserted its commitment to NATO and 
the US by cancelling planned trips by Khrushchev and rejecting $500 million in 
military aid from Moscow.189 But despite these moves to improve its security 
position, by diluting the role of religion, tensions re-emerged with the new İnönü 
administration, especially about Turkey’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. 
They also reasserted the primacy of the military and the ideational centrality of 
Kemalism during a period where the internal polity was at risk of exploitation from 
several competing domestic forces. 
The process whereby those who acted outside of Kemalist tenets were cast as a 
security threat continued to guide constitutional reform were again visible during the 
1980 coup, when all political parties were banned by the military as part of a 
political ‘reset’.190 Notable changes included the high 10 percent vote hurdle for 
parties entering parliament as part of the 1983 Political Parties Act (PPA).191 The 
PPA created an environment in which Islamist parties maintained their core 
constituents, but in order to gain electoral power they diluted their policies to align 
closely with the political centre. Hence, one interpretation is that Turkish politics 
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was ‘centred’ (in other words, diluted) in 1983 after the military approved just three 
parties, all of which represented centrist and moderate positions. 
The 1997 coup is also instructive, given that the ruling Welfare Party—the precursor 
to the current AKP—was banned for violating Kemalist principles.192 The so-called 
‘postmodern coup’ occurred when generals submitted a list of issues to the 
government that were to be enforced, before instigating the resignation of the Prime 
Minister in what became known as the ‘February 28th process’.193 The list contained 
liberal provisions, designed to prevent a shift towards political Islam and the Middle 
East. Its new measures included the enforcement of a headscarf ban, provisions for 
eight years of primary education, and the closing of Quranic schools.194 
In this instance, the military was concerned about loud political Islamist voices 
emerging from within the Welfare Party. As in the past, a core fear of foreign policy 
and security elites was that the re-emergence of political Islam that could move 
Turkey societally in the direction of its neighbour Iran, thereby harming Turkey’s 
overall security position.195 As a result, the military oversaw the dismantling of the 
Welfare party and forced Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan out of power. 
Dilution is also visible within the Welfare Party’s reinvention as the AKP in 2001. In 
fact, at the AKPs formation it had a clear moderate and centrist agenda, and a pro-
Western and pro-American foreign and security policy.196 In practice, this meant the 
AKP remained largely adherent to Kemalist principles up until changes in the 
geopolitical environment, and, notably, the events of the Arab Spring in late 2010 
and early 2011. At this point Kemalism was rendered less useful after political Islam 
re-emerged as a driver of popular movements in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. More 
worryingly for Ankara, this combined with fears of US retrenchment and an 
increasing opposition to Turkish membership of the EU.  
One result of the AKP’s shift towards political Islam is that extremist parties have 
been prevented from seizing the political space from disenfranchised citizens. For 
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example, at the electoral level radical and hard-line Islamist parties such as the 
Felicity Party and Great Union Party have lost their relevance as the AKP harnessed 
the conservative Islamic vote.197 At the same time, the AKP has also captured right-
leaning constituents who are receptive to the AKP’s neo-Ottoman language, 
resulting in the ‘traditionalist’ (i.e. those sympathetic to nationalist and pan-Turkic 
parties) vote decreasing from 25 percent in 2002 to 2.7 percent in the 2011 
elections.198 This suggests that the increase in Islamist rhetoric from the AKP 
possessed a security function, which was to capture and moderate rogue political 
actors by diluting their messages. 
The left has also experienced similar processes. Dilution has been visible in an 
unlikely cluster of groups that have manifested themselves in the form of the 
People’s Democracy Party (HDP), which have links to the Kurdish independence 
movement. Notably, and as addressed earlier in the section on deflection, the HDP is 
Green leaning, has a feminist agenda, is pro-LGBT, and has a Kurdish leader in 
Demirtaş.199 The new coalition includes the remnants of the Democratic Society 
Party, of which Demirtaş was a member, and had previously been banned in 2009.200 
From the position of dilution, the emergence of the HDP worked in an assorted 
number of positive ways for elites, despite holding radically different political 
positions. Firstly, it initially allowed them to diffuse any accusations of 
authoritarianism or persecution of Kurdish and minorities. In security terms, this 
enhanced European relations, while also helping stabilise the situation in the East of 
the country by moving these extremes of the political spectrum and their more 
responsible members closer to the centre of power, where they could be carefully 
monitored. This is understandable given the HDP’s Kurdish connection was 
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increasingly important in respect to conflict in Syria and Iraq, as well as the 
emergence of the KRG as a potential independent entity.  
Similar processes of dilution were visible when the AKP attempted to counter the 
power of the military class through the September 2010 referendum, which although 
promoted as a tool to meet EU compliance, was actually designed to weaken the 
military’s control over the judicial structure.201 In this instance, the AKP has tried to 
dilute the role of the military, where its crude anti-democratic positions are viewed 
as a security threat.  
In security terms, the dilution of the military’s power was again critical to Turkey’s 
alignment with EU norms, thereby functioning as an important variable in Turkey’s 
wider security agenda. Consequently, Turkish rhetorical changes on Europe in the 
post-Cold War era correlated with the weakening influence of the military and a 
move towards a more ‘democratised’ political structure on paper. But, as 
demonstrated earlier with the Kurdish example of deflection, this was driven by the 
fear that security agreements such as the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) might lead to the EU superseding NATO at some point in the future. 
Therefore, to not engage with Europe through reforms to meet acquis 
communautaire conditions, could have meant isolation both in economic, and (by 
proxy) security terms. This contrasted with the Cold War environment, where 
European allies and the US were more tolerant of a state with lax internal structures, 
including use of torture,202 a highly controlled media, and an impotent judicial 
system.  
In practice, the EU accession reforms of 2001, designed to accommodate the Aquis 
condition, included thirty-four constitutional amendments passed under Bülent 
Ecevit, with the majority revolving around human rights issues.203 Other key reforms 
were the passage of free speech laws and the ‘civilianization’ of the National 
Security Council (MGK).204 The Council was reformed to comprise a civilian 
majority and specifically positioned as a consultative body rather than an 
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authoritarian one, as it was under military rule.205 These changes, especially within 
the MGK, have led to claims that the ‘elected civilians have now become the 
ultimate decision-makers concerning Turkish foreign and security policy’.206 In the 
broadest sense, Tarik Oguzlu termed this process ‘Europeanization without 
Membership’.207  
Indeed, Turkish domestic instability and poor democratic credentials were key 
factors militating against EU accession and full economic integration. Specifically, 
military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 led to a perceived gap between EU and 
Turkish political standards. Because of this, after the initial European Economic 
Community (EEC) application being made in 1959, it was not until 1987 that Ankara 
again formally made an application for full EEC membership. The EEC deferred 
Turkey’s application on numerous grounds, including human rights, the unresolved 
natured of the Cyprus and Aegean Sea issues with Greece, and a lack of political and 
democratic reforms.208 In 1995, the EU-Turkey customs union was formed and 
allowed free trade between the two areas, and again EU accession looked more 
likely. However, the 1997 military coup and subsequent EU protests delayed this. 
Finally, in 1999, forty years after its initial submission, Turkey was formally 
recognised as a candidate state for EU membership.209  
The paradox was that the internal discourse used to sell these radical changes was 
inherently undemocratic. This is visible in the shift from the soft authoritarianism of 
Kemalism to the proto-authoritarianism rhetoric of Erdoğan. Consequently, a 
substantial rebalance of the civilian-military relationship has occurred since 2003 
when the AKP took power, being a combination of adhering to the EU Acquis 
process mixed with a consistent theme of the military acting as a ‘rogue’ and 
unaccountable political actor.  
Publicly, this means that Erdoğan and the AKP had resorted to certain domestic 
narratives to dilute the power of the military, without straying too far from European 
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political norms. A key device to facilitate this shift in public debates was the so-
called ‘Sledgehammer’ plot in 2003, in which the AKP ‘uncovered’ a conspiracy to 
remove Erdoğan from power via a military coup. In this instance, many of those 
jailed had supposed connections to ‘Ergenekon’ an ultranationalist movement whose 
key motive was to retain a more rigid version of Kemalism.210 Its supporters, in turn, 
were suspected to be involved with a clandestine ‘deep state’. The result was that at 
the beginning of 2012, half of Turkey’s admirals and one in ten active generals were 
in prison.211 In September 2012 a further 330 military officers were jailed.212  
Dilution therefore occurs in a distinct and peculiar way in the Turkish setting. Unlike 
in Australia, where a simple left-right division is generally suitable, the Turkish 
political spectrum is split in multiple ways. Until recently, centralised military rule 
meant this process was straightforward, whereby the military would simply ban any 
rogue actors but then allow them to regather in moderated form, using clear-cut 
security rationales in the process. This included the experience that led to the 
formation of the AKP, and to a lesser extent the HDP. More recently, the domestic 
balance has changed, and the Kemalist system that invested much power in the 
military role has been reversed. Nonetheless, as the Kurdish example demonstrates, 
the AKP’s continuing concentration of power means it can strategically dilute public 
debates depending on their security implications. 
As with the issue of deflection, there are also similarities with the Australian case. 
Although Australia’s ‘centre’ is politically different, adopting messages to control 
them has parallels with the treatment of the right and the left in Turkey. Hence, in 
the Australian case, we can see entrepreneurs such as the One Nation party and the 
Greens being moderated and politicians censured by their parties for making 
statements outside of the centre. In Turkey, similar phenomena are apparent, albeit 
more crudely. Thus, groups such as the Welfare Party were banned and shifted by 
law closer to the centre. Similarly, AKP politicians such as Erdoğan and Davutoğlu 
moderated their messages in line with the political thought of the time. 
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Consequently, (and pragmatically), Erdoğan was staunchly pro-European and pro-
Western at a point when this was viewed as critical to Turkey’s security interests. 
Inflation 
Dilution is made much easier when benign threats are inflated, rather than core ones. 
Hence, the third response type—inflation—suggests that elites in Turkey choose and 
promote issues that are ‘safe’ for consumption by domestic audiences. Here, elites 
seek to fill ideational vacuums. Thus, inflation is not a direct response to any distinct 
security threat, but instead one that seeks to obfuscate other threats through the 
exaggeration of less important issues in the public discourse. 
One overt form of inflation has been particularly evident with the demonization of 
technologies such as social media since 2011. This is understandable given these 
electronic and virtual platforms cannot be censored in the same way as newspapers, 
television or radio. This led to AKP elites like Erdoğan continually attacking social 
media. He claimed that ‘all kinds of immorality […] and espionage can be found 
there’.213 Erdoğan also stated ‘I don’t understand how people of good sense could 
defend this Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter’ and made the broader claim that social 
media was a ‘knife in the hand of a murderer’.214 The ensuing blocks on YouTube 
and Twitter instigated by the AKP were widely publicised, and pitched in security 
language, with Erdoğan  repeatedly claiming that Twitter was ‘threatening national 
security’.215 Informatively, Erdoğan’s first social media ‘outrage’ occurred parallel 
to campaigning for the March 30, 2014 municipal elections. The ban was lifted two 
weeks later, and the security tone Erdoğan used to justify it resonated with 
conservative voters, who delivered a 4.5 percent swing to the AKP.216 
A useful way to interpret this is by viewing public outbursts from elites at social 
media as a form of theatre designed for the large conservative domestic audience. 
Hence, while the ‘damage’ done by social media is prominent in the AKPs 
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discourses about Turkey, the empirical effects of highly publicised Twitter and 
YouTube bans are minimal, with circumvention techniques widely used to bypass 
restrictions. This includes the use of VPNs (virtual private networks), proxies and 
alternative domain name server (DNS) providers. 
Indeed, the hollow nature of the ‘threats’ found online is demonstrated by the AKP’s 
own use of the social media environment when it deems it appropriate. For example, 
the I-POST project at Sabancı University found the previous President, Abdullah 
Gül—the co-founder of the AKP, but now an independent—was highly influential 
and active on Twitter, with over 4.5 million followers.217 Using the I-POST model, 
he was the second most ‘central’ figure shaping and disseminating information, 
while Erdoğan ranked fifth.218 Hence, on another level elites have used these 
emerging tools to help shape debates when deemed necessary. At the same time, 
anti-social media narratives resonate when addressing the large conservative 
audiences outside of the major cities. Amongst this demographic only 46.25 percent 
of individuals use the Internet, which represents a lower penetration rate than Russia 
(at 61 percent), or the UK (at 90 percent).219  
This means the inflation of language about security has been one of the most 
important processes affecting Turkish domestic politics over the last few years. In 
other words, much of the rhetoric out of Turkey is designed to complement empirical 
security considerations. At the same time, elites are aware of the dangers of rhetoric 
and its impact on security outcomes. Much of the rhetoric is therefore deliberate and 
calculated, with the current assumption being that the discourse emerging from 
Ankara was largely seen as benign by its core security partners—the EU and 
NATO—as long as it is not backed by hard action. 
While the inflation of rhetoric concerning social media resonates with certain groups 
within Turkey, it is less useful when projecting messages about Turkey into 
countries of concern in the Middle East, and in particular Syria and Egypt, where 
                                                 
217 Identifying Policy Opinion Shapers and Trends in Turkey” (I-POST) is an online opinion-tracking tool 
developed by researchers at Sabancı University. 
218 See Osman Zeki Gökçe et al., “Twitter and Politics: Identifying Turkish Opinion Leaders in New Social 
Media,” Turkish Studies 15, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 671–688. 
219 “Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet 2000-2013” (International Telecommunications Union 
(Geneva), n.d.), http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/statistics/2014/Individuals_Internet_2000-
2013.xls. 
194 
 
only 28 percent and 31 percent of population respectively uses the Internet.220 
Consequently, crude mass media statements have been used by the AKP to promote 
its agenda, with the wider goal of helping its security position, most prominently 
about Israel. This is informative and paradoxical, because the two countries have 
shared close diplomatic ties since 1949.221  
The most obvious example of inflation concerning Israel was the ‘Davos incident’, 
when Erdoğan confronted the Israeli President Simon Peres face-to-face in 2009. 
Referring to the Israeli attitude to Palestine, he stated that ‘my voice will not be that 
loud. You must know that. […but…] when it comes to killing you know killing very 
well. I know how you hit, kill children on the beach’ before storming off the stage.222 
It is unlikely that an experienced politician such as Erdoğan would make the error of 
acting emotionally without thinking through the rational consequences of such an 
action on an important stage, and thus we can interpret this as deliberate theatre to 
inflate the issue to his domestic audience. Indeed, on his return to Turkey, Erdoğan 
was widely praised, receiving a ‘hero’s welcome’ with banners proclaiming that he 
was the ‘delegate of the oppressed’.223  
Erdoğan’s vocal support for Palestine was next followed by an ‘Arab Spring’ tour in 
2011, which started with an appearance on an Egyptian TV program where he called 
Israel ‘the West’s spoiled child’.224 Interestingly, Erdoğan’s claim mirrored a shift in 
negative attitudes towards the US and the EU, with Turkey having the most 
unfavourable opinion of both the EU and the US of all NATO members (34 percent 
for the US and 38 percent for the EU).225 At the same time, Turkey had the highest 
number of people who believed that Asia was more important to the national interest 
than the US. It also had the lowest number of people that approved of Obama’s 
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international policies among NATO members (52 percent).226 This had the important 
function of legitimising and enabling a pivot in Turkey’s wider strategic policy East 
to a domestic audience. 
But, despite these public displays, the Israel-Turkish relationship remains critical to 
both nations. In the 1990s, Turkey and Israel shared a strong relationship, not to 
mention many common threats, including a mutual suspicion of the EU and Iran.227 
Indeed, Turkey is one of the only Muslim countries with a major military agreement 
with Israel (signed in 1996).228 Given this position, Turkey again has a larger amount 
of political capital to expend on the question of Israel in comparison to other states in 
the region. 
Furthermore, bilateral trade continues to be important to both states, which has 
increased fourfold since 2005, reaching USD$5.6 billion in 2014.229 In fact, as a 
leaked diplomatic cable noted, ‘Turkish civil servants had advised Israel to weather 
the prime minister’s harsh rhetoric until ties improved’ and that ‘repeated outbursts 
against Israel were for “domestic consumption only”’.230 Similarly, less visible 
relationships, such as over intelligence sharing, remain important. In one quiet 
episode during the public feud, Hakan Fidan, the head of the Turkish National 
Intelligence Organisation, discussed security matters with Mossad Chief, Tamir 
Pardo, on visits to Ankara in 2012 and 2013.231 Agreements signed in the early 
1990s with Mossad, which allowed its agents to operate freely in Turkey, also 
remained in place.232 Further evidence of an improving relationship behind the 
rhetoric can be found in a USD$1.3 billion gas deal that was signed between the 
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Israeli Power Company Edeltech and the Turkish company Zorlu Enerji in early 
2016.233  
Relations between the two states were formally normalised on June 27, 2016, ending 
a six-year rift after Turkey agreed to drop all claims against Israeli soldiers involved 
in the Gaza incident.234 Here we could reasonably claim that Turkey’s political 
capital was being exhausted and that much of the rhetoric was designed for an 
internal audience with the goal of legitimatising wider shifts in Turkish foreign 
policy. This suggests that a great deal of the political dynamics between Israel and 
Turkey are grounded in pragmatism, despite the changing rhetoric. Hence, Israel 
begrudgingly accepted Turkish criticism in the knowledge that Ankara must appease 
Middle Eastern viewers. This increased Turkey’s security position by inflating issues 
about Israel, and thereby deflecting concerns about Turkey’s Islamic credentials to 
the wider Middle Eastern audience. 
A larger, but more obtuse target of Turkish rhetoric has been the US. Negative 
messaging focused on Washington has been increasing over the past decade. This 
can be partly attributed to the break of the isolationist norm after election of the AKP 
and US actions against Turkey’s neighbour Iraq. This is visible a wide range of 
cultural outlets. Books in the 2000s such as ‘Metal Storm’ about a hypothetical war 
between the US and Turkey, which ended with a nuclear detonation over 
Washington, sold record numbers.235 Similarly, The Valley of Wolves: Iraq (Kurtlar 
Vadisi: Irak), a fictional account of the USS Hood incident (featuring US soldiers 
machine-gunning innocents, and an American Jewish doctor selling their organs), 
became the biggest budget movie and biggest commercial success in Turkish 
history.236 Then Speaker of the House, Bülent Arınç, was present at the premiere, 
and proclaimed it ‘a great film that will go down in history’.237 Such populism was 
reflected in domestic opinion about the US, with 64 percent of Turks in 2007 
viewing the US as a threat, while fewer than one in ten Turks had a positive view of 
                                                 
233 Sharon Udasin, “Leviathan Signs First Gas Deal at $1.3 Billion,” The Jerusalem Post, last modified January 
31, 2016, accessed April 12, 2016, http://www.jpost.com/Business-and-Innovation/Leviathan-signs-first-gas-
deal-at-13-b-443426. 
234 Barak Ravid, “Israel and Turkey Officially Announce Rapprochement Deal, Ending Diplomatic Crisis,” 
Haaretz, June 27, 2016, accessed June 27, 2016, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.727369. 
235 Richard Morgan, “What Turks Are Watching,” Slate, June 13, 2006, accessed October 21, 2012, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2006/06/what_turks_are_watching.html. 
236Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Friends No More?: The Rise of Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey,” The Middle 
East Journal 64, no. 1 (2010): 61. 
237 Morgan, “What Turks Are Watching.” 
197 
 
the US—second only to Palestine.238 Importantly, unlike many other states of the 
region, US domestic politics have barely changed this trend, with net favourability 
towards Obama only three points above George W. Bush (at 15 percent) during 
2012.239  
Nonetheless, US–Turkish relations have remained ultimately robust when examined 
in isolation, despite the anti-Western rhetoric. Notably, Ankara still toes the US line 
on most important security decisions, such as participating and hosting elements of 
the NATO missile defence system.240 Furthermore, Turkey is acting as expected 
under a structural reading, where it is hedging against total commitment to NATO. 
As noted earlier, it initially awarded a tender for missile defence to China and its 
FD-2000 missile system, and used this to pressure Brussels about its role in NATO, 
given it has the second largest armed force among members.241 NATO membership 
is also likely to remain a pillar of Turkish strategy in spite of the departure of Turkey 
from a wider set of European institutional pathways (such as the European 
Commission on Human Rights [ECHR] and the EU Acquis process), given that 
Ankara remains central to the US’s own regional security interests.242  
The inflation of the Gülenist movement in the period since 2010 is curious too, but 
one that complements the broader argument that Turkish elites inflate certain issues 
to sell changes in security policy to the domestic audience. The group itself is led by 
the exiled Fetullah Gülen, who resides in the US. During the early 2000s, Gülen’s 
influence helped facilitate the AKP’s rise and the decline of Kemalism.243 As with 
the other examples here, and within the other cases, there are elements of truth that 
sit within a larger body of exaggerated issues, which are often hard to unpack. 
Nonetheless—and despite the problematic outcomes of the recent push against 
Gülenist linked groups, including alleged human rights abuses— there is a functional 
role for the inflation of Gülenism within the wider state security discourse.  
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This has allowed for the consolidation of power and the wider security infrastructure 
of the state at a time when Turkey’s security challenges are greater than at any time 
during the past twenty years. From this position, even if the Gülenist threat is almost 
entirely manufactured, as many suggest244, functionally it gives Ankara ‘permission’ 
to undertake changes to its security posture that might not be possible during a more 
‘ordinary’ time. In effect this complete shift, from a military and its isolationist 
stance, to one that embraced a more moderate form of political Islam, makes sense 
given the wider geopolitical climate of the mid-2000s, when Turkey had been 
concerned about political entrepreneurs harnessing the resurgence of radical Sunni 
actors through the wider Middle East. 
In fact, this relationship initially leveraged Gülen-linked media interests, including 
the popular Zaman newspapers, Samanyolu and Mehtap TV, and the Cihan News 
Agency. And, from 2002-2010, the AKP and the Gülenist movement jointly used 
their combined media influence to promote domestic narratives unfavourable to the 
military, thereby breaking down many of the norms about Kemalism, and hence the 
military’s role in politics. Notably this included promotion of the events concerning 
the so-called ‘Sledgehammer’ coup plot in 2007 by the Gülen-associated political 
magazine Nokta and the subsequent ‘Ergenekon’ trials.245 The Sledgehammer plot 
was (supposedly) revealed in the anti-military newspaper Taraf and included a plan 
by the military to remove the AKP from power by staging ‘false-flag’ events that 
included the shooting down of Turkish plane, and bombing two mosques.246 Some 
365 people were found guilty of participating in the conspiracy during trials in 2012, 
but all were released in 2014 after the split between the AKP and the Gülenists 
emerged, and the AKP attempted to court the military again.247 
The result of the split was that Gülenism became inflated in the public discourse as 
the key threat to Turkish security, despite a lack of hard evidence. In this sense, 
Gülenism was the latest in a line of inflated threats that had started with political 
Islam in the early days of the Republic. Perhaps most interestingly, the Gülenist 
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‘threat’ remains the least well defined. Outwardly, the AKP rejects the Gülenist 
pillars of interfaith dialogue and tolerance because it sees them as a tool to subvert 
Turkish institutions, and regards the use of the media and professional associations 
as a covert way to achieve a takeover of the state.248  
Supporters of the takeover narrative point to Gülenism’s previous use of ideational 
rhetoric to achieve its goals. This includes Gülenist literature released in 1999 that 
asserted ‘every method and path is acceptable [including] lying to people’.249 There 
is also evidence that pro-Gülenist elements have funded lawmakers in Washington 
D.C. to lobby Congress, with over USD$800,000 in travel expenses since 2008, paid 
for by groups such as the Texas-based Turquoise Council of Americans and 
Eurasians.250 The AKP responded to the alleged political actions by a variety of 
security driven movements including the closure of Turkey’s largest circulation 
paper, the Gülenist-linked Zaman, in early 2016.251 Later Gülenists were also blamed 
for publishing the contents of secret negotiations between the National Intelligence 
Organisation (MIT) and the PKK.252 Most recently, the July 15 2016 coup was 
blamed on Gülenist forces and resulted in the shutdown of over one hundred media 
outlets linked to Gülenism.253 
Yet ultimately there are few signs that the Gülenist movement has the tools, 
capability or desire to destabilise Turkey in the way that is now publicly promoted 
within Turkey. Again, this can be reinterpreted in security terms, regardless of the 
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position one has on the Gülen movement. By inflating Gülen as the key public threat 
the AKP has managed to centralise and purge the military, arguably leading to a 
more unified military structure. Practically, this has meant the administration could 
realign its security posture to one more favourable to Russia as well as Israel, and in 
doing so has ‘reset’ many of the problems that emerged from poor policy 
implementation and the rebalance of civil-military relations that occurred during the 
late 2000s and early 2010s. 
In this respect, Gülenism is an excellent example of rapid inflation, where a pivotal 
middle power in a problematic position has managed to ‘correct’ troubling security 
narratives penetrating the public discourse. Indeed, there is little evidence that 
Gülenism is an existential threat, yet the AKP has used the issue as a funnel for 
many of the issues confronting Turkey. Finally, the AKP has emerged from events, 
such as the July 2016 coup, which they strongly attributed to the Gülen Movement, 
with a better ability to counter the myriad external pressures bearing down on 
Turkey, thanks to a concentration of executive capabilities. 
The conclusion of this section is that important parts the domestic discourse are 
largely theatre—or inflation—primarily designed for domestic consumption, and 
with the objective of obfuscating shifts in security policy to meet more genuine 
concerns. One way of witnessing this divide is by examining how the AKP has 
backpedalled when rhetoric does impede important security relationships. For 
example, criticism of Israel stopped abruptly (but temporarily) when a meeting 
brokered by Obama in March 2013 ended with the ‘first step’ of normalization with 
Israel.254 Overall, there are strong strategic interests between the two states and the 
recent inflation of Israel as a ‘threat’ is more demonstrative of the regional security 
dynamics than grievances about moral, ideological or religious variables. In this 
way, rhetoric serves two purposes. First, it appeases low information constituents 
who are often malleable in their ideas. Their support can then be used to justify 
changes to security policy. Second, it avoids rogue messengers exploiting the 
periphery of debates, by appealing (however crudely) to the most problematic 
internal constituents: those vulnerable to exploitation by radicals.  
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Critics may ask here why Turkey would exploit its key security partners such as the 
US. The answer is simple: Turkey exploits it because inflating anti-Americanism is 
not overly risky. Turkey’s position as the US’s ‘anchor’ state in the region is 
unlikely to be challenged soon. Politically, Turkish support is critical for the US’s 
regional agenda, given it is widely perceived as the best model for a liberal Islamic 
state.255 Moreover, even if were challenged, it is likely that other inflated issues will 
be moved to alternative threats in the future in a manner consistent with the model 
articulated in this thesis, given the AKP’s increasing appetite for manipulating 
discourses via the media. Thus, overall, we can attribute the ‘inflation’ of the US as 
an ideational target because it is the easiest to harness in what is an underdeveloped 
public sphere, and the risks of blowback are minor at the structural level. 
Inflation is not without risks, though. Too much emphasis on the Middle East risks 
Turkey being dragged into unnecessary political conflicts. This occurred in 2013 in  
Istanbul, when civil unrest flared up after development plans in Taksim Gezi Park 
became linked to wider discontent at the perception of creeping authoritarianism 
under Erdoğan, alongside domestic concerns that involvement in Syria was affecting 
internal security, demonstrated by the 2013 Reyhanlı bombings when fifty-one 
people were killed in Hatay.256 This in turn resulted in an upsurge of anti-AKP 
sentiment, especially in Istanbul, where perceptions emerged that neo-Ottomanism 
was increasingly a dangerous pursuit and not in the national interest. 
One way of understanding these dangers is that certain rhetoric can become path-
dependent. To deflect it too overtly risks elites losing credibility. Yet once this 
dissipates from public view, policies can be changed to a more pragmatic version. 
From a theoretical position, this supports Brian Rathbun’s claim, that under the 
neoclassical model, ‘leaders [who] veer too much into constructivism […] are 
punished by the system’.257 
Overall, this results in one feature that seems unique to the Turkish case:  the rapid 
and crude reordering of ideas about potential allies and adversaries such as Russia, 
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the US, Europe, Syria and Israel. In each instance, the rhetoric initially clashed with 
the pursuit of prudent foreign and security policy making in the region. Nevertheless, 
the evidence has shown that systemic and pragmatic factors ultimately restrain 
ideational rhetoric when they begin to be problematic. For example, the 
rapprochement with both Israel and Russia occurred despite Ankara’s harsh rhetoric, 
after the material realities of the security environment demanded elites reengage. 
Hence, despite the widespread criticism of Turkey at a political level, the Syrian war 
to South and the Ukrainian conflict to its North, as of 2017 Turkey’s security 
position remains strong despite many challenges.  
Analysis and Implications 
The thesis’ framework, applied to Turkey, has demonstrated how issues within the 
domestic discourse are promoted and reordered depending on their pertinence to the 
larger security concerns. Turkey must rearrange these narratives frequently because 
of its dangerous security position, wedged between three important geopolitical 
positions. 
One immediate point of difference with the Australian case is that Australia is 
relatively strong, with a considerable military capability when measured in material 
terms, yet promotes ‘soft’ discourses. In contrast, while Turkey bases a great deal of 
its internal rhetoric on what can appear to be aggressive nationalism and the pursuit 
of modernity, it is actually a status quo actor. Furthermore, in material terms, it has 
acted pragmatically and has managed to navigate an intense security environment 
with relative success. 
This account is valuable because it contrasts with other scholarly narratives about 
Turkey’s recent history, where both Kemalism and the rise of the AKP are 
frequently framed around ideational factors including Islam, Turkish and Turkic 
identity.258 Journalistic commentators also prefer to attribute these problems to the 
agency of elites from within the ruling AKP259 and especially Erdoğan.260 However, 
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the problem with these simplistic assessments based on rhetoric is that they tend to 
trivialise the difficult security environment Turkey continues to face.261  
Consequently, the framework here reveals important phenomena about how Turkey, 
as a middle power in a pivotal position, behaves when faced with security challenges 
that penetrate domestic discourses. As with the Australian case study, the framework 
reveals how the public and private responses to security issues change in the context 
of regional security dynamics. In doing so, it reveals several paradoxes. It reveals 
that when the sum of the evidence is considered, Turkey has managed to respond 
largely as expected under a material reading. Furthermore, for the casual observer, 
many Turkish actions may seem illogical, but make sense in a strategic setting, in 
which Turkey is hedging against total US and NATO commitment by engaging 
Russia and China in various capacities. This is pragmatic considering Washington 
and Brussels have consistently considered Turkey as a fringe concern. Furthermore, 
Turkey’s attempts to make institutional inroads into Central Asia also make sense, as 
seeking a core role in an increasingly important trade zone helps it diversify against 
too much US influence. Finally, it does this in the context of a security environment 
to the immediate South and West where hostile actors are active, and where it has 
attempted to engage key actors through both private and public diplomatic channels. 
So, overall, the empirical evidence suggests that under the AKP Turkey has 
continued to perform well in economic and strategic terms. It has done so despite a 
challenging geostrategic position between Russian, Central Asian, Middle Eastern, 
European and US interests. Recently, this geostrategic position has also required a 
pivot to the Middle East, as this is where the management of internal/external 
antagonisms is most important. The framework here suggests that the Syrian issue, 
while not one that can be ameliorated easily, needs to be addressed in a way to 
appease both domestic and international audiences. In this context, Turkey has 
inflated rhetoric about the US, despite engaging in close cooperation. This works on 
two levels: it appeals to a domestic audience, but also a wider Islamic audience in 
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the region, removing the notion that Turkey is pejoratively the home of ‘American 
Islam’.262 
It also helps explain the paradox in which—despite a problematic security 
environment—Turks have been generally optimistic, and their fears do not align 
with the empirical realities of Turkish security. For example, in 2011, 75 percent of 
Turks were optimistic about the future,263 while its politicians have enjoyed periods 
of popularity and legitimacy domestically and abroad, such as when Erdoğan was 
named the most ‘favoured’ leader in the Middle East in 2012.264  
A deeper paradox also explained by this account of Turkey’s shift east is that 
engagement in the Acquis process remains necessary to maintain its strong links with 
the EU, and by extension its security links to NATO and the US. To reject these 
ideas in their entirety risks Turkey’s marginalization at the edge of Europe, removing 
its capacity to hedge by engaging with Middle Eastern actors. This has been visible 
following the 2016 coup, when Erdoğan engaged in populist rhetoric about the 
reintroduction of the death penalty.265 Yet doing so would violate EU acquis 
principles, thereby formally ending Turkey’s engagement process. Correspondingly, 
as of November 2016, the AKP and its leadership have not pushed forward the idea, 
despite possessing the political capital to do so following the coup attempt. Once 
again, this suggests that a split exists between discourses designed for internal 
consumption and those designed for the realities of managing Turkey’s security 
environment. 
Thus, the framework presented here can help to clarify a variety of other 
international relations positions that often appear conflicted when describing 
Turkey’s security outlook. For instance, from a theoretical perspective, neo-realists 
assert that Turkish behaviour is consistent with bandwagoning (with the US) to 
protect itself from threats from the East and North. Neoliberal institutionalists would 
suggest that EU accession is Turkey’s best option, because it reduces security threats 
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by entwining and linking various institutions. From the sociological perspective, 
English School scholars such as Hedley Bull might view their recent actions as 
processes of state socialisation, with Turkey wishing to join a ‘society’ where a 
mutual interest would increase security.266 Meanwhile, Turkey could be viewed 
through the lens of constructivists, such as Alastair Johnson and Peter Katzenstein, 
in terms of its Kemalistic tradition, which desires to maintain and regain the 
historical legacy of a once great empire.267  
Yet the explanation here is arguably richer when considering the empirical record. 
Turkey’s relations are not as fractious as many first-image analyses suggest, and 
assessing Turkish rhetoric at face value is not always helpful. Again, at the 
international level, overall US–Turkish relations have a history of being positive, 
with Hillary Clinton referring to Turkey as the ‘anchor’ of the region in 2009268 and 
Obama describing the relationship as ‘a model partnership’ in early 2016.269 Even 
after the events of July 2016, when the public discourses had generally come to view 
US-Turkey relations as strained, ties remain strong. Additionally, Turkey arguably 
has much more leverage in the relationship and flexibility that it did compared to a 
decade ago. The complex security environment means that Turkey can contest US 
objectives when they diverge from Ankara’s. Hence, Ankara has played off Russia, 
Chinese and US attentions, while remaining critical to the interests of them all. 
Finally, the Turkish economy was the fastest growing in Europe in the first quarter 
of 2016. Even following the coup attempt in 2016, the OECD continues to project 4 
percent annual GDP growth up to the end of 2017.270 This is in stark contrast to 
mainstream readings of the Turkish political environment, where Erdoğan is often 
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framed as a proto-fascist, and Turkey as a looming disaster at the front line of the 
instability facing Europe.271 
The corollary is that Turkey’s ideational aspects and domestic discourses should not 
be automatically conflated with strategic action. Turkish behaviour has been 
informed by the material environment and possesses a great deal of sound strategic 
logic. In this sense, the framework also complements and tightens analyses of 
Turkey’s behaviour at the international level in terms of James Fearon’s notion of 
signalling.272 In this context, it ‘signals’ to external security partners that it is largely 
rhetoric, but will back up with action when required. In the Turkish case, it can 
leverage many security tokens, including involvement in missile shields, the extent 
of its cooperation with Israel and intelligence, and the extent of integration with 
Western norms. In one instance, Erdoğan clearly demonstrated this dualism by 
attending the Charlie Hebdo march in Paris, then threatening Cumhuriyet employees 
with jail on his return for publishing sections of the offending magazine.273 
Chapter Conclusion and Implications for Middle Power Study 
This case has explained how Turkish elites have managed domestic rhetoric to align 
their content with pragmatic security considerations at the regional level. This 
includes bandwagoning with NATO and the EU as part of a balancing coalition 
balancing against the Soviets.274 This changed in form over the past twenty years, 
with the US influence potentially waning in the region, while the great power to the 
North (in the form of the USSR and now the Russian Federation) has also changed. 
Therefore, as security dynamics have altered, so too has Turkish foreign and security 
policy, with Turkey now attempting to align itself more closely with states to the 
East, while remaining open to continued integration with the West. 
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Consequently, the framework helps add value to other materially grounded analyses, 
such as those by Kaplan and Mearsheimer.275 It does much to explain how and why 
the EU is used as security currency by Turkey, when a great deal of other materially 
grounded literature focuses on the role of NATO. Indeed, the evidence here suggests 
that EU engagement can be interpreted not primarily as an economic tool, but 
instead one based on advancing foreign policy and security agendas.276  
At the domestic level, this chapter also adds value by suggesting that phenomena 
such as the increasing levels of anti-Americanism within Turkey (for the most part) 
are a tool to fill a temporary ideational gap. In the Cold War era, this was clearly 
demarcated, with the Kurds consistently pushed as the primary threat to the Turkish 
republic. Now though, anti-Kurdish sentiment has the potential to intervene in 
Turkey’s expansion, to the West, via the Acquis process, which requires Turkey to 
fulfil human rights commitments, while to the East antagonism risks threatening its 
desired role as an energy transit state. Thus, elites have allowed ideational threats to 
shift away from the PKK and towards the US and Israel. This comes with risks, but 
overall threats that are more distant have less chance of being translated into 
empirical problems on the ground. This contrasts with the exploitation of near threats 
such as Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria and Iran. Elites themselves are also moderated through 
a process of dilution, where emerging actors are pulled closer to the centre of power 
so their ideas do not intervene strongly and affect the self-interest of the state. 
Therefore, Turkey rarely acts in the way the rhetoric emerging from the country 
suggests it might. For the passive observer, Erdoğan and the AKP may appear to be 
leading the country into an Islamist abyss, but the evidence here suggests a 
pragmatic logic behind many of the foreign policy decisions made by the AKP. Most 
importantly, the shift in foreign policy under the AKP from the CHP after the 2003 
election is not driven just by party ideology. It is primarily based on changing 
regional circumstances to which Ankara must adjust. 
The prescriptive lesson from Turkey is that if elites do not gain permission to 
undertake appropriate strategic changes within this intense environment, adverse 
security outcomes can emerge. Hence, elites rearrange the hierarchy of domestic 
ideas that connect with foreign policy in ways that minimise domestic populism and 
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political entrepreneurs affecting security. This allows them to respond to threats 
appropriately, without undue interference from domestic political forces. Thus, to 
achieve optimal outcomes, Turkish elites use emotive language about topics less 
likely to impact immediate security, such as the US and Israel, while deemphasizing 
higher order issues such as relations with Iran, which do have considerable security 
implications. 
Finally, the implication for middle power scholarship is that Turkey has many useful 
parallels to Australia. While the intensity of external conditions is different, the 
responses fit within the typology presented here. More importantly, it opens the 
study of Turkey to new theoretical paradigms when using a middle power lens, 
without over-emphasising ideational factors. In doing so, it addresses the rush to use 
critical viewpoints, as demonstrated earlier on page sixty-six by Pinar Bilgin’s 2011 
review of Turkish scholarship, where she found a strong focus on reflexive studies 
due Turkey’s ‘historico-political context’.277 Consequently, this research expands the 
theoretical range of positions on Turkey, but does so without retreating to the 
normative liberal lens that has often marginalised it as a case in middle power study. 
Hence, by using the neoclassical realism approach to understand Turkey as a 
‘pivotal’ middle power, new conclusions become available. One is that Turkey acts, 
quite simply, as a mid-sized power would be expected to, regardless of normative 
and historical factors. In short, it promotes itself as a middle power to maximise its 
role institutionally, but ultimately its overall stance is defensive and based on 
maintenance of the status quo, which is best assisted by adroitly managing its 
internal discourses.    
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 CHAPTER 5: MEXICO 
In this final case, I apply the neoclassical realist framework outlined at the outset of 
this thesis to Mexico. Mexico is well suited to this analysis because it provides an 
important contrast with the Australian and Turkish cases. From a comparative 
position, it is routinely called a ‘middle power’.1 It also meets the criteria of the 
‘pivotal middle power’ set out in Chapter Two. Yet Mexico’s main comparative 
value concerning middle power lies in the uniqueness of its political system and its 
geographical location. It is classified as a ‘flawed democracy’ by the Economist’s 
democracy index, lying between Turkey (a ‘hybrid regime’) and Australia (a full 
democracy).2 This ‘flawed’ nature stems from its use of a highly concentrated 
presidential system that gives leaders a single six-year term with extensive powers. 
Mexico’s other important point of differentiation from the previous cases is its 
proximity to the US, with which it shares a 3,200-kilometre border.3 This provides a 
greater set of interlocked security dynamics than seen in the previous cases, working 
in both directions. This shields Mexico from a great deal of external interference, but 
also forces it to act in line with US interests. Problematic discourses emerging from 
Mexico risk the country becoming a focus of the US’s own security narratives. This 
is in much the same way that China can be framed as a risk to Australian security 
and how anti-Islamist sentiment can problematize Turkey’s security relationship 
with Europe. Consequently, reordering of certain problematic domestic discourses is 
critical to Mexican security. The evidence presented within this chapter suggests that 
Mexico does control these discourses as expected: it has a cordial relationship with 
the US and routinely avoids invoking issues that could be exploitable for political 
gain, despite numerous incentives for political entrepreneurs to do so. Together, 
these two points of differentiation make Mexico an excellent comparative case for 
understanding how domestic discourses are managed across distinct types of 
domestic political systems, and within different geographical locations. 
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As with the previous two chapters, I begin with an overview of Mexico’s security 
environment, which is dominated by the proximity of the US. I then trace the 
development of Mexico’s strategic posture over the twentieth century, and 
demonstrate that it has managed to avoid many of the security problems experienced 
by other Latin American states, including left-wing populism. I attribute this to the 
centrist tendency of Mexican politics, which combines with a non-interventionist and 
largely isolationist foreign policy. Overall, I argue that Mexico’s lack of 
assertiveness in international affairs (despite its considerable material weight) is 
pragmatic in the context of its geographical position. 
The second part of the chapter applies the typology of deflection, dilution, and 
inflation. First, processes of deflection in Mexico bear some notable differences to 
the previous two cases. Unlike Australia and Turkey, where certain discourses are 
avoided, deflection in Mexico is rooted in domestic systemic factors—such as 
education and the media—where knowledge of international politics is limited, and 
domestic audiences focus on local politics as their top priority. When international 
politics are invoked they are rarely about ‘high’ security challenges or existential 
issues. Instead, there is a preference for security discourses focused on abstract 
notions of the Mexican state and Mexican nationalism, rather than emphasising any 
specific external adversaries. The party system assists in this process given that the 
major Mexican parties are largely centrist, and focused on economic policy 
opportunities. Consequently, elites can deflect and control contentious security 
topics (such as the relationship with Cuba manifesting as tepid support for Havana) 
in ways that appease leftist sentiment, without antagonising Washington. Hence, for 
instance, feigning concern for the Cuban cause while maintaining a security policy 
aligned with the US moves issues away from the centre of debates, and prevents 
them becoming a central rallying point for political entrepreneurs. 
Second, my assessment of dilution in this case reveals that Mexican elites are 
primarily concerned with diluting the role of leftist politics because a genuine leftist 
movement could antagonise Washington. Elites have responded to this problem by 
using the idea of a ‘hard’ and soft’ left to provide a distinction between ideas that are 
tolerated by the US, and those seen as problematic. This creates a set of ‘safe’ 
political cleavages to contest in the public space, where leaders can invoke leftist 
ideals as long as they do not veer into the type of leftist populism (the so-called 
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‘wrong left’) witnessed in other parts of Latin America. Elsewhere, I demonstrate 
how problematic actors, including the Zapatista movement, organised criminal 
groups, and vigilante groups—such as the so-called ‘Autodefensas’—have received 
substantial concessions and had their central messages taken on and diluted by the 
centre when elites have viewed these issues as harmful to state security and stability. 
Finally, the process of inflation is visible. In Mexico, inflation is delicate and the 
targets more diffuse than in the Australian and Turkish cases. One reason for this is 
that obvious targets for inflation, such as anti-American sentiment, are likely to have 
an existential impact on Mexico’s security position. Hence, inflated sentiments about 
the US are often unfocused and based on broad cultural narratives rather than 
specific issues. Elsewhere, Mexicans’ main security concerns revolve 
(understandably) about violence and disorder resulting from cartel activities, but 
outside of national borders these concerns become ambiguous and stress issues such 
as vague internationalism, unfocussed environmentalism, and—in common with 
Turkey and Australia—a disproportionate fear of outsiders and immigrants. 
Consequently, in Mexico, fears targeting the security role of Guatemalan and 
Salvadorian immigrants are inflated despite their relatively small numbers and their 
historical centrality to Mexico’s agricultural economy. 
As with the previous two cases, the final third of the chapter provides analysis of the 
typology and synthesizes this with structural conditions. It finds that Mexico exhibits 
the same generalised responses as the first two cases when using the typology. At the 
same time, the balance between deflection, dilution and inflation is different. I find 
that this is primarily the result of proximity to great powers, as Mexico does not have 
the equidistant position between competing powers as Australia does with China and 
the US, or Turkey with Europe, the US, Russia and the Middle East.  
Historical and Material Context 
Security Overview 
When viewed in isolation, Mexico has considerable power. Its population of 127 
million is comparable to Japan’s (also 127 million).4 It has significant territory as 
well—it is the fifteenth-largest state on the planet—and it possesses both sea access 
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and protection from two oceans.5 It is a G20 country with the world’s fifteenth 
largest nominal global GDP in 2014.6 In any other region this set of attributes would 
be formidable. However, in the regional security context, its size is small relative to 
its northern neighbour, the US. The US’s 2015 GDP of $18.5 trillion dwarfs 
Mexico’s $2.34 trillion, while its population is approximately a third of the US.7 
One outcome of its proximity to the US is that Mexican elites, in general, adhere to a 
strong isolationist and non-interventionist norm despite Mexico’s material 
capabilities. Many factors contribute to this, although scholars have highlighted the 
period during the Mexican revolution, the Zimmermann telegram, and the US 
actions in Veracruz as the cornerstones of this norm.8 Non-interventionism was 
codified in what has popularly become known as the ‘Estrada Doctrine’ (after then- 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Genaro Estrada), and emerged after Mexico’s 
admission to the League of Nations in 1931.9 Specifically, Mexico pledged it would 
not withdraw diplomats or alter relations in the event of governmental change by any 
methods other than elections, because to do so would breach other states’ 
sovereignty. The overall argument of Estrada was that de facto governments are not 
functionally different to de jure governments.10 Further, the doctrine stressed that 
Mexico should not provide value judgements about internal political matters, 
including military coups, which were a common occurrence throughout the region.11 
Overall, the policy was invested in non-interventionism and recognition of self-
determination. 
From a security perspective, this made sense. Mexico’s best route to avoid further 
US interference was to promote non-interference as a regional norm, informed by the 
experiences of the early twentieth century. For example, the US was instrumental in 
the overthrow of President Francisco Madero in 1913 after the US ambassador to 
Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, provided support to the coup planners, due to Wilson’s 
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fears of socialism taking hold.12 Soon after, in April 1914, Mexican attempts to act 
assertively ended poorly after it detained US troops conducting refuelling in 
Tamaulipas. Mexico detained the troops after the US refused to recognise 
Venustiano Carranza as the leader of the state during the Mexican revolution.13 In 
retaliation, the US occupied Veracruz for six months during 1914, humiliating 
Mexico and highlighting the wide differences in military capabilities between the 
two. 
Mexico’s ability to pursue an isolationist foreign and security policy following the 
Veracruz incident was enabled by resource income. Oil’s place in Mexican security 
is codified in Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917. It asserts that ‘the 
wealth contained in the soil, the subsoil, the waters and seas of Mexico belongs to 
the Nation; the right to land ownership and to exploit the subsoil may therefore only 
be granted by the Nation’.14 Isolationism and oil income therefore facilitated 
Mexico’s slow but steady economic development during the twentieth century. This 
persists today: oil remains nationalised and commercialised via the national oil 
company PEMEX (an abbreviation of Petróleos Mexicanos), which maintains a 
monopoly on production. In 2013 PEMEX accounted for almost one-third of 
Mexico’s total taxation revenue.15 Oil exports accounted for 11 percent of export 
income in 2014, and Mexico is the twelfth largest producer of petroleum products 
worldwide.16 
It is therefore unsurprising that oil revenue is often linked to domestic stability and 
security in Mexico.17 This rentier-styled economy has also helped create a strong 
central corporatist government that prioritises industries such as petroleum as central 
to the national interest, to the detriment of traditional military capabilities. 
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Correspondingly, Mexico’s defence capabilities are severely underdeveloped for a 
state of its size. Historically, defence spending has traditionally averaged 0.4 to 0.6 
percent, and in 2015 military expenditure was only 0.52 percent of GDP (at just over 
USD 6 billion).18 This contrasts with 4.2 percent for the US and 1.83 percent for 
Australia.19 In fact, Mexico has the lowest GDP-to-military-spending ratio of all the 
G20 nations. 
This low level of spending is assisted by domestic norms, which emphasise state 
sovereignty and non-interference. Technically, no Mexican troops can act as 
peacekeepers due to Article 129 of the 1917 Constitution, which states ‘No military 
authority may, in time of peace, perform any functions other than those that are 
directly connected with military affairs’.20 At the same time, the persistence of this 
constitutional article provided an important way for Mexico to navigate the complex 
regional rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War, where it 
often retreated to legalistic arguments when called on for assistance, thereby 
maintaining a semblance of neutrality.  
However, in the current international climate this domestic norm has proven 
restrictive. It has meant that Mexico is constrained from enhancing its security 
prospects through multilateral engagement as other middle powers do, via activities 
such as peacekeeping, and participation in multinational coalitions (such as those in 
Iraq and Afghanistan). Attempts have been made to break this norm, but they have 
faced strong opposition. For instance, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari raised the 
idea of sending troops to Iraq during his tenure in 1991, but backed down soon after 
opposition from Congress.21 Overall, until 2014, Mexico had only been involved in 
three peacekeeping missions, with the largest and last being in El Salvador during 
1992-1993.22 Overall, this has created an environment where Mexico is largely 
subordinate to the US, and constrained by domestic normative features promoted to 
maintain Cold War era security. As David Aleman has observed, this overall trend 
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means that means Mexico ‘remains more of a spectator than an actor on the 
international stage’.23 
Relative Power and Security Competitors 
Mexico’s underdeveloped military capability is not only the result of isolationism, 
but also reflects differing approaches to military affairs in the region. Notably, the 
US has been restrained when using ‘traditional’ military interventions in Latin 
America, for fear of antagonising and emboldening leftist movements. This has 
resulted in a preference by the US to use covert channels when addressing their 
interests in the region. This tradition stems from the Cold War, and was articulated 
in the 1954 US ‘Doolittle’ report, which promoted the use of clandestine military 
activities to influence security outcomes in the region.24 In short, it argued that 
coercion was preferable to direct military action and that in the Cold War 
environment ‘there are no rules in such a game [...and...] if the United States is to 
survive, long standing concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered’.25 The end 
result was that indirect action became the preferred method of engagement for 
Washington. So, while direct military action is rare, US interventionism has been 
common, with interference in Guatemala (1963), the Dominican Republic (1965), 
Chile (1972), El Salvador (1980), Honduras (1980), Nicaragua (1980) and Panama 
(1989). Each instance has sent a signal to Mexico that leftist governments 
challenging US interests will be the target of interference. 
While the US is undoubtedly the hegemonic power of the region, Mexico’s latent 
and economic capabilities continue to increase relative to the US. In fact, the country 
has enjoyed steady economic growth (with the exception of 2009 due to the GFC) 
since the beginning of the twenty-first century.26 Only Brazil has a larger economy 
in Latin America, and no other Central American state comes close to Mexico’s 
material capabilities. In comparison, the second largest economy in Central America 
is Cuba, which has a GDP of only USD$68 billion (2012).27 
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Furthermore, when viewing Mexico’s location through a material lens, its position to 
the South appears secure. Mexico shares southern borders with only Guatemala and 
Belize. Guatemala’s military strength is largely inconsequential: it has spent less 
than 0.5 percent of GDP on defence over the past decade.28 It possesses only four 
attack aircraft, and had a total defence budget of USD$274 million in 2015.29 Belize 
is even smaller, with a 2015 defence budget of USD$20 million in 2015, and no 
functioning air force.30 Thus, with the exception of the US, only Cuba and Colombia 
could perceivably threaten Mexico in hard security terms in the immediate region, 
and there is little or no incentive for either to do so.   
Security and Foreign Policy Responses 
Although isolationism and restraint is a consistent trait of Mexican security and 
foreign policy, Roberto Dominguez has nonetheless argued that a few distinct 
foreign policy eras are discernible.31 Importantly, each allows a clear demarcation 
between the external political conditions and their alignment with differing internal 
domestic debates. For Dominguez, the initial period lasted from the end of the 
Second World War to the late 1970s. This was focused on state building and internal 
consolidation during a period of regional instability. This correlates with the 
consolidation of the Cold War and emergence of security competitions during the so-
called ‘Central American Crisis’.32 In fact, Mexico is notable here because it avoided 
much of the problematic meddling seen elsewhere in the region during this 
timeframe. That included Soviet moves to support Cuba ending in the Bay of Pigs 
defeat, the Guatemalan Civil War on Mexico’s border, and civil conflicts in 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras, where belligerents clearly attached 
themselves to either the US or the USSR. 
A second era of Mexican foreign and security policy began during the 1980s, largely 
as a reaction to the political instability emerging in Central America, resulting in the 
reorganisation of its disparate security infrastructure.33 As a result, the military 
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became more deeply involved with the planning and organisation of security, rather 
than being simply tasked with maintaining the post-revolutionary domestic order.34 
Dominguez’s final period involved the emergence of transnational actors in the post-
Cold War environment. Here, Mexico’s foreign and security policy was driven by 
institutional engagement in NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement). 
This was also accompanied by a change in the government from the PRI’s 
corporatist style of governance to PAN’s more neoliberal outlook under Vincente 
Fox in 2000. The period was also one when Mexico’s domestic organised crime 
issues became a primary security concern, with claims it was a ‘failed state’ after a 
United States Joint Forces Command report stated ‘the government, its politicians, 
police and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by 
criminal gangs and drug cartels’.35  
Similarly to the Australian and Turkish cases, we can reinterpret these phases 
through the neoclassical realist framework advanced in this thesis, and extract broad 
expectations about how Mexico should behave. Internal consolidation and adherence 
to non-intervention made sense in the post-WW II era and during the early phases of 
the Cold War, as overt support for either side invited interference. During the 1980s, 
neoliberal reforms and military modernisation made sense, given the problems of the 
post-revolutionary period had been addressed and engaging economic orders gave 
Mexico a way to lower its threat perception to the US, while maintaining a façade of 
ideological independence. Finally, the post-Cold War period saw full integration in 
institutions, such as NAFTA, that were favourable to the US. 
Domestic Environment and Elites 
As with its isolationist foreign policy, Mexico’s domestic political system has 
retained clear links to the security environment it must navigate. First, it is designed 
to emphasise decisiveness and hierarchy. Mexico has a Federal system of 
government, headed by a President with unusually concentrated power, famously 
termed the ‘perfect dictatorship’ by Peruvian author Mario Vargas Llosa.36 The 
Mexican president has a single six-year term known as the ‘sexenio’. This combines 
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with no restrictions on the cabinet and executive that the President can appoint. 
There is no Vice-President. Furthermore, the process of succession within PAN was 
secretive, and colloquially known as the dedazo (the ‘tap’).37 From a functional 
perspective, this enabled decisive and strong leadership not bound by formalities 
when dealing with security matters. Furthermore, according to Roderick Ai Camp, 
the Mexican political system does not adhere to a rigid ideology, and nor is it built 
on any legalistic norms.38 Thus, there are few obstacles in the way of foreign policy 
decision making for elites.39 
For Camp, this creates a political elite which 
‘governs, to a great extent, the behaviour of each succeeding group in the 
governing elite, since they, like their predecessors, are socialised to the 
norms of behaviour present at the time of their initial recruitment into the 
political system’.40  
The result is a so-called ‘camarilla’ pyramidal system with the President and his/her 
clique at the top. 
Despite this concentrated political environment, three parties have played important 
roles in modern Mexican politics. The first, and most prominent is the PRI, founded 
by Plutarco Elías Calles in 1929, which held power at the Congressional level until 
1997 (and at the Presidential level until 2000).41 According to Joseph Klesner, the 
PRI in Mexico became an institution that made a ‘self-reproducing civilian political 
elite’42, leading to the claim that Mexico was only a ‘proper’ democracy after 1994 
because of this deep system of patronage.43  
A second influential party, PAN, broke the PRI’s stranglehold on power in 2000 
with the election of Vincente Fox. A second PAN Presidency occurred under Felipe 
Calderón from 2006 to 2012. PAN’s policies are centrist, conservative and strongly 
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associated with the Catholic Church and free enterprise.44 But the PAN electoral 
victories had little to do with policy differences. Instead, as Klesner claims, it was a 
strategy to ‘harvest the discontent of voters with one-party rule’ that allowed PAN to 
succeed at the ballot box.45 Together, this created an environment where the two 
parties—PAN and the PRI—have few differences on foreign and security policy. 
Rather, both have attempted to act as ‘catch-all’ parties, with their main point of 
differentiation being appeals to either change or continuity.46 
A highly concentrated media complements the Mexican party system, with 92 
percent of Mexico’s television stations owned by two companies: Televisa and TV 
Azteca.47 Outside these major outlets, there exists a convention of self-censorship in 
the print media due to threats of violence and repercussion by several domestic 
actors, most notably from cartels.48 Additionally, Mexican media owner Carlos Slim 
Helu is the world’s wealthiest individual. He has obtained a large amount of his vast 
fortune from his holdings in América Móvil and its subsidiaries.49 América Móvil is 
the largest provider of telecommunications in South America, with approximately 
250 million subscribers across eighteen countries.50 Slim has also been linked to 
takeover attempts on Univision Communications (valued at approximately USD$20 
billion), which deliver Spanish language broadcasts to the US, although he is limited 
to a 25 percent share under American foreign ownership laws.51  
Hence, Slim’s holdings also exert influence outside of Mexico, with a specific 
emphasis on the US. Of note is his interest in the New York Times, which is currently 
the second largest holding. His current stake is 8 percent, and as of 2016 was seeking 
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to double this.52 According to the New York Times, ‘his vast resources often translate 
into less-than-critical coverage’.53 Indeed, Slim’s vast power is partly addressed in 
the ‘Pacto por Mexico’, the bipartisan reforms that sought to reduce his potential for 
influence via constitutional reform.54 Nonetheless, Slim maintains a politically 
neutral position, in line with the corporatist thinking that has traditionally dominated 
Mexican politics. 
At the same time, the Mexican media has faced few overt censorship attempts under 
Mexico’s highly centralised political system, even during the growth of the Internet. 
Rather, censorship by intimidation and violence is the norm, often enforced by non-
governmental actors. This coercive power was demonstrated when the day after the 
Zetas cartel leader Miguel Morales was arrested, no local newspaper printed the 
story for fear of reprisals.55 Much of the data on cartels comes from sites such as 
Blog del Narco, whose writer has been forced into exile in Spain.56 Even in the 
digital realm, uncredited authors have been targeted, because the Zetas are believed 
to have infiltrated law enforcement, and have access to online surveillance tools.57 
For example, a supposedly anonymous writer for the website Nuevo Laredo en Vivo, 
Marisol Macias Castañeda, was found decapitated with her head left next to a 
keyboard – with a note stating ‘I’m here because of my (online) reports’.58 
This means that although Mexico has no formal censorship, with freedom of speech 
enshrined in the Constitution, it struggles in press freedom rankings, coming in at 
149 out of 180 in the 2016 Reporters Without Borders index.59 In fact, a 2015 
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Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) report ranked Mexico as the eighth most 
dangerous country for journalists, ahead of Pakistan and Russia.60 At the same time, 
the lack of governmental control means that populist and sensationalist discourses 
are the norm, especially within the print media. This creates a challenge for elites 
when they are rewired to shape debates to meet external security realities.  
Applying the framework  
This initial survey of Mexico’s security environment has demonstrated that despite a 
similar geographical setting to Australia and Turkey, which sits between two larger 
political blocs, Mexico’s geopolitical position differs substantially. Central to this 
difference is its proximity to the US. At this point, and as with the first two cases, I 
have identified and contextualised the core security threats to Mexico. Consequently, 
this section applies the neoclassical realist framework outlined in the first chapter. 
As before, I identify how elites: (1) deflect problematic issues away from debates; 
(2) dilute issues that have managed to penetrate debates; and (3) prefer to inflate 
benign threats. 
Deflection 
The use of deflection within Mexico’s domestic discourses on foreign and security 
policy varies from the first two cases as its domestic population has an arguably less-
informed understanding of its place in international affairs. For example, a 2010 
survey, taken at the height of the drug war, showed that Mexicans’ main knowledge 
of international affairs was about the UN and the US President.61 The same 2010 
survey found only 6 percent of respondents could identify Mexico’s then-Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, Patricia Espinosa Cantellano.62 A similar poll from CIDE found 
that 42 percent of Mexicans have ‘little or no interest in international affairs’.63 This 
means that public knowledge of Mexico’s security and foreign policy challenges is 
limited. In fact, Mexico had the least interest in international politics of any of the 
Latin American countries surveyed, despite its centrality to the US and its role in 
NAFTA.64 As David Shirk notes, this has led to a situation where ‘Mexicans are 
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uninformed about national or international politics, and are not willing to invest 
resources, assume responsibilities, or carry out international actions that imply costs 
or larger commitments’.65 
The evidence also suggests that low knowledge of foreign policy and security issues 
is not an educational problem, given that Mexico’s schooling standards are relatively 
high (it has higher school retention rates than Turkey, and a similar literacy rate).66 
Similarly, access to information is not an obstacle, although Mexico’s Internet 
penetration rate is low at 57.4 percent (as of 2015), similar to that of Turkey.67 A 
central question, then, is whether this deflection of political knowledge is a response 
to its systemic position, or the result of other factors. 
A survey of the party system helps illuminate why international issues do not 
resonate deeply with domestic audiences. Notably, Mexico’s domestic politics lacks 
a clear left-right political cleavage prominent in similar sized emerging economies. 
Hence, in Mexico, the main parties—PAN, PDR and PRI—are loosely affiliated 
with the centre-right, the centre, and the centre-left respectively, rather than a clear 
left and right. This precedent stems from the dominance of the PRI during the 
twentieth century, which relied on a corporatist style of governance, and acted as a 
body that delegated political power to a wide range of loyal groups across both the 
left and right, rather than dividing political interests based on ideological differences. 
This included spaces for peasant groups (such as the National Peasant 
Confederation), workers, and economic elites, working together in what George W. 
Grayson described as a political ‘gyroscope’.68  
This has led to a lack of wide ideological divisions in Mexican politics and a dearth 
of party affiliation, where less than half of voters identified with any party in 2000, 
even though that election resulted in the end of seventy-one years of PRI rule.69 In 
2010 David Vidal et al noted that party identification has remained relative low, and 
that voting is viewed within a clientelistic lens, with a vote seen as currency for 
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protest rather than an expression of deeper ideological beliefs.70 For the purposes of 
understanding deflection, this serves as one example of how the major parties have 
deflected the wider ideological divides apparent in other Latin American states, 
thereby preventing the emergence of the ‘wrong left’ and its associated security 
problems. Overall, it is the narrowness of the political spectrum that permits the easy 
deflection of issues outside of the centre and deemed harmful to the national interest. 
Even when electoral changes occur, deflection is visible because so-called 
‘concertacións’ are a frequent feature of Mexican politics. This is where cross-party 
collaboration has been normalised during times of political crisis or minority 
government.71 Although commonly interpreted through an economic lens,72 in this 
case they can be expanded to demonstrate their role in security. At the simplest level, 
concertacións have their basis in ‘non-ideological consensus’, removing the power of 
smaller interest groups, and delegating elements of the political structure to groups 
based on loyalty.73 One outcome is that political cooperation is common, and since 
1997, minority legislatures have further required cooperation between PAN and the 
PRI.74 
A specific example of deflection by PAN and PRI occurred during overt electoral 
fraud during the 1988 election. In this instance, an alliance known as the National 
Democratic Front (FDN), consisting of splinter groups from the PRI and a loose 
coalition of smaller centre and centre-left parties, contested the election. The 
coalition also included radical socialist parties, which were perceived as problematic 
to the broader Mexican isolationist stance, including the Popular Socialist Party, the 
Socialist Workers’ Party, and the Socialist Mexican Party.75  
Established elites became concerned because in the lead-up to the election polling 
showed that FDN candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was likely to win the 
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Presidency.76 From a foreign and security policy position, this was problematic, as 
the PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s policy positions were closely aligned 
to the administration of Ronald Reagan’s drug war strategy. In contrast, the more 
radical FDN threatened to contest the wider US approach to security matters in the 
region.77Another security problem (for existing elites) was Cárdenas’ opposition to 
Mexican membership of the GATT, which included changes to the laws on foreign 
ownership, allowing US companies to own property. This was also critical to the 
implementation of NAFTA, which the policies of FDN were likely to derail.78 Thus, 
the prospect of a Cárdenas victory posed substantial changes to Mexico’s security 
outlook by aligning it ideologically with the wider Latin American left. 
In this instance, deflection was apparent in the behaviour of the two ‘major’ parties’ 
approach to electoral fraud that delivered the PRI the Presidency. On Election Day 
the tallying computer crashed and blatant voting rigging was reported in regional 
electorates.79 Ballots were burned soon after in order to remove evidence of the 
assumed fraud.80 PAN, the traditional opposition, did not protest the result, helping 
restore a semblance of legitimacy despite the fraudulent count.81 As Beatriz 
Magalona has correctly noted, there were two reasons for the lack of protest from 
PAN. First, the dangers of confronting the government were too high, and the PRI 
was willing to use force to prevent a FDN Presidency.82 Second, the PRI gave PAN 
‘significant side payments’ to remove the fraud narrative from their political 
discourse, in the form of policy influence in the legislative arena.83 Magalona’s 
conclusion was that PAN deflected the fraud narrative because the ‘left-wing 
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alternative was a worse choice than tolerating the PAN’s collusion with the 
autocratic regime’.84  
This demonstrates how Mexican elites—from two major parties at least—were 
willing to make domestic concessions and had refused to exploit conditions that may 
have resulted in short-term political capital, but that would have had substantial 
implications for state security. In short, the election of a president linked to the 
Trotskyist left during the late 1980s was viewed as a bigger threat to the national 
interest than electoral fraud. Hence, the elite within the two centre parties made the 
decision that a ‘tainted’ democracy was preferably to one infused by leftist 
radicalism, which would have potentially invited US interference. 
In this context, clear two-level games were being played. Mexico was fearful of 
inviting further US influence because of increasing political violence and internal 
instability. Domestically, the ruling PRI was pulling the emerging radical factions 
back to the centre of the debate, even if it meant losing power as a result. The overall 
message was that domestic power for its own sake was less desirable than overall 
stability and a reduction in threats. In short, a Mexico that antagonised the US was 
one where all domestic players came out at a disadvantage, as did Mexico’s security 
prospects as a whole. 
Deflection via electoral fraud also made sense when assessing Mexico’s place in the 
regional order of the time. For example, in January 1994, NAFTA went into effect. 
NAFTA included coercive elements concerning US critical interests in the region, 
especially in respect to oil, natural gas, and manufacturing. As Paul Krugman 
pointed out at the time, ‘NAFTA is essentially a foreign-policy rather than an 
economic issue’.85 His argument was that the US gained little from the economic 
side of NAFTA. Instead, the main benefits came from allowing the US a way to 
ensure Mexican domestic stability, making it in essence a security project. 
Though they are subtler, similar patterns of deflection have emerged in recent years 
under President Enrique Peña Nieto of the PRI, where a number of tripartisan 
measures—between the PRI, PAN and PRD—have passed, including a bill to limit 
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telecommunications ownership by Carlos Slim.86 One concern was that Slim’s power 
was too great, with his companies totalling 7 percent of Mexico’s annual economic 
output.87 While the majority of parliamentary discourse about Slim focused on his 
monopoly on telecoms and accusations of overcharging, a core focus of the reforms 
was to diversify the media, including the establishment of two new television 
stations.88 These concerns were raised during the 2016 US Presidential election 
campaign, when then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump routinely invoked Slim 
as someone who was attempting to undermine democratic processes by publishing 
material in the New York Times critical of Trump’s bid for power.89  
Attempts to counter Slim were part of the larger tripartisan effort ‘Pacto por Mexico’ 
(Pact for Mexico) referred to earlier, which consisted of ninety-five points of 
agreement between the three major parties.90 Other reforms included the 
restructuring of PEMEX to attract investment, and, from a security position, a 
reorganization of the military’s role in domestic policing.91 This last reform was to 
involve the creation of a National Gendarmerie—essentially a police force with 
military capabilities—and was aimed at strengthening internal security. Hence the 
tripartisan agreement highlighted how for domestic politicians, internal security was 
increasingly viewed as an important part of Mexico’s overall security position. 
The corollary is that within Mexico, the two (and often three) largest parties tend to 
agree on a number of key areas linked to security: energy security (via liberalisation 
of PEMEX), economic liberalisation, a reduction in media monopolies, domestic 
policing modernisation, and general policy towards the US in respect to military and 
security affairs.92 Consequently, within the framework articulated in this thesis, bi- 
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and tri-partisanship allows contentious issues within this sphere to be deflected away 
from the centrality of debates, with the higher security function of reducing the 
chance of US interference. 
Overall, this supports the argument that the foreign policy and security elite in 
Mexico act in unison on matters critical to the national interest, and are hesitant to 
politicise matters such as US military and economic issues that could resonate with 
the public in problematic ways. Hence, deflection helps explain how what should be 
a contentious issue in Mexican domestic narratives is largely ignored. Michael 
Hoopes makes this type of claim, with respect to the most recent administration that 
that ‘it’s not clear yet what President Peña Nieto is doing differently [from his 
predecessor]’.93 Elsewhere, Vanda Felbab-Brown has claimed that Peña Nieto has 
‘essentially the same operational design as the previous Felipe Calderón [of the 
PRI’s] administration’.94 Consequently, Mexican foreign and security policy, at least 
outwardly, seems highly consistent.  
Dilution 
While deflection can be viewed as a way for security and foreign policy elites to 
move the most problematic discourses away from the centre of public debates, the 
issue of leftist politics has remained within Mexico, and its exploitation by political 
entrepreneurs has consistently threatened Mexico’s security position. Dilution is 
therefore a useful way to understand how elements that are beyond deflection are 
brought back to the centre, where they can be controlled. 
A traditional economic reading suggests that the conditions in Mexico should have 
made the state vulnerable to leftist messages, especially during the height of the Cold 
War. For instance, in 1968, GPD per capita in Mexico was USD$600 compared to 
USD$4,491 in the US.95 This figure was similar to other developing states in the 
region, including Chile, where the emergence of the left resulted in the US funding a 
military coup to topple the democratically elected leader Salvador Allende on 
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September 11, 1973.96 While less extreme, similar disparities have persisted. In 
2010, for instance, residents of the Southern state of Chiapas had a GDP per capita 
of approximately 15 percent of those living in the Federal District (Mexico City).97 
And while leftist movements have emerged, especially during the 1960s under 
President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, these have largely been contained within the 
educated middle class of Mexico City. One strategy Díaz Ordaz used to counter 
dissent of this type was to differentiate between the Mexican revolution (‘our 
revolution’) and that of the international provocateurs, which he framed as an 
attempt by external actors to undermine the Mexican nationalist project.98 
Jorge Castañeda Gutman (writing in his academic rather than governmental 
capacity) has argued the answer lies in the concept of the ‘two lefts’.99 Here, Mexico 
responded to the ideological conundrum of the emergence and acceptance of a 
pragmatic ‘right left’, and a problematic ‘wrong left’. The ‘right left’ engaged 
economically and diplomatically with the wider international community in a way 
favourable to Washington’s interests.100 In contrast, the ‘wrong left’, typified by 
leaders such as Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro, was nationalistic, anti-liberal, and 
antagonised the US. According to Castañeda the ‘wrong’ left have revelled in the 
notion that ‘taunting the United States trumps promoting their countries’ real 
interests in the world’.101 Raúl Madrid covers similar territory, renaming them as the 
‘liberal’ left and the ‘interventionist’ left, with the interventionist type relying on 
‘highly personalist movements’.102 Dilution has therefore occurred by narrowing the 
domestic political agenda, and is visible where elites have taken issues that cannot 
fully be deflected, and have repurposed them in the centre. 
This helps provide a solid explanation for the lack of a genuine Marxist presence in 
Mexico. It also helps explain how elites have been successful at diluting debates that 
have gained traction in societies elsewhere in the region. Under this reading, 
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Mexican elites have been acutely aware of the security implications of courting or 
allowing the propagation of the ‘wrong left’. For example, in Mexico, there were 
consistent fears that the Cuban revolution would act as a template for political 
entrepreneurs. Indeed, Renata Keller has claimed that state officials received 
intelligence that in the decade after the Cuban revolution, noting that ‘leftist groups 
and individuals were ready and able to jeopardise their hold over the country’.103 
Consequently, the response of elites was to enmesh ‘revolutionary’ leftist politics by 
emphasising Mexican nationalism and revolutionary exceptionalism instead of the 
broader goals of regional leftist movements.  
Another specific example here was the dilution of the radical elements of the FDN 
following the fraud at the 1988 election, described earlier in this chapter, and its 
incorporation (and dilution) into a new party: the PRD. In short, the PRD diluted the 
most problematic Trotskyite elements of the party. Key players, including 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Francisco Arellano-Belloc, moderated their messages 
under the newly formed PRD, and removed the influence of smaller radical parties, 
leading to a more centrist message. In policy terms this meant that Cárdenas—as the 
PDR candidate—centred himself on many positions. So, unlike the anti-Western 
stance of the FDN, he instead switched policy positions and pledged to uphold all 
international agreements if elected, including NAFTA and those with the IMF, as 
part of an agreement with the three major parties.104 
Established actors also experience dilution when rogue actors are pulled back to the 
centre should their messages promote discourses problematic to security. One 
notable example of the dilution of PAN policy was the short-lived ‘Castañeda 
Doctrine’. Named after the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from 2000 to 2003, this 
involved a retreat from the isolationism of the Estrada doctrine. Indeed, Castañeda’s 
wider career is indicative of dilution. Initially he was a member of the communist 
party and the radical left105 but his subsequent political career consisted of a sharp 
trajectory from the left-wing PRD to the centre-right PRI. 
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Castañeda embarked on an internationalist activist agenda as part of an attempt to 
break from the PRI’s foreign policy and security norms after eighty years of rule, 
including the pursuit of a temporary seat on UNSC.106 Castañeda also implemented 
reforms to NAFTA under the ‘NAFTA plus’ strategy107 and began bilateral 
agreements with Israel, the EU and Japan.108 Regionally, the Northern Triangle Free 
Trade agreement was also signed in June 2000, allowing free trade with El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras.109 According to Pamela Starr, Castañeda’s goal was to 
formulate an assertive foreign policy that would allow Mexico to ‘reclaim its rightful 
role in world affairs as the ninth-largest economy in the world, as the geographic, 
cultural, and economic bridge between North and South America, and as an aspirant 
to First World middle-power status’.110 
But elsewhere, Castañeda antagonised Cuba to appease the US in an attempt to 
promote Mexico’s human rights credentials. This included criticism of Cuba’s 
human rights record and the suggestion that Mexico should offer refuge for Cuban 
dissidents.111 Havana reacted furiously, and the criticism gained traction within 
Mexico and foreign and security policy circles, where Castañeda was accused of 
becoming a US lackey.112 Opposition PRD member Matri Batres claimed the new 
Castañeda doctrine was part of Mexico ‘attack[ing] the weak and obey[ing] the 
strong’.113 
At the same time, Castañeda’s assertive approach also upset the US, which had 
expected Mexico to support its wider aims in the war against terror following the 
9/11 attacks. In particular, George W. Bush was upset by Castañeda’s continued 
defence of territorial absolutism concerning Iraq. He claimed that ‘the exercise of 
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sovereignty cannot be used as an excuse to justify any violation of rights’.114 
Elsewhere, the Puebla-Panama Plan, which sought to promote integration and 
development between Mexico and Central America and Colombia, failed too. 
Ultimately Mexico retreated to its traditional foreign policy, which appeased the US 
after barely a year of assertiveness. 
Many of Castañeda’s reforms were quietly rolled back. Castañeda himself was 
removed from his post after two years, and was replaced by Luis Ernesto Derbez. 
Derbez’s foreign and security approach dropped many of the ideational policy facets 
in a return to a pragmatic and economically-focussed agenda.115 A useful 
interpretation of this is that Castañeda’s attempts to pursue an ideational agenda 
within a ‘traditional’ middle powers foreign policy failed. He was, as Rathbun 
suggested, ‘punished by the system’ as neoclassical realism has predicted.116 Even 
though the motive was to increase Mexico’s position in international affairs, it 
harmed Mexico’s security position by prioritising impractical and ill-thought policy 
transformations. As a result, Castañeda’s tenure is broadly perceived as a failure, 
since his attempts to broaden and diversify Mexican security and foreign policy 
interests were diluted by wider consensus within the political elite. 
In the extended context, dilution of Castañeda’s policies towards Cuba is part of a 
long pattern where Mexico has not challenged Havana, despite its centrality to US 
security policy (and therefore wider regional security dynamics) in the region. 
Instead the pattern has been for quiet support, which appeased Mexican sympathies 
for Cuba’s plight without politicising them.117 In fact, Cuban engagement was an 
outlier policy within the region and Mexico was the only state in Central America 
between 1964 and 1970 to maintain diplomatic and air connections with Cuba.118 
Hence, a core reason for Mexico’s overall engagement with Castro (and US 
toleration of the relationship) was that it helped to dilute debates about communism 
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and prevented radical leftist groups from being mobilised in the civic debates.119 As 
Renata Keller explains: 
‘Mexican leaders decided to defend Castro primarily because they were 
worried about leftist groups and individuals in their own country and 
believed that they could use their policy toward Cuba to minimise the 
domestic leftist threat’.120 
Furthermore, close Cuban-Mexican cooperation was permitted and even encouraged 
by Washington because of concerns that a hard line on communism might lead to 
civil unrest.121 The result was that in 1967 an informal understanding between the 
US and Mexico emerged, whereby Mexico would act as a back channel for Cuban-
US relations. Again, as Keller observed: 
‘Cutting relations with Cuba could potentially unite the disparate leftist 
groups and individuals in opposition to the government’s foreign policy, 
whereas maintaining relations could win political capital for the regime and 
help shore up its revolutionary image. Adolfo López Mateos and Gustavo 
Díaz Ordaz crafted their country’s lukewarm defence of Castro with these 
considerations in mind, thus creating a foreign policy for domestic 
consumption’.122 
For the purposes of this thesis, Mexico’s acceptance of Cuba has helped it play two 
simultaneous political games: it diluted the well-established cause of Cuba and its 
centrality to the Latin American left away from the centre of public concerns. It 
simultaneously gave Mexico an important role in the US’s regional security strategy. 
This type of role was visible after Mexico assisted the CIA by allowing its agent, 
Carrillo Colón, to work within the Mexican embassy in Havana.123 According to Eric 
Zolov, this created a system where ‘both the media and Washington learned to 
accept Mexico’s “defiance”’ of the United States because it was a reflection of 
domestic political considerations, and a “politically expedient aspect of the bilateral 
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relationship”’.124 Consequently, the Cuban-Mexican relationship, when viewed 
through the lens of dilution, helps us to understand why those who seek to exploit 
the relationship are reined in. It allowed a potentially problematic issue to be 
controlled by the centre, with the addition payoff of hedging against US concerns by 
providing intelligence and back channels to Havana for Washington.125 
Yet despite the overall pattern of Mexican foreign and security policy being 
conservative and centrist, political actors do sometimes gain traction outside of the 
established political channels. This was demonstrated in Mexico by the events 
immediately following the accession of NAFTA and the resultant Zapatista uprising 
in Chiapas State, where groups were incensed by the removal of Article Twenty-
Seven from the constitution, which protected the land of indigenous peoples.126 The 
movement itself was the result of years of failed social and economic policies in 
Chiapas and attempts to privatise communal farms (ejidos), which are central to the 
indigenous people’s autonomy and welfare.127 
The Zapatistas movement is informative not only for its political outcome but 
because it was an early example of the Internet enabling a group to amplify its 
messages outside of state borders, giving it much greater reach than indigenous 
protests of the past. In short, it meant such groups could ‘escape’ borders and inflate 
messages quickly, via what Harry M. Cleaver calls an ‘alternative political fabric’.128 
For Ronfelft et al. it allowed just ‘two-hundred individuals with vague demands’ to 
become media savvy, and exploit new transnational ‘issues networks’ by permitting 
increasing access to information.129 Controlling these messages was problematic, not 
only because of the nascent nature of the Internet, but also because they could 
exploit an anti-censorship norm under Article Six of the Mexican constitution, which 
protects freedom of speech. 
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While substantial human rights concerns emerged about the treatment of the 
protestors after approximately three hundred deaths during skirmishes,130 the episode 
is also notable for the willingness of the central government to minimise the 
uprising’s impact. A chronology of events during 1994 helps illustrate this. The 
Zapatistas declared war on the first of January 1994, the day NAFTA went into 
effect, resulting in two weeks of conflict.131 Soon after, Salinas was presented with 
thirty-four demands by the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation). Salinas’ 
envoy, Manuel Camacho Solís, eventually reached agreement on thirty-two of the 
thirty-four points on March 2, 1994.132 President Zedillo came to power in December 
1994, and the San Andres Accords were signed, although never enacted. Fox also 
made considerable concessions to the Zapatista cause via the Commission for the 
Development of Indian Towns, although after the initial announcement progress was 
limited.133 
So, while most analyses of the actions in Chiapas are interpreted as a victory for the 
Zapatistas, using the framework presented in this thesis we can reinterpret this as an 
attempt by central elites to keep it off the political agenda: to dilute it. By mitigating 
this issue, elites managed to diffuse the problematic rhetorical parts of the movement 
with the potential to mobilise the radical left in the uncertain post-Cold War 
environment. This could have harmed the national interest and led the US to alter it 
threat perceptions of Mexico. 
This trend of diluting rather than attacking and splintering rogue and vigilante 
movements is visible across other areas of Mexican policy too. For instance, the 
deteriorating internal security situation after 2006 led to a dramatic increase in 
vigilantism.134 These groups were known as Autodefensas or ‘rural defence 
groups’135 and by late 2013, they were operating in over thirteen states (and in 
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particular the states of Michoacán and Guerrero).136 Independent militia forces have 
a long history in Mexico, and often aid the government in problematic areas near 
borders.137 Despite being politically expedient and occasionally a useful tool to 
maintain law and order, these groups have often expanded beyond their initial remit, 
becoming vectors for organised crime and extortion. Since the 2010s they have also 
contributed, along with cartel activity, to the idea of Mexico as a failed state.138  
Dilution is apparent in this process whereby the central government has tolerated 
rogue groups to perform security work, up to a point at which there are reclaimed by 
the central government, and their most extreme activities curbed. Thus, the 
administration of Felipe Calderón was largely tolerant of both vigilante and 
Autodefensa groups, whereas Peña Nieto has tempered their worst behaviour by 
taking on their organisational structures, which usually consist of poorly trained and 
amateur personnel, and replacing the senior figures in these groups with those who 
have government and leadership experience.139 The overall treatment of rogue actors 
such as the Autodefensa groups can therefore be interpreted as a form of dilution, 
where many were pulled back into the political process rather than prosecuted. 
Importantly, this has occurred with little regard for legal process. For instance, 
Michael Hoopes stated that ‘vigilante groups in the violence-prone state of 
Michoacán [were] gain[ing] official approval by the government’.140 This can be 
combined with widespread evidence that many of these groups were involved in 
extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses, including against government forces, 
which stood in direct conflict with Mexico’s public foreign and security policy 
posture.141 
This type of response has also occurred concerning the broader drug war, during 
periods of the so-called ‘Pax Narcotica’. This existed under the PRI, and was, 
according to Adam Morton, a ‘compact between the traffickers loosely affiliated to 
the Sinaloan drug lords and the state-organised system of patronage and corporatism 
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linked to the ruling PRI’.142 Moreover, while the US was aggressive in areas such as 
Colombia under the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, 
Mexico avoided US confrontation by simply demonstrating a will to fight drugs, 
rather than meeting any performance metrics.143 In essence, the central government 
diluted drug cartels and treated them as rogue actors, pulling them to the centre 
where they could shape their impact by engaging with them in limited ways. Indeed, 
it was only with the election of Calderón in 2005 that the Pax Narcotica policy was 
abandoned, with the effect that drug related violence escalated rapidly. 
Even then, the strategy used after 2006—the so-called ‘kingpin’ strategy—involved 
a great deal of political theatre, as it created easily identifiable ‘successes’ that would 
appease audiences both domestically and abroad. The kingpin strategy had a dual 
purpose, acting as a public relations exercise for both the domestic and international 
audience (and especially in the US) to provide clear and visible examples of ‘action’. 
Here, the PAN administrations targeted high profile leaders (‘kingpins’) for arrest, in 
contrast to the détente between traffickers under the PRI throughout the 1990s. It 
focused on the arrest of prominent cartel leaders, and a focus on violent activities 
such as executions, torture and kidnapping as public safety campaign, rather than 
drug trafficking itself.144 
Later, in 2012, Peña Nieto initially criticised the kingpin strategy used by Fox and 
his successor Calderón, but quickly resumed the strategy due to its positive optics in 
the ‘war on drugs’.145 It led to the capture of key leaders, including the head of Los 
Zetas, Miguel Ángel Treviño Morales (widely known as Z40), and Sinaloa leader 
Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán. Nonetheless, in 2013, Patrick Corcoran commented 
that the security landscape looked ‘strikingly similar to the way Felipe Calderón left 
it eight months ago’.146 Furthermore, critics of the kingpin strategy have suggested 
that the technique helped obfuscate the extent to which the cartels were embedded in 
Mexican security politics, and that this ultimately led to a wider and more diversified 
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set of criminal organisations.147 In fact, Don Winslow has argued that the Mexican 
government decided to ‘pick a winner’ in the drug war in order to give the central 
government some influence in their behaviour.148 Similarly, a NPR news 
investigation asked whether Mexico’s drug war was a ‘rigged’ fight.149 The BBC 
also alleged intelligence links between the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives (ATF), the Mexican government and the Sinaloa Cartel, which 
provided information on rivals.150 In all versions of this story, the Sinaloa Cartel was 
deemed the preferable victor. Hence, the drug conflict, which peaked in 2011, began 
to decline in 2012 after the election of Peña Nieto. This occurred after he prioritised 
policing crimes that affected civilians and legitimate businesses, rather than the 
militarized approach of Calderón and Fox—despite the fact his policy left the core of 
the cartels organisational structures largely intact.151 
The removal of symbolic leaders demonstrated that the optics of the drug war are 
important, as it has been an issue that has threatened to penetrate US debates, and 
therefore wider US threat perceptions in respect to Mexico. This was apparent during 
the 2016 US election campaign when Donald Trump exploited crude stereotypes 
about Mexican immigrants as drug traffickers, and after his election issued an 
executive order to construct a US-Mexican border wall, despite critics claiming this 
would be both ineffectual and costly.152 Nonetheless, privately, Mexico has ranked 
highly in the concerns of US strategic planners: not because of immigration, but 
because of organised crime. This was demonstrated by the Joint Operating 
Environment (JOE) ‘Future Trends’ report, produced by the US Department of 
Defense in 2008, that stated that in the near future: 
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‘the growing assault by the drug cartels and their thugs on the Mexican 
government over the past several years reminds one that an unstable Mexico 
could represent a homeland security problem of immense proportions to the 
United States’.153  
It continued: 
‘In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, 
two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden 
collapse: Pakistan and Mexico’.154 
This means that privately the US has been blunt about intervening in Mexico if it 
affects its national interest. For example, an earlier 1996 US military briefing 
paper—INSCOM SCG 90-01—considered the deployment of troops in the face of 
Mexican instability.155 Similarly, in 2011, US Under Secretary of the Army, Joseph 
Westphal, speaking about increasing narco violence, claimed that the cartels 
constituted an insurgency, and that he did not wish ‘to have to send [US troops] 
across the border’.156 
Overall, the evidence here suggests that dilution is important in the Mexican case 
because drawing actors to the centre seems the default response. In contrast, dilution 
in Australia can be interpreted as a ‘last resort’ to rein in rogue actors. Turkey 
provides a better comparison via its use of Kemalism, which demonstrates 
similarities to the role of Mexican nationalism. But both have had the duty of 
removing broad ideological positions and replacing them with a clear set of 
‘boundaries’ in which to operate. Even here, though, the Turkish population’s 
acceptance of the role of the military has meant that crude dilution through banning 
and jailing actors has been a common occurrence. In contrast, Mexico has used the 
party system, corporatism and the embrace of actors outside the legal framework to 
dilute fringe discourses. 
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Inflation 
Inflation is more opaque in Mexico when compared to the other cases. Unlike 
Australia and Turkey, Mexico has less of a need to promote threats that are distant. 
This is because of its geopolitical position, where the US is a clear hegemon. Indeed, 
this leads to the paradox where one of the central inflated discourses with Mexico is 
about the US itself. This is problematic given it is also Mexico’s de facto security 
guarantor. As the prior section on deflection demonstrated, Mexican security and 
foreign policy elites have resorted to splitting discourses about the US into two 
arenas. One deals with ‘high’ security issues, which are largely handled privately by 
foreign and security policy elites, and the other occurs where broader antagonisms 
linked to the US’s treatment of Mexico are filtered into diffuse discourses. Inflation 
follows a similar theme because Mexican elites are unable to dilute or deflect all 
discourses about the US. Hence, there is a preference to inflate vague, benign and 
unfocused narratives concerning the US that are unlikely to be actualised and create 
existential problems. 
In fact, the inflation of some US narratives is necessary because considerable anti-
American (and some anti-European) sentiment still exists within Mexican society.157 
This stems from the experience of Mexico losing territory in the nineteenth century 
to the US, leaving what Julia Sweig terms a ‘pocket of visceral anti-
Americanism’.158 For Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, this has created a 
‘legacy of anti-Americanism’, as the result of US military actions in Mexico over the 
past one hundred and seventy years,159 with the result being the ‘institutionalisation 
of historical memories of American wrongs’.160 
This is visible in the literature as far back as the 1950s where Norman Humphrey 
described how cultural rather than political differences dominated the inflated 
narratives about anti-Americanism. Politicians were publicly and ‘instinctively’ anti-
gringo161 at a cultural level, as demonstrated by the popularity of the narrative 
concept of La Raza (‘the race’). The differentiating point of La Raza was 
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popularised by the writer and philosopher José Vasconcelos, who identified Mexico 
as the centre and home to a unique mixed race, incorporating aboriginal, European 
and African peoples.162 This painted actors (cartoonishly) with predominantly 
European ancestry, and most specifically the US, as overly materialist and 
capitalistic.163 Hence, when La Raza was invoked it was a way of protecting 
Mexican nationalism by avoiding the embrace of US culture.164 Importantly, it is in 
this space where much anti-Americanism persists, with few public contests on 
distinct political policies, and instead contests targeting symbolism and perceived 
attempts at cultural hegemony. Yet as Humphrey noted, in other areas including 
intellectual, educational and economic sectors, there is ‘amazing good will to the 
country’, informed by close proximity to the US.165 
We can see this dichotomy in the treatment of senior US officials in the region, 
whom have been subjected to trivial tabloid treatment by the Mexican media, but 
with little high-level scrutiny about the wider US strategic position. For example, 
during the 1980s Ronald Reagan appointed the actor John Gavin as Ambassador to 
Mexico. Mocking descriptions of him as a ‘gringo’ stereotype were not helped by 
the fact he was well known for advertising a popular brand of rum in Mexico.166 In 
one instance a newspaper decried him as a ‘pot-smoking gringo tourist who 
smuggled cocaine’.167  
Jeffrey Davidow was US Ambassador during the period of transition between the 
PRI and PAN during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Again, media scrutiny of his 
role focussed on sensationalism rather than policy. In one case Davidow remarked 
how a simple private joke overheard at Independence Day celebrations was 
reinterpreted as an insult to the Mexican fight for independence, with La Jornada 
lamenting ‘the lack of respect that the U.S. gives a traditional speech by the weak 
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president of a subordinate nation.’168 Davidow later added that he was ‘a target for 
malicious reporters, hostile editors, and editorial cartoonists who greeted the advent 
of a six-foot, six-inch overweight gringo ambassador as a gift equal to a lifetime’s 
supply of free crayons’.169 This supplemented a wider narrative, in which Joseph 
Contreras has claimed the ‘mainstream press [has] continued to function as a vehicle 
for lingering anti-American sentiment’.170 
Yet the inflation of cultural aspects has meant that their existential impact on 
security is minimal. Furthermore, attempts to invoke anti-American sentiment are 
rarely actualised outside of broad caricatures and sensationalist hyperbole. From this 
position, Pamela K. Starr has argued that public mentions of foreign policy in 
Mexico are generally superficial and have ‘developed into a favoured tool for 
demonstrating the government’s revolutionary credentials’.171 
The split between public and private responses about anti-Americanism was also 
noted in Samuel Huntington’s original ‘Clash of Civilisations’ article. Within he 
described a 1991 conversation with a senior advisor to President Gortari, where the 
advisor 
‘described at length to me all the changes the Salinas government was 
making. When he finished, I remarked: “That's most impressive. It seems to 
me that basically you want to change Mexico from a Latin American country 
into a North American country.” He looked at me with surprise and 
exclaimed: “Exactly! That's precisely what we are trying to do, but of course 
we could never say so publicly.”’172 
On the other hand, critics might argue that this type of inflation risked increasing the 
chance of US interference in the US. But this is not the case according to Mario 
Ojeda, who states that: 
‘The United States recognises and accepts Mexico’s need to dissent from US 
policy in everything that is fundamental for Mexico, even if it is important 
but not fundamental for the United States. In exchange, Mexico cooperates in 
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everything that is fundamental or merely important for the United States, 
though not for Mexico’.173 
Consequently, these discourses provide an important function of splitting and 
redirecting problematic narratives ripe for exploitation within Mexico. Castañeda 
himself summarised this phenomenon: 
‘Mexico’s nationalism can be defined through anti-Americanism, [and] 
creates a brutal national schizophrenia. […] On the one hand, the immense 
majority of this country’s population has a direct, personal, immediate 
interest in having a good relationship with the United States, and at the same 
time it is being asked to be anti-American’.174 
The result is that Mexican society thrives on abstract nationalism designed to 
maintain cultural symbols rather than focussing on issues that actually affect the 
national interest.175 In the end, anti-Americanism is not about the US per se, and 
therefore not perceived as a threat by US security and foreign policy planners. It is 
simply a domestic discourse that functions to give constituents an outlet for 
grievances in a way that needs no existential response in foreign or security policy. 
Aside from anti-Americanism, and despite Mexico’s isolationist norms, Mexicans 
have prioritised globally-focused problems that require deep engagement with the 
outside world as security threats. For instance, the 2010-2011 The Americas and the 
World report from CIDE (the last time this survey was published) showed global 
warming adjudged to be the number two security threat by Mexicans.176 For the sake 
of comparison, in a US poll taken in the same year by Gallup, global warming 
ranked eighth, behind issues like terrorism and federal debt.177 Meanwhile, the 
highest-ranking foreign policy objective according to the Mexican survey was drug 
                                                 
173 Mario Ojeda, Alcances Y Límites de La Política Exterior de México (Ciudad de México: Colegio de México, 
1976), 93, cited in ; Jorge Dominquez, “Mexico’s New Foreign Policy,” in Bridging the Border: Transforming 
Mexico-U.S. Relations, ed. Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Jesús Velasco (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1997), 184. 
174 Andres Oppenheimer, “Drop Anti-American Stance, Mexico’s Foreign Minister Says,” The Miami Herald, 
November 21, 2002. 
175 Ibid. 
176 González González and Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, The Americas and the World 2010-
2011, 69. 
177 Gallup, “Federal Debt, Terrorism Considered Top Threats to U.S.,” Gallup.com, last modified June 4, 2010, 
accessed November 16, 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/139385/Federal-Debt-Terrorism-Considered-Top-
Threats.aspx. 
243 
 
trafficking.178 The same survey revealed that Mexico also had the second-highest 
level of support for a generic international court (behind Ecuador) and broad support 
for globalisation and foreign investment. Some 43 percent viewed globalisation as 
good, 16 percent were neutral, and 28 percent saw globalisation as bad.179 For 
Aleman, this is the result of leaders ‘redeeming their domestic lacks by endorsing 
and defending noble causes in the international arena.’180 
In a related poll, 75 percent of respondents had a favourable view of the UN, and a 
majority (60 percent) favoured Mexican participation in peacekeeping missions.181 
This occurred despite Mexico being severely restricted in its ability to send 
peacekeepers due to its constitutional. Indeed, Mexico’s total peacekeeping 
commitment under the Peña Nieto administration has been twelve soldiers deployed 
across three operations: in Western Sahara, Haiti and Lebanon.182 
Another technique that has emerged in Mexico since the 1980s that mirrors the 
Australian case is the inflation of security rhetoric about immigrants. In Mexico, this 
is focused on immigrants from Central America. Fear of immigrants is easily 
exploited in a country where the domestic population, overall, has few interactions 
with foreigners: some 75 percent of Mexicans have never travelled outside of the 
country, and 80 percent have no daily contact with foreigners of any type.183 Anti-
immigrant sentiment usually targets Salvadoran, Honduran and Guatemalans 
immigrants.  
From a security position, political exploitation of these people presents little risk of 
blowback for Mexico. El Salvador and Honduras share no direct border with 
Mexico. Honduras has a military budget of USD$200 million and a nominal GDP of 
USD$20 billion (compared to $11 billion and $1 trillion respectively for Mexico). 
Further South, El Salvador has a similar capability with a military budget of 
USD$150 million and a nominal GDP of USD$28 billion. Guatemala is slightly 
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larger, given its shared border with Mexico and a GDP of USD$53 billion, but its 
military is underfunded with a 2015 budget of USD$274 million.184 
Consequently, while the official discourse of elites ‘may appear surprisingly 
antiracist’, Mexican politics is infused within a coded framework that mirrors 
Australia’s treatment of immigrants of Eastern heritage, and Turkey’s treatment of 
the Kurds.185 For example, President Vicente Fox invoked subtle racism by claiming 
that ‘Mexican migrants do jobs “that not even blacks want to do”’.186 Teun Dijk also 
identified the undercurrent of racism inherent in Mexico during interviews with the 
upper middle class in Mexico City, who identified mestizos (those having indigenous 
heritage) as ‘“superstitious”, “people who do not to work”, “lazy”, “savages”, 
“uncivilized people” and “backward”’. 187 Similar attitudes were visible during the 
release of stamps in 2005 that depicted the character ‘Memin Pinguin’, which fit 
many of the racist stereotypes of dark-skinned people seen in the US in the 1940s.188 
In defending the stamps, Vincente Fox claimed they were a ‘celebration of Mexican 
culture’.189 
These sentiments assist in shifting discontent concerning security linked to cartels, 
especially in the South, to the indigenous people in poorer states such as Chiapas and 
Guerrero. The inflation of scapegoat groups makes sense (even if it is ethically 
dubious) when viewed in the context of internal crime as a core security issue. Here, 
crime and law and order was rated as a ‘very big problem’ problem by 81 percent of 
respondents top a 2013 Pew survey, compared to terrorism at 59 percent.190 
Vilification of Central American people therefore provides a way to shift public 
security concerns into different domains, despite the fact that Mexican corruption 
and crime is primarily driven by domestic forces.  
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This increasingly hostile view of immigrants correlates with the drug war, but 
contrasts with Mexico’s traditionally progressive approach to immigration and 
dissidents. For instance, in 1980, during the height of the Guatemalan conflict, 
Mexico took in 46,000 Guatemalans via ‘mass’ protections.191 Yet by 2013, the 
number of immigrants granted refugee status was only 300 out of 100,000.192 
Visible xenophobia has emerged in areas such as Lecheria, which sits at the start of 
the main train route, pejoratively termed ‘La Bestia’ or ‘the Beast’: a popular route 
for immigrants moving from the Southern border. A Washington Office on Latin 
America (WOLA) report found various signs targeting immigrants, including one 
that read ‘if we catch you robbing or abusing people, we are going to lynch you’.193 
Most immigrants aspire to reach the US, but exploitation and gang activity along 
these routes means that success is now less likely. And although this only represents 
a small percentage of the population, it has resulted in it wide anti-immigration 
sentiment. A CIDE survey in 2011 showed that 60 percent of Mexican’s supported 
the idea of deporting all illegal immigrants, while 21 percent supported the idea of a 
wall on the southern Mexican border.194 
This has occurred despite Guatemalan labour being central to Mexico’s agricultural 
economy. In fact, it has meant that illegal immigration was tolerated until the 1980s, 
and even sometimes encouraged.195 Yet with the changing security environment 
during the Central American crisis, immigrants became a scapegoat when tackling 
security issues. For example, the director of the Migration service Diana Torre 
Acieniega was outspoken (and wrong) when she blamed all of Mexico’s social 
problems on refugees,196 leading to the expulsions of Guatemalans in 1981 and 
1983.197At the same time, inflation of the immigration threat occurred alongside the 
genuine security problems posed by sixty-eight incursions by Guatemalan ‘kabiles’ 
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across the border from 1980 to 1983.198 In this instance, the central government was 
hesitant to blame the Guatemalan state directly for the incursions, and instead 
inflated the threat of immigration in order to permit the deportation of people who 
were deemed capable of mobilizing a leftist movement in the South. 
There have been additional security motives for Mexico redirecting sentiment about 
immigration. One was that the state oil company PEMEX’s operations had 
discovered potential reserves in the 1980s of 1.5bn barrels in Chiapas.199 It also 
bordered the state of Veracruz that encompassed the Cantrell Oil Field. For a time it 
was delivering the second-biggest output in the world, with over 2 million barrels 
per day.200 
The removal of immigrants has therefore become a way of signalling to domestic 
audiences that something is being ‘done’. This included a second wave of 
deportations in 1990, when 126,000 immigrants were expelled from Mexico. More 
recently, the Southern Frontier Programme has had a similar motive. Under Peña 
Nieto Mexico deported 92,889 Central Americans between October 2014 and April 
2015, a figure that was double the previous year.201 
Yet many of the deportations are effectively empty gestures. Most Salvadorians 
deported just across Guatemala’s border have the knowledge they can easily 
return.202 Thus the policing figures are improved on paper, while the inflated risk of 
immigrants persists, with the same people being expelled and then returning. 
Another way that immigrants are exploited within domestic debates is by providing 
an easy target to internal security forces to demonstrate ‘action’. Here, authorities 
will frequently arrest immigrants falsely to boost crime clearance rates.203 Overall, 
the inflation of immigration provides a convenient way for Mexican elites to absolve 
themselves of serious domestic problems, while building an outsider narrative 
concerning weaker groups. Anti-Guatemalan, anti-Honduran and anti-Salvadorian 
sentiments are also issues that have little potential for blowback from North 
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America, because there is a general perception that Mexico is a target of racism—
especially from the US—rather than an instigator of it itself. 
Consequently, the inflation of immigration as a core threat to Mexico has an 
important security function since it melds together two threats, and provides 
convenient scapegoats with implications for elites. Of course, there are substantial 
human rights concerns that sit alongside this interpretation, and vulnerable 
immigrants have become part of a broader currency of violence between cartels and 
the state. This has resulted in several horrific massacres, including the August 2010 
mass murder of seventy-two migrants.204 And, problematically, the inability of 
illegal migrants to seek legal recourse and fear of deportation makes this position 
even more exploitable. 
The overarching theme in the Mexican case therefore is that vague types of inflation 
are preferred. Notably, nationalism is inflated, and anti-American sentiment is 
unfocused. There is also evidence that Mexicans are largely uninterested in 
international topics, which contributes to these trends. According to The Americas 
and the World 2010-2011 public opinion report, ‘in general, Mexicans pay little 
attention to questions related to national or global affairs’.205 For example, 70 
percent of Mexicans could name their local authority, a much higher figure than 
those who had ‘never heard of’ regional leaders including Cuban leader Raul Castro 
(44 percent) and former Brazilian President Lula da Silva (63 percent).206 This 
suggests that deflection and dilution are preferred in the Mexican case, and that a 
lack of specifics and low information about international issues to reinforce these 
processes. This includes the inflation of an historical humiliation narrative about 
anti-Americanism, rather than a focus on ‘hard’ security challenges.  
Analysis and Implications 
As with the first two cases, the framework when applied to Mexico reveals 
interesting differences between public and private responses to security. In line with 
the findings of the previous two chapters, the account here suggests that Mexican 
foreign policy and security elites have reordered the way they present domestic 
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discourses. Moreover, in the Mexican case, high levels of risk aversion about 
invoking issues concerning the US have resulted in a highly conservative approach 
to foreign and security policy, and one that is poorly communicated to domestic 
audiences. The upshot is that Mexican foreign policy is based on autarkic principles 
rather than internationalisation, and that this stems from a long ‘healing process’ 
whereby it is still recovering from the effects of the Mexican revolution and 
interventions from its Northern neighbour.207  
Another important factor has been Mexico’s strong nationalistic narratives, and how 
this has interfaced with leftist values that align more closely to a Latin American 
sphere of influence, rather than a North American orientation. But despite this 
rhetoric, there is little evidence to suggest elites have acted on these narratives 
privately. Hence, Mexican leaders have inflated benign issues such as anti-gringoism 
or globalist concepts with little scope for resolution, because they present very little 
risk of antagonising their main security competitor: the US. 
However, one important difference with respect to the other two cases is Mexico’s 
domestic security situation, due to widespread corruption and crime. While Turkey 
has internal security problems, Mexico’s drug cartels have contributed to violence 
and deaths on a similar scale to conflicts in the Middle East, and which should have 
attracted substantial international attention. This is puzzling, as this topic should be 
exploitable by entrepreneurs within the US. In this sense, geography should increase 
the visibility of the drug war in the US, but here the opposite seems true.  
Processes of deflection, dilution and inflation provide one explanation for this 
paradox, and the application of the framework above shows how Mexican elites have 
pragmatically engaged with criminal and vigilante elements as required, while also 
inflating vague concepts of nationalism to obscure the deep security problems facing 
the country. From this position, as David Mares has pointed out, there are increased 
risks for a middle power that sits between weak and powerful states.208 Thus, for 
Mexico, its middle power position puts it in the ‘firing line of a great power.’209 In 
short, superpower proximity seems to be a more important variable in the Mexican 
case than for either Turkey or Australia. 
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The thesis’ typology also provides explanations of why Mexican instability is 
viewed as a relatively benign issue by US domestic audiences. For example, in a 
2014 Pew Research report of US public perception, Islamic extremism, 
cybersecurity, an Iranian nuclear program and North Korea’s nuclear program were 
viewed as the top global concerns to United States citizens.210 In contrast, Mexico 
did not rate a mention in the top ten foreign policy issues. The focus on the US here, 
at the expense of other regional security concerns may seem exaggerated, but it is 
important to restate that one of Mexico’s core security interests is to avoid 
antagonising Washington. In this respect, US attitudes towards Mexico are critical 
and revolve around two perceived threats: immigration and drugs.  
From this position, Mexican attempts to mitigate problematic narratives emerging 
from the country seem to be working. The Mexican Drug War ranks as one of the 
most serious security challenges worldwide of the past decade. Ciudad Juarez was 
more violent than Baghdad for the second half of the 2000s, while over 100,000-
drug war related deaths have occurred since 2006.211 At the height of the drug war, 
there were 11,753 conflict-related deaths a year, in contrast to 5,132 in Iraq.212 At 
each conflict’s respective peak (2006 in Iraq and 2008 in Mexico) there were 12,284 
Mexican deaths213 and 29,113 deaths in Iraq related to conflict.214 This results in a 
problematic domestic environment, where Mexico ranks ninety-fifth out of 167 
states in 2015 Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, below 
countries such as Egypt and Mali.215 Yet the Mexican drug war (at least until the 
election of Donald Trump in late 2016) was largely a peripheral issue to Americans 
when compared to the place of Middle Eastern terrorism in domestic debates. The 
conclusion is that Mexico’s elites have successfully blurred debates harmful to the 
national interest. 
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From a theoretical perspective, this chapter has also shown the effects of Mexico 
political centrism and rich executive powers. Here, the semi-authoritarian nature of 
the presidency allows decisive decision making that maximises power because 
leaders are not beholden to their internal audiences. They do not need to ‘sell’ their 
message as they can more easily mobilise the assets of the state in line with foreign 
policy objectives. This has historically been beneficial to the US as the concentration 
of power and corporations within a few small elite Mexican cliques meant that the 
US could use its considerable economic influence to manipulate foreign policy 
without needing to resort to more extreme forms of interventionism as experienced 
elsewhere. 
As a result, the framework presented in this thesis provides a number of useful 
answers. It helps explain why Mexican political culture is dominated by several anti-
American narratives built around unfair treatment, yet also explains why these have 
little impact on Mexico’s security and foreign policy, which remains non-
interventionist and isolationist. It also explains the pragmatic security responses 
within Mexico about contentious issues such as the drug war, Autodefensas and the 
Zapatistas uprisings. Substantial concessions to these groups across different 
administrations demonstrates that elites have had few ethical or moral qualms in 
engaging groups outside of normal political processes as required, especially if they 
view them as problematic to Mexico’s wider security position. 
It also explains Mexico’s ability to maintain good relations with US antagonists, 
including Cuba, while also successfully navigating a set of issues that have caused 
security problems for other smaller states in the region, such as Nicaragua, 
Guatemala and El Salvador. Finally, it explains paradoxical public opinion towards 
security and foreign policy issues, despite the deep problems within Mexican society 
that in many states would be ripe for exploitation. Despite ongoing violence and only 
moderate economic gains, some 48 percent of Mexican respondents agreed with the 
government’s performance on foreign and security policy issues (with 39 percent 
against) in Las Americas y el Mundo 2010.216 Overall, this suggests that regardless of 
political will, Mexican foreign policy is subservient to the external security 
environment, which is centred on the US. Indeed, given Mexico’s increasing 
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pluralism, the only real way to ‘sell’ change to an audience is through the inflation, 
dilution and deflation of specific and problematic issues.  
In this context, Mexico has a more restricted set of discursive tools available to it 
than Australia or Turkey. Again, we can attribute this to proximity. Proximity to the 
US offers many obstacles to pursuing an independent foreign and security policy 
detached from Washington’s core objectives. Of course, the same can be said for 
Australia, as it has followed US security policy closely for nearly seventy years. But 
Australia’s isolation, both geographically and culturally provides a façade of 
independence while presenting little challenge to US interests. Conversely, Mexico’s 
proximity to the US and its cultural differences mean that troublesome domestic 
narratives can be exploited within both the US and Mexico. One prominent example 
is the treatment of Mexico as a populist tool by President Trump, whose election 
campaign invoked hollow stereotypes of Mexicans as ‘bad hombres’217 and 
suggested a 20 percent tariff on Mexican goods.218 These proclamations can have a 
severe existential threat to Mexico’s national interest, and their exploitation by 
Trump is a stark demonstration of the vulnerability of Mexican security to rogue 
discourses. 
Chapter Conclusion and Implications for Middle Power study 
This final case has examined how Mexican security and foreign policy elites have 
managed their difficult place in international affairs. As with the previous cases, 
there is evidence that domestic elites are acutely aware of how rhetoric can affect 
security outcomes, and when problematic discourses arise, they are either deflected 
or diluted. Elsewhere, themes, such as vague anti-Americanism and unjustified 
concerns about immigration are conveniently inflated in ways that do not intersect 
with Mexico’s core security concerns. Furthermore, the Mexican case demonstrates 
that despite Mexico’s large size, and middle power credentials, it is largely a passive 
actor in international relations. 
This has wider implications for the study of Mexico in a middle power context as it 
addresses and contests the emphasis on scholarship grounded in international 
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political economy and domestic level variables. As mentioned on page sixty-eight, a 
study by Mariano Bertucci found that only 0.5 percent of US-Mexican scholarship 
used structural factors as a way to understand Mexican security.219 As a result, the 
research here provides a novel structural interpretation of how Mexico manages its 
position as a middle power. Furthermore, this chapter challenges the dominant 
normative and institutional approaches to middle powers such as Mexico, which is 
widely theorised, and continues to be, including recent work by J. Mo and Mo 
Jongryn220 and Jorge A. Schiavon and Diego Domínguez.221 
Consequently, the neoclassical realist position advanced here provides a new account 
of Mexico’s approach to international affairs through a middle power lens, where the 
primary reason for Mexico’s security passivity is the presence of the US and the 
weak potential for the formation of a credible sub-regional balancing coalition 
against the US. Attempts at balancing have emerged, but these are problematic for 
Mexico as its geography would place it at the vanguard of any such effort. The result 
is a foreign and security policy that appeases the leftist states of Latin America, 
while never presenting an existential threat to the US. 
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 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
The general hypothesis presented at the beginning of this thesis—that common 
behaviours and responses are visible within middle powers in pivotal positions—has 
been tested over the last three chapters. This final chapter takes the analysis from the 
cases presented in Chapters Three, Four and Five. In summarising my findings I 
show how they generate a theory about middle powers in pivotal positons. I also 
discuss the limitations of the framework and suggests future directions for research. 
At this point, it is useful to restate the research question, which is: 
How can we explain and reconcile the differences between foreign and 
security policy responses to security challenges and public discourse 
concerning those challenges in pivotal middle powers? 
My simple answer is that middle powers act largely in accordance with structural 
pressures. But, in order to meet these pressures, elites rearrange domestic discourses 
to deliver pragmatic foreign and security policy. And since middle powers have little 
agency in respect to the wider security positions, it is better to describe pivotal 
middle powers as status quo states that are reactive rather than proactive in 
international affairs. 
Theory Generation Revisited 
At the beginning of this thesis, I provided seven points, as outlined by Stephen Van 
Evera on what a theory should be, and what it should achieve.1 These were: 
1. Explanatory power  
2. Parsimony 
3. Satisfaction 
4. Clear framing  
5. The theory is falsifiable 
6. Explains important phenomena 
7. Prescriptive richness 
Revisiting these questions after the case chapter helps to conclude this thesis and 
provide context to the findings. 
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First, this thesis has demonstrated explanatory power. In the Turkish case, it 
provided an explanation for changes in Turkey’s foreign and security policy and the 
correlating domestic responses, which is an issue that has vexed recent scholarship. 
In the Australian case, the thesis demonstrated that there is consistency in foreign 
policy and that changes in the external environment are the catalyst for changing 
discourses on security, rather than the other way around. Mexico’s consistency in 
foreign and security policy since the early twentieth century was also explained by a 
highly centralised political system that attempts to pull rogue voices to the centre of 
debates in order to avoid changes to foreign and security policy that could antagonise 
its neighbour, the US. In each case, harmful ideas were managed by elites and those 
privy to state security matters to minimise the effect of rogue discourses impacting 
on—and intervening—in foreign and security policy making. 
These findings provide the thesis with exploratory range and power. As laid out in 
Chapter Two, it has demonstrated at a theoretical level that when the intervening 
variable (external security pressures) changes the independent variable (foreign and 
security policy), the dependent variable (domestic discourse) follows. Hence, at the 
simplest level it allows for casual inference between great power activities and how 
middle powers, who have weaker material positions, respond. And, as the thesis has 
shown, when great power security dynamics have changed, these pivotal middle 
powers have changed their foreign and security policies to suit. This creates the 
burden of selling these changes to domestic audiences by using a combination of 
deflection, dilution and inflation. This explains how the pivotal middle powers of 
Australia, Turkey and Mexico have maintained their security positions, despite 
occupying problematic geographical positions.  
Within this wider set of explanations, the thesis also provides a highly granular set of 
explanations of how pivotal middle powers achieve this by giving examples of elites 
reordering discourses in order to ameliorate security issues. Furthermore, it has also 
explained why middle powers must be careful of the impact of their rhetoric, as this 
can quickly become the focus of ideational entrepreneurs. Here, deflection and 
dilution are critical ways of removing problematic discourses from the public 
agenda.  
Inside each case, certain examples stood out as being particularly instructive of these 
tendencies. In the Australian case, I demonstrated how the Chinese media will use 
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Canberra as a proxy for grievances about their treatment by the West. In response, 
Australian elites have rarely invoked China in recent domestic political debates. 
Likewise, in Turkey it was apparent that elites have quickly changed their positions 
on topics such as Israel and Russia as changing security dynamics have demanded it. 
This is also why the discourse about Kemalism has been replaced by a new Turkish 
nationalism that once again embraces Islam as a political tool. Consequently, the 
account here has explained how the resurgence of political Islam is not driven by 
ideational factors or the agency of elites, but is instead the result of Ankara adjusting 
to the realities of the new security environment. Finally, the thesis has explained why 
Mexico has rarely been assertive in international affairs, and why its discursive 
antagonism towards the US has not been actualised. In this instance it is the result of 
careful management of discourses concerning the left of the domestic political 
spectrum. 
The account here also presented a parsimonious way of understanding events in each 
of the three cases. By breaking down the study into a typology with fewer variables, 
it has arguably provided a usefully nuanced overview of the way that pivotal middle 
powers behave. Critics may argue that this is too reductionist, and that it invites the 
cherry picking of examples. Yet it is this type of reduction that allows parsimony, 
and is consistent with Van Evera’s argument that parsimonious theories are valuable 
because they use ‘few variables simply arranged to explain [their] effects’.2 Indeed, 
as the literature review suggested, the middle power literature faces the opposite 
problem: the wide scope of positions and ontologies makes it hard to analyse cases 
within widely accepted frameworks. For example, one area where this parsimony 
adds value is in the finding that pivotal middle powers respond in generalised ways 
across three different governmental systems, ranging from a full democracy 
(Australia) to a proto-authoritarian government (Turkey).  
The findings here provide a satisfactory outcome under Van Evera’s criteria, as it 
satisfies our ‘curiosity’ about the phenomena identified.3 In this context, I have 
provided a way of explaining the paradoxes between domestic discourses and 
foreign and security practice across multiple levels of analysis, leaving little 
‘mystery’ on behalf of the reader. This was achieved by process tracing different 
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phenomena through the three cases, from their place in global politics, through to the 
actions of small political actors with little power, but which nonetheless have the 
potential to harm the national interest. More importantly, I have done this within the 
area of middle power, where many accounts are arguably ‘unsatisfying’. Thus, while 
accounts of middlepowerdom are, as David Cooper describes, often ‘parochial’4, the 
account here provides satisfaction by incorporating a range of cases and by inferring 
causation at multiple political levels: international, state and domestic.  
Theoretical satisfaction stems from three important findings. First, the differences 
between the security and foreign practice of middle powers and what their domestic 
constituents prioritise occurs because elites rearrange discourses that they see as 
problematic. Domestic populism is rarely aligned with the realities of international 
security, and therefore management of ideational factors is central to the delivery of 
pragmatic foreign and security policy. Thus, in all three cases, problematic security 
discourses are deflected away from the centre of debates. If smaller actors exploit 
those discourses successfully, they are diluted. Finally, established actors inflate 
discourses that are not central to security to allow a set of safer issues for inevitable 
debates to occur on. 
Second, theoretical satisfaction was found in the assertion that middle powers are 
equally concerned with maintaining the status quo, rather than expanding their 
influence (as the ideational literature suggests). Hence, in the Australian case, there 
is little evidence to suggest that Australia is expansionist in any material form. Even 
in the ideational middle power space, Australian diplomacy is frequently framed as 
signalling designed to appease its alliance partners. And, as Chapter Two 
demonstrated, many middle power initiatives claimed by Australia are underwritten 
by great power support, and usually only succeed when aligned with great power 
interests. For Turkey, similar conclusions can be made, with the evidence in this 
thesis suggesting that Turkey’s ‘pivot’ to the East facilitates the maintenance of a 
status quo, rather than expansionism. Indeed, the account here has argued that 
rhetoric used by the government is simply a way to facilitate necessary changes in 
Turkey’s foreign and security policy. These have been regulated by a set of deeply 
embedded secular norms under Kemalism that required change to adjust to the new 
security dynamics that emerged after the Cold War. In contrast, Mexico’s security 
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environment is much less dramatic, and no radical shifts in its foreign and security 
policy have been required. But a simple, and satisfying answer can be found in its 
proximity to the US, where no credible attempts to balance against the US have 
emerged. This means that despite some changing discourses and internal security 
issues, Mexican foreign and security policy has remained remarkably consistent. 
Attempts to change it, as occurred in 2000 and 2001 after the change of government 
to PAN and the emergence of the Castañeda Doctrine, were quickly diluted. 
Finally, and arguably the most ‘satisfying’ finding is that the changing structure of 
the international system is the most important intervening variable in pivotal middle 
powers and their foreign and security policies. For instance, Australian foreign and 
security policy was largely indistinguishable from that of the UK until the Second 
World War and the US since the 1940s and until the early 2000s. With the rise of 
China, Australia has engaged with Beijing as would be expected: economically and 
diplomatically in a way that hedges against the US and provides a level of 
redundancy should the US revise its role in the region. Importantly, domestic 
rhetoric has played no central role in driving this policy. Rather, Australia is 
responding exactly as expected under a structural reading of international politics. 
Consequently, this thesis’ value comes from adding domestic level variables, and 
from demonstrating how political elites have used certain responses to contain 
domestic sentiment and then sell change as required. 
Similarly, great power politics have shaped Turkish foreign policy, rather than 
domestic agency, despite a plethora of literature claiming the agency of Atatürk and 
Erdoğan have driven Ankara’s approach. Hence, its position as a US ally was (and 
continues to be) not ideational, but pragmatic. And, in common with Australia, 
Turkey is hedging against full commitment to the US and NATO by engaging actors 
within the Middle East and to the North. Furthermore, domestic discourses have 
shifted to topics like Kemalism not because of the agency of elites, but because the 
legacy of Atatürk’s isolationism now constrains the ability of the foreign and 
security policy elite to respond to the new security environment. Thus, the 
resurgence of political Islam in Turkey is not a causal factor, but rather a 
consequence of the changing security environment in which Turkey sits. The 
typology here explains how elites in Ankara have achieved this transition in foreign 
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and security policy at the domestic level: by deflecting, diluting and inflating 
specific issues to align them with the realities of their security environment. 
Finally, Mexico, unlike the other cases, has had no need to substantially change its 
security policy over the past century, and remains a strong US ally. Importantly, 
Mexico’s domestic population has many historical grievances against the US that 
could be exploited, but these are managed by elites through deflection, dilution and 
inflation. The Mexican case therefore provides satisfaction by demonstrating how 
consistency in foreign and security policy occurs despite many domestic incentives 
to act counter-intuitively to the national interest. This leads to dilution enjoying 
primacy in the Mexican case and this provides an alternative explanation of why 
centrism dominates the Mexico’s political institutions, in contrast to the wide left-
right schisms found in other Latin American states to the South. 
The thesis also provides clear framing. The combination of the neoclassical realist 
framework with a typology facilitates this, and the analysis has taken place through a 
consistent basis over each case. In Van Evera’s formulation, this means the thesis 
contains a ‘statement of the antecedent conditions that enable its conditions and 
govern its impact.’5 Thus the examples have been framed within a set of specific 
systemic conditions, where either change or continuity could be expected in foreign 
policy. For Australia and Mexico, continuity has been dominant, and correlated with 
external security environments, resulting in domestic continuity on foreign and 
security policy. In contrast, clear framing of the changes in Turkey’s security 
environment provide a clear context to the changes in domestic discourses. In other 
words, the contextual section of each chapter framed the antecedent conditions, and 
made their use appropriate and in context.  
Clear framing also means that the thesis is falsifiable. This is central to generating 
useful theory, and was identified in Chapter Two as a problem in existing middle 
power research, as well as approaches using critical positions. In this context, 
positivists such as John Mearsheimer have argued that critical theorists see ‘endless 
interpretations of the world around them’ and ‘deny the possibility of objective 
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knowledge’.6 In contrast, the account here allows for the thesis to be tested should 
differing data and trajectories present themselves in the future. 
More specifically, the outcomes presented here are falsifiable when assessed over 
the short-term. For example, the analysis of Mexican foreign and security policy 
using only 2000-2002, or Turkish foreign policy from 2011-2013 can result in 
alternative conclusions. Nonetheless, when viewed over longer periods, as this thesis 
has done, the general trend is that pivotal middle powers behave as would be 
expected: they gradually reorganise their domestic discourses in ways that enables 
elites to address issues that can harm their position within the regional security order.  
At the same time, the thesis remains falsifiable across longer time frames. Indeed, 
the framework is likely to be challenged and either confirmed or debunked by a new, 
richer set of data emerging given the uncertain security environment at the beginning 
of 2017. Notably, Donald Trump has challenged Australia’s traditional alliance with 
problematic rhetoric. Should this persist, there is also the potential for Australia to 
seek out new allies or modify the extent to which it relies on its US partner. In this 
instance, if the thesis holds, we should see attempts to reorder rhetoric to facilitate 
this change in the international order, where leaders in the centre deflect and dilute 
problematic rhetoric while inflating less problematic narratives. From this position, 
the thesis is falsifiable if there is a trend over the coming years where elites in 
pivotal middle powers fail to enact pragmatic foreign and security policy in the 
national interest, despite the emergence of new discursive challenges. This might be 
demonstrated, for instance, by the new focus on ‘fake news’ by the Trump 
administration.7 Even so, if falsified in the future, the thesis will still provide an 
important contribution to the literature allowing scholars to add value by addressing 
any problems with the theory. 
Perhaps most significantly, this thesis explains important phenomena. It has 
explained the phenomenon whereby elites respond paradoxically to security 
challenges, with their public positions often in contrast to their private policy 
responses. Consequently, it explains why they inflate superfluous debates: to obscure 
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issues more pertinent to security planners. In Australia, the most prominent example 
has been the use of xenophobia towards Middle Eastern people, which redirects 
attention away from other problematic targets, most notably China. In Turkey, this 
has occurred via the inflation of first the Kurds as a threat, and now Gülenism, as the 
strategic priorities of Turkey’s elites have changed. Finally, in Mexico, the thesis has 
revealed phenomena whereby anti-American and anti-immigrant sentiment has been 
contained and redirected into more benign areas. 
This leads to the final attribute: prescriptive richness. I argue the thesis has achieved 
this objective. Prescriptive richness allows policy makers to use the outputs of this 
thesis and use them to remedy security challenges. This has been particularly 
beneficial in the Australian setting, where the notion of middle power activism is 
embedded within the foreign policy community.8 It can also be seen to a lesser 
extent in Mexico, which is increasingly embarking down the route of traditional 
‘middle power diplomacy’, but has at times antagonised the US by doing so. What 
this thesis provides is a counter argument to prescriptions based on liberal positions, 
where deep institutional engagement is viewed as central to security.9 Importantly, 
this pessimistic view of middle powers’ security positions gives their policy makers 
the tools to see behind the theatre of public security narratives. For example, there 
are many discussions about the immigration debate harming Australia’s international 
reputation, yet this thesis has demonstrated this type of behaviour (and, indeed 
responses) were actually common across all the cases, and therefore by no means 
unique. This does not excuse the more immediate harm and problems posed by 
xenophobia, but it does provide wider context about the behaviour of elites towards 
the issue. Hence, by providing this new assessment, driven by theory, I hope to 
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temper the rush to inflate and isolate these variables in policy prescriptions without 
exploring their wider context. 
This also informs one more pessimistic conclusion at the centre of this thesis: pivotal 
middle powers ultimately have little control over their fates. Furthermore, attempts 
to assert influence beyond their material capabilities often result in punishment when 
broader systemic forces come into play. This is visible in the Turkish case where 
assertive action on Israel and Russia from Turkish elites has ended in a softening in 
rhetoric when it became apparent that pursuing antagonisms with those states was 
counterproductive. As each respective chapter demonstrated, Turkish elites have let 
attacks dissipate when a pushback occurred. Likewise, in the Mexican case, attempts 
at pursuing an assertive agenda, such as that by Jorge Castañeda as foreign minister 
of Mexico in the early 2000s, were constrained. The takeaway is that middle power 
positions are constantly contingent on the actions of great powers. Pivotal middle 
powers thus reject contentious foreign and security policy: instead they are loyal to 
their security guarantors to engender reciprocity against future threats. This also 
means, that in contrast to a great deal of the ideational middle power literature, the 
impact of pivotal middle powers on the international system is likely to continue to 
be minimal.  
Limitations of the Thesis 
While this research shows promise, several lingering questions require further 
research to adequately address. One area that requires further research is the limits of 
agency in elite decision-making. This is typified by the ‘Hitler’ problem, where an 
individual’s actions can send a nation’s security one way via their own decision 
making.10 International relations theory still struggles with the broad question of 
agency versus structure, but the rise of Recip Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey and the 
election of Donald Trump in the US present interesting challenges about the extent 
of agency. While this thesis has argued that Erdoğan has acted largely within the 
constraints of structural limitations and his behaviour is the result of exploiting 
international opportunities, this is potentially falsifiable. Indeed, it is feasible that 
Erdoğan’s personal ambition could harm state security over the longer-term. Both 
Schweller and Rathbun have addressed the related question of overbalancing and 
                                                 
10 To Schweller, the problem of dictatorships versus structure is (partly) solved by assuming that leaders, such as 
Hitler, ‘let’ rather than ‘make’ things happen. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s 
Strategy of World Conquest, 7. 
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overstretch leading to negative outcomes11, but future research on this area with 
respect to middle powers would be highly informative, as the additional 
‘permissions’ required by middle powers should result in more rational and accurate 
assessments of power as per the arguments presented above. 
Identifying acts of discourse and assigning weight to them also remains a challenge 
for both the positivist and critical approaches to international relations, and 
quantifying and measuring discourse remains a contested activity. The ambiguity of 
language, ideas, and their socially effectiveness remains disputed not only in the 
study on international relations, but also across the study of journalism, 
communications and sociology. Nonetheless, the account here remains robust as it 
can encapsulate future advances in this arena. For example, while this thesis focuses 
on paradoxes between public and private discourses, the same framework could be 
used in quantitative and qualitative content and discursive analysis (or alternatively, 
highly critical interpretations of security), and still provide rich descriptions. For 
example, articles such as Jason Ackleson’s ‘Constructing security on the U.S.-
Mexico border’, which concentrates on the use of rhetoric ‘scripts’ and the problems 
of perception of risks and dangers could be assessed within a wider context and 
within this framework.12  
Similarly, newer research on Turkey would be of benefit. This includes articles such 
as ‘Political orientations, ideological self-categorizations, party preferences, and 
moral foundations of young Turkish voters’ by Onurcan Yılmaz et al., who argue 
that left-right classifications are unsuited to Turkey, and that what constitutes 
‘liberal’ is fluid.13 In this instance, the thesis presented here can assist the 
understanding of positions implemented and enabled by the centre: Turkey’s 
political cleavages have been informed by their security environment and have 
formed around security challenges. Finally, there are many research articles on 
Australian foreign and security policy that could be synthesised with the arguments 
presented here. It could help explain, for example, the hesitancy of Australia to fulfil 
its obligations to the ‘Bali Process’ concerning people smuggling, as highlighted by 
                                                 
11 Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of 
Structural Realism”; Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power. 
12 Jason Ackleson, “Constructing Security on the U.S.–Mexico Border,” Political Geography 24, no. 2 (February 
2005): 165–184. 
13 Onurcan Yılmaz et al., “Political Orientations, Ideological Self-Categorizations, Party Preferences, and Moral 
Foundations of Young Turkish Voters,” Turkish Studies 17, no. 4 (October 1, 2016): 544–566. 
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Melissa Curley and Kahlia Vandyk.14 So, while their conclusion is grounded in a 
policy-level assessment, the thesis here can help understand the barriers and role of 
discourses about immigration within both Australia and Indonesia, and how they 
relate to (and intervene with) the strategic agenda of Canberra within a wider 
strategic and security context. 
Implications of the research: Middle Powers 
The framework here could also be applied to a range of states claimed as middle 
powers. A list might include Iran, Canada, South African, Singapore, Kenya and 
South Korea for both single and comparative analysis. Iran is an excellent future 
case, being highly diverse, and surrounded by intense security pressures. In addition, 
in the Iranian example, the leadership has arguably acted in a way that has 
successfully maintained state security (even if its methods are unpalatable to the 
West). Iran has experienced intense threats from the Soviets, Salafi extremism, a 
strong (at the time) Iraq and the US. At the same time, it has successfully repelled 
these advances through a combination of pragmatic statecraft and inflated religious 
narratives. 
Elsewhere, the framework would benefit from a detailed case on Canada, which 
shares several security commonalities with Mexico in the context of its position next 
to the US. A cursory look at its domestic politics reveals general consistency in 
foreign policy across administrations.15 In the same way that Mexico maintains anti-
US sentiment while also drawing its security from the North, so too does Canada in 
the North. For example, it differentiates itself on populist issues such as climate 
change and its pursuit of middle power activism. Even on contentious issues such as 
Iraq, Canada publicly did not provide military assistance, although it provided 
‘moral’ support.16 But, leaked documents have shown that Canada’s activist rhetoric 
does not always align with its private outlook, and that Ottawa was prepared to 
                                                 
14 Melissa Curley and Kahlia Vandyk, “The Securitisation of Migrant Smuggling in Australia and Its 
Consequences for the Bali Process,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 42–
62. 
15 See Adam Bromke and Kim Richard Nossal, “Tensions in Canada’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 62, no. 2 
(1983): 335–353. 
16 See Brendon O’Connor and Srdjan Vucetic, “Another Mars–Venus Divide? Why Australia Said ‘yes’ and 
Canada Said ‘non’ to Involvement in the 2003 Iraq War,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 5 
(November 1, 2010): 526–548. 
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support the US in Iraq through alternative channels in order to remain in favour with 
the US military.17 
Implications of the research: Neoclassical Realism 
Finally, this thesis has attempted to broaden the value of neoclassical realism as a 
research program in international relations. Currently, much of the neoclassical 
realist literature focuses on great power politics, but its value in a middle power 
setting is less clear. The account here could help advance the theory’s usefulness 
across a wider range of settings. Indeed, it is my claim that the evidence presents 
here provides better scope to describe the actions of states where ideational factors 
are usually given primacy. The framework here gives analysts an alternative and 
rigid framework, to reassess these cases and view them from a different perspective. 
Conclusion 
With the evidence presented and analysed, this thesis has explained the difference 
between responses to security challenges and domestic discourse concerning 
those challenges in pivotal middle powers 
Throughout this thesis I have reconciled several differing perspectives with the hope 
of addressing gaps in the existing literature. I have drawn strongly on the realist 
tradition, combined with an extension of neorealist research programs in the form of 
neoclassical realism. I have claimed that while neoclassical realism currently 
describes the international/domestic nexus in great powers, its descriptive value is 
less valuable in a middle power setting. Consequently, a middle power framework 
outlined here, that builds on the neoclassical realist research program, allows for an 
assessment of the international-domestic nexus in middle powers that sit in pivotal 
positions.  
Interestingly, global security dynamics have changed substantially during the writing 
of this project. Some of these have been incorporated (such as the recent moves in 
Turkey spurred on by the emergence of IS and Russian revisionism), while others 
have not been fully played out (like the role of the Palmer party in Australian 
politics, the re-emergence of One Nation, Russia’s use of so-called ‘hybrid’ 
techniques to disrupt the order of adversaries’ discourse, and, most prominently, the 
                                                 
17 Greg Weston, “Canada Offered to Aid Iraq Invasion: WikiLeaks,” CBC News, last modified May 15, 2011, 
accessed June 3, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/weston-canada-offered-to-aid-iraq-invasion-wikileaks-
1.1062501. 
265 
 
election of Donald Trump in the US and his Jacksonian approach to foreign 
policy).18 But, importantly, the main findings of the thesis are not contradicted by 
these events. In fact, in some ways they have they are enhanced. Notably, the 
revisionism of Russian policy and the emergence of IS have resulted in changes to 
the rhetoric of Turkey’s elites, even while its fundamental security position has 
remained constant. Similarly, Australia has experienced four different Prime 
Ministers during the writing of this thesis, yet Australian foreign and security policy 
remains, for the most part, unchanged. Mexico’s discourses are the most challenging, 
given the aggressive rhetoric from President Trump about the construction of a 
Mexican Wall. But even here, President Peña Nieto’s responses have been measured, 
in contrast to those of former Mexican President’s Vicente Fox, who crudely stated 
on Twitter that ‘Mexico is not paying for that #FuckingWall’.19  
In fact, the next few years will arguably be critical for Mexican foreign and security 
policy. Domestic responses to Trump will be challenging for Mexican elites to 
manage, and the framework here should allow scholars to identify links between the 
domestic discourses about international political topics and their treatment by 
foreign and security policy elites. In other words, it could potentially explain the 
limits of inflation, deflection and dilution. With that said, Mexico is already 
accelerating an FTA with Europe, while Turkey and Mexico have also sped up talks 
concerning an FTA, in an effort to diversify and interact with other middle powers.20 
These moves already suggest that Mexico is looking to hedge against the US in a 
way similar to Turkey and Australia, despite its proximity to the US, as a new post-
American order becomes a possibility.  
In final conclusion, then, the argument here has permitted a rich explanation of: (a) 
the disconnect between domestic ideas and the foreign and security policy of that 
state; (b) how problematic discourse can harm a middle power’s wider security 
position; and (c) demonstrated the way that domestic actors that threaten to amplify 
security threats through poor discourse are handled. Consequently, the ability to 
provide rich analysis about such questions is this thesis’ contribution to knowledge.  
                                                 
18 See Walter Russell Mead, “The Jacksonian Revolt,” Foreign Affairs, January 20, 2017, accessed March 5, 
2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-01-20/jacksonian-revolt. 
19 “Vicente Fox Quesada on Twitter: ‘I’ve Made It Clear, Mexico Is Not Paying for That #FuckingWall. US 
Congress Don’t Get Fooled by @realDonaldTrump. You Can Stop His Maddness.,’” accessed February 6, 
2017, https://twitter.com/VicenteFoxQue/status/827646728325234691. 
20 “Mexico, Turkey to Speed up Talks to Sign Trade Deal,” Reuters, February 3, 2017, accessed February 6, 
2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-turkey-trade-idUSKBN15I2QL. 
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